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I. THE STRUGGLE OVER CASH FLOW
Upon first impression, proceeds of real estate-rents-would appear to be
personal property. These proceeds are initially general intangibles or rent
receivables. Once collected, they are money, checks, or bank
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accounts-exemplars of personal property. Furthermore, rights under a lease
were classically considered mere contractual rights and were a form of
personal property-"chattels real," to use the ancient phrase.'
In many states, the chattel real has been rechristened a real property
interest.2 Even in states where leaseholds are still chattels, Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U. C. C.) excludes security interests on real estate
receivables from its coverage in section 9-104(j), which provides: "This
Article does not apply. . (j) to the creation or transfer of an interest in or
lien on real estate, including a lease or rents thereunder. . .. " Thus, it is
impossible to claim that Article 9 applies to security interests in rent
receivables.4
Prior to "severance" from the real property through collection,' rent
receivables may have been encumbered by a mortgage lien. For that reason,
real property law has jurisdiction over security interests on real estate
receivables. In this respect, rents are like lumber or crops-real property that
becomes personal property through severance. These too can be encumbered
by mortgage liens before they become personal property.6
1. On this ancient status of the leasehold as personal property, see R. Wilson Freyermuth,
Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism in the Bankruptcy Courts: Implications for Reforming
Commercial Real Estate Finance, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1461, 1478-81 (1993).
2. E.g., N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. & R. 105(s) (McKinney 1990).
3. U.C.C. § 9-104(j), 3 U.L.A. 179 (1990) (emphasis added).
4. In re Bristol Assocs., 505 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1974) (Adams, J.) (ruling that Article 9 does
not apply to the assignment of rents). A different problem beyond the scope of this Article is
whether hotel receivables are proceeds of real estate or whether they are pure accounts receivable
to which Article 9 applies. See generally Freyermuth, supra note 1. As part of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Congress recently enacted § 552(b)(2) to establish that hotel receipts are
to be treated as real estate receivables, thereby preempting state law on the question. 11
U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
5. Collection of rent by the debtor is sometimes called the severance of the rents from the
underlying real property. See Julia P. Forrester, A Uniform and More Rational Approach to
Rents as Security for the Mortgage Loan, 46 RUTGERS L. REV. 349, 358 (1993).
6. Professor Forrester, who advocates that § 9-1040) be amended so that Article 9 might
cover security interests on rent receivables, complains that the U.C.C. covers crops, and yet,
before they are severed, crops are just as likely to be encumbered by a mortgage lien,
Accordingly, there is no good reason why rent receivables should not fall within the provisions
of Article 9 as well. See Forrester, supra note 5, at 409-11, In particular, Article 9 coverage
would allow for the separate use of receivables as collateral where the security interest does not
reach the debtor's reversionary interest in real estate. See id. at 415; see also In re Claremont
Towers Co., 175 B.R. 157, 166 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994) (Gindin, J.) (alleging that a security
interest in rents can exist independently from a mortgage on the real estate); Craig H. Averch,
Revisitation of the Fifth Circuit Opinions of Village Properties and Casbeer: Is Post-Petition
"Perfection" of an Assignment of Rents Necessary to Characterize Rental Income as Cash
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RENT RECEIVABLES
The mortgage lien on rent receivables is an important concept in single-
asset real estate bankruptcies-the most common Chapter 11 case in the early
1990s. 7 At stake is the ownership and control of cash flow. A valid security
interest on rent receivables establishes that the secured party owns the cash
flow. An invalid security interest on rent receivables establishes that the
debtor owns the cash flow.
All possible positions have been taken on the question of who owns the
cash flow. The fate of security interests on rent receivables has ranged from
total avoidance on a strong-arm theory' to the remarkable view that a
There is a movement afoot to bring rent receivables directly under Article 9 of the U.C.C.,
thereby ending any distinction between real property proceeds and personal property proceeds.
See Forrester, supra note 5; Freyermuth, supra note 1, at 1536-41; Alexander Rostocki, Jr.,
Perfecting Security Interests in Rents: Article 9 Must be Amended, 24 U.C.C. L.J. 151 (1991);
Comment, An Article Nine Scope Problem-Mortgages, Leases, and Rents as Collateral, 47 U.
COLO. L. Rav. 449, 459-60 (1976).
7. In the early 1990s, these single-asset cases constituted about half of the Chapter 11 docket
of a typical bankruptcy judge. Good Faith: A Roundtable Discussion, 1 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 11, 15-16 (1993) (remarks of Judges Fenning, Greendyke, Hillman, and Mark). A great
many of the most intractable problems in bankruptcy law are generated by the single-asset
bankruptcy, including the classification veto, the bad faith Chapter 11 filing, the new value
exception to the absolute priority rule, and the confusing effect that adequate protection payments
have on the undersecured claim of a real estate financier. See generally John D. Ayer,
Bankruptcy as an Essentially Contested Concept: The Case of the One-Asset Case, 44 S.C. L.
REv. 863 (1993); David Gray Carlson, Adequate Protection Payments and Surrenders of Cash
Collateral in Chapter 11 Cases, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1387 (1994) [hereafter cited as Carlson,
Adequate Protection Payments]; David Gray Carlson, The Classification Veto in Single Asset
Cases Under Bankruptcy Code Section 1129(a) (10), 44 S.C. L. REv. 565 (1993) hereaftercited
as Carlson, Classification Veto]; Michael L. Molinaro, Single-Asset Real Estate Bankruptcies:
Curbing an Abuse of the Bankruptcy Process, 24 U.C.C. L.J. 161 (1991).
8. The bankruptcy trustee's strong arm powers are described in the United States Bankruptcy
Code, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988). According to this provision:
The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without regard
to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor
that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to
such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple
contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor
exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the
commencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to such
credit, an execution against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such time,
whether or not such a creditor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from
the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected,
that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such transfer
at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser
19951 1077
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mortgagee has an absolute interest in rents-not just a security interest in
them. Under the first extreme, the rents are not cash collateral because the
debtor owns them free and clear. In the middle of the spectrum, rents are
considered to be cash collateral or might become so if the secured party
performs the postpetition perfecting ritual contemplated by § 546(b).9 Finally,
at the "absolute assignment" extreme, the rents are, once again, not cash
collateral because the secured party owns them free and clear of the debtor.
The importance of cash flow control can be overestimated. For example,
complete avoidance of the security interest on rent receivables does not imply
that the mortgage lien on the real estate is invalid."0 The secured party still
is entitled to the value of the underlying real estate collateral. Thus, if a
Chapter 11 plan is confirmed over the opposition of the secured party, such
a creditor still is entitled to the present value of the real estate. Value is
determined by computing the present value of future income, as measured
exists.
9. Section 546(b) provides:
The rights and powers of a trustee under section 544, 545, and 549 of this title
are subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of an interest in
property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before
the date of such perfection. If such law requires seizure of such property or
commencement of an action to accomplish such perfection, and such property has not
been seized or such action has not been commenced before the date of the filing of
the petition, such interest in such property shall be perfected by notice within the time
fixed by such law for such seizure or commencement.
11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1988), amendedby Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394,
see. 204, § 546(b), 108 Stat. 4106, 4122 (1994). The meaning of § 546(b) for security interests
on rent receivables is of the utmost importance and is discussed infra in the text accompanying
notes 252-60.
10. Avoidance, according to Craig Averch, "would permit a debtor to limit a creditor's
secured claim under § 506(a) to the value of the land less the value of the income produced
therefrom if the debtor files before the lien is 'created.'" Averch, supra note 6, at 518 n.5. This
particular formulation denies the validity of the security interest on the reversion, because the
security interest on the rent receivables is avoided in bankruptcy. Since sale of the reversion
includes the sale of the existing receivables plus the sale of the potential to earn new rent
receivables, the effect of lien avoidance is not as severe as Averch warns.
4
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from the time the plan is confirmed." The secured party, therefore, will
have all income from the collateral following the plan's confirmation.
Meanwhile, if the security interest is valid and if all or most postpetition
rents are considered cash collateral of the secured party, the possibility of
reorganizing a single-asset real estate firm is by no means terminated. As a
matter of state law and by virtue of Bankruptcy Code § 506(c), cash collateral
must be used to maintain the property. 2 The validity of the security interest
on rent receivables probably implies, however, that the bankrupt entity will
have to find the means to pay the lawyers from new equity investments. All
cash generated in a single-asset real estate case is likely to be cash collateral,
and relatively few courts are willing to find that attorneys' fees in Chapter 11
cases are properly chargeable to secured parties under § 506(c). 3
Equity owners are likely to pay for the chapter 11 proceeding because of
the structure of the typical real estate deal. In such deals, the owner of the
real property is a partnership and the mortgage is nonrecourse. This is so for
11. Because secured parties are typically undersecured in single asset Chapter 11 cases, their
prepetition claims are subdivided into secured and unsecured claims. If the holder of a bifurcated
secured claim votes against the plan, she is entitled to the "cram down" protections of the
Bankruptcy Code. According to § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II),a debtor-in-possessionmay force a cram
down on a secured party if the secured party retains the lien on the collateral and is given
"deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the
effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in such estate's interest
in such property." 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (1988) (emphasis added). Alternatively, the
debtor may sell the collateral free and clear of the security interest and allow the security interest
to attach to the cash proceeds. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1988). The debtor-in-possession
also may give the secured party some "indubitable equivalent" of the above. 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1988). All of these mechanisms guarantee the secured party the value of
the collateral, which, in turn, guarantees the secured party income going forward from the
effective date of the plan.
Thus, in BA Business Credit Corp. v. Di Toro (In re DiToro), 17 B.R. 836 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1982), vacated, 22 B.R. 392 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982), the collateralwas eventually abandoned
before the mortgagee took any perfecting step with regard to the rents. At the later foreclosure
sale, the mortgagee bid in its claim and was the buyer. Judge William King initially decided that
the security interest in the rent receivables was void. But this lack of a security interest on rent
receivables still allowed the mortgagee, as buyer, to collect all rents going forward. Only rents
paid prior to the sale were disencumbered in favor of the bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 837-39. In
a later decision, Judge Kinf reconsidered and decided that the trustee held the collected rents in
constructive possession for the benefit of the mortgagee. DiToro, 22 B.R. at 394.
12. See infra text accompanying note 224. According to § 506(c), "the trustee may recover
from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable, necessary costs and expenses
of preserving, or disposing of, such property to the extent of any benefit to the holder of such
claim." 11 U.S.C. § 506 (c)(1988).
13. A few precedents nevertheless exist. See Douglas L. Furth, et al., Secured Creditors
Playing to Win in a Single-Asset Real Estate Chapter 11 Case: Using 11 U.S. C. § 363, 506(c),
and 1129 to Control a Case by Restricting Payment of the Debtor's Professional Fees From
Collateral, 4 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 177 (1994); David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and
Expenses of Bankruptcy Administration, 70 N.C. L. REv. 417, 484-90 (1992).
5
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tax reasons."4 Because the nonrecourse mortgage claim is by far the largest
debt owed by the partnership, the individual partners are quite likely to be
solvent even though their real estate partnership is under water. Accordingly,
they can well afford to pay the attorneys' fees for the debtor partnership.
Furthermore, should they lose control of the partnership to the lender, the
lender will force a sale resulting in the realization of recapture income.
Because partners are anxious to avoid a tax liability, they often are willing to
pay lawyers, up to the amount of the tax liability, to prevent a foreclosure sale
through a Chapter 11 proceeding.
At the extreme procreditor end of the spectrum, the rents are considered
the sole property of the secured party and not property of the estate within the
meaning of § 541(a). Such an interpretation poses a dire threat to the equity
owners in a debtor partnership, but even here refinancing, however inconve-
nient, is possible. This result raises the cost of reorganization to the equity
owners 5 because they must pay to maintain the property and pay the
lawyers. Meanwhile, the secured party milks the property by taking away the
rents.
14. The structure of the typical real estate venture is key to the dialectic of the single-asset
case in Chapter 11. See generally David Gray Carlson, Artificial Impairment and the SingleAsset
Real Estate Bankruptcy, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 339,347-45 (1995); Carlson, supra note 7, at 566-
67. The real estate firm is almost certain to be a partnership, because of the flow-through nature
of partnership taxation. Each partner reports her share of the partnership's income or, more
typically because of the depreciation deduction that is allowed, loss on her own return. See 26
U.S.C. § 702 (1988). These losses shelter income presently and defer taxes until later.
The mortgage that finances the purchase of the real estate is likely to be a nonrecourse
mortgage because of tax considerations. If a partnership has general and limited partners, a
recourse mortgage imposes the risk of loss on the general partners for the full amount of the
mortgage debt. Cf. REv. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 306, 6 U.L.A. 247 (1993) (stating that
partners are jointly and severally liable for the partnership's obligations unless agreed or provided
otherwise). The limited partners have no liability for any deficit judgment. If a recourse
mortgage goes into default, the partnership entity will be liable to the mortgagee, and depletion
of the partnership estate means that the limited partners will lose the value they may have paid
to obtain their limited partnership interests. Limited partners are not personally liable for
partnership debts, however, in the same way as general partners. REV. UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP
ACr § 303, 6 U.L.A. 442 (1985). In such a case, the Internal Revenue Code limits the losses
that the limited partners can deduct to their cash investments. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 704(d), 705
(1988). The effect is to deny the limited partners the benefit of the depreciation expense.
On the other hand, if the mortgage is nonrecourse, then the general partners are no more
at risk than the limited partners. Thus, the Internal Revenue Code permits the depreciation
deduction to be shared among all the partners-general and limited. Because there is no personal
liability, limited and general partners are indistinguishable when the mortgage is nonrecourse.
15. Courts often assess that reorganization will be "impossible" if rents are not deemed cash
collateral. See, e.g., In re Growers Properties No. 56 Ltd., 117 B.R. 1015, 1015-16 n. 1 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1990) (Baynes, J.). But such a description is too strong. Characterizing such
reorganizations as very expensive would be a more accurate description.
[Vol. 46:1075
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RENT RECEIVABLES
When considering the validity of security interests on rent receivables,
what is thus primarily at stake is who must pay the lawyers in Chapter 11.
Naturally, equity owners would like the secured party to pay, and the secured
party seeks to have the equity owners pay.
The Supreme Court has joined in high engendered battles over the
temporary control of the cash flow. In Butner v. United States 6 the Supreme
Court seemed to favor debtors by apparently ruling that bankruptcy courts may
not intervene in the name of equity to help secured parties. Instead, the Court
ordered bankruptcy judges to honor state law,17 which often tends to be
prodebtor. s Four years later, in United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 9 the
Supreme Court held that debtors-in-possession could recover collateral that
secured parties repossessed before bankruptcy, even where the debtor
possessed no equity in the collateral. This holding, involving a tax lien
creditor, was soon applied to security interests on rent receivables and was
very useful where the secured party had succeeded in dispossessing the debtor
before the bankruptcy proceeding began.' Subsequently in 1988, the
Supreme Court, in United Savings Association v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, Ltd.,2 ruled that undersecured creditors were not entitled to
postpetition interest as part of their right to the adequate protection of their
secured claims.' In essence, Timbers relieved debtors-in-possession of the
obligation to pay debt service to undersecured creditors during the Chapter 11
proceeding. This proved to be an enormously valuable entitlement for
debtors-in-possession, although its force in cases where the secured party
claims a security interest on cash flow has been controversial.
By 1988, the Supreme Court had undersecured creditors on the run, but
secured creditors claiming the cash flow still had a trump card. According to
§ 552(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,; as it then existed:
Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545, 547 and
548 of this title, if the debtor and an entity entered into a security
agreement before the commencement of the case and if the security interest
created by such security agreement extends to property of the debtor
16. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
17. Id. at 54-57.
18. This is the vulgar reading of Butner. Whether it is the correct reading is taken up later.
See infra text accompanying notes 46-53.
19. 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (Blackmun, J.).
20. See In re Milford Common J.V. Trust, 117 B.R. 15, 16 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (lavien,
J.); In re Willowood East Apts., 114 B.R. 138, 144-45 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); Bryn Athyn
Investors v. Hutton/Conam Realty Pension Investors (In re Bryn Athyn Investors), 69 B.R. 452,
457-58 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987) (Small, J.).
21. 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
22. Id. at 382.
1995]
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acquired before the commencement of the case and to. . . rents .. . of
such property, then such security interest extends to such . . . rents...
acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case to the extent
provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law,
except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on
the equities of the case, orders otherwise.2?
This entitlement was, by its terms, made expressly subject to partial or total
avoidance under a series of provisions-most of which are the very subject of
this Article. But assuming the security interest in rent receivables survived
avoidance by the trustee, § 552(b) seems to imply that all accruing rents
belong to the secured party.
The right to accruing rents puts a secured party claiming real estate in a
rather unique position. It means that, where the building is well maintained,
the undersecured party is constantly improving her position over time. In
other words, the secured claim of the undersecured party is constantly growing
larger, and the unsecured claim of the same creditor is constantly growing
smaller.24 Such improvement in position is elsewhere generally thought to
be contrary to bankruptcy policy.' Thus, Justice Scalia in Timbers com-
plained that postpetition interest for undersecured parties would constitute an
23. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988) (emphasis added), amended by, Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, sec. 214, § 552(b), 108 Stat. 4106, 4126 (1994). Section 552(b)(2)
of the Bankruptcy Code has been amended in 1994 to include rent receivables. This new
provision reads as follows:
Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545, 547, and 548 of this
title, and notwithstanding section 546(b) of this title, if the debtor and an entity
entered into a security agreement before the commencement of the case and if the
security interest created by such security agreement extends to property of the debtor
acquired before the commencement of the case and to amounts paid as rents of such
property ... then such security interest extends to such rents ... acquired by the
estate after the commencement of the case to the extent provided in such security
agreement, except to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based
on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.
11 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
Omitted from the above-quoted section are references to hotel receipts, which are now to
be considered postpetition proceeds belonging to the secured party. See id. The emphasized
language in the quote above is potentially significant for security interests in rent receivables and
is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 279-81.
24. This is the usual view that is taken of accruing rents. See Carlson, supra note 7.
25. For example, § 547(c)(5) of the Code takes careful pains to assure that secured parties
claiming inventory or receivables do not improve their positions throughout the preference period.
See David Gray Carlson, Security Interests as Voidable Preferences under the Bankruptcy Code,
1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 211 (1995). More precisely, sections 506(c) and 552(b) each take aim at
improvement in position by undersecured creditors at the expense of the unsecured creditors.
1082 [Vol. 46:1075
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improvement in position26 -though, to be sure, he also noted that security
interests in rents should permit such an improvement.'
As of 1992, the tools fully existed to deprive secured parties of the cash
flow that § 552(b) seemed to endorse. Curiously, those tools had rarely been
exploited. According to this theory, an undersecured creditor's prepetition
claim had to be bifurcated into its perfectly secured and unsecured parts. The
lien for the-unsecured claim could then be avoided under § 506(d), which
provided:
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not
an allowed secured claim, such a lien is void, unless-
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section
502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only
to the failure of any entity to file a proof of such claim under
section 501 of this title.28
Before 1992, most people interpreted this section as avoiding the liens of
undersecured creditors to the extent that the lien might benefit the postbifurca-
tion unsecured claim. In essence, § 506(d) worked to guarantee for the
debtor-in-possession a permanent bifurcation of the undersecured claim and,
hence, any appreciation in value over time.29
26. 484 U.S. 365,372 (1988). Justice Scaliawarned that if undersecuredcreditors could have
postpetition interest, "the 'value of such creditor's interest' would increase, and the proportions
of the claim that are secured and unsecured would alter, as the stay continues-since the value
of the entitlement to use the collateral from the date of bankruptcy would rise with the passage
of time. No one suggests this was intended." Id. On the nature and validity of this curious ratio
ofsecured-to-unsecureddebt, see David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy
Code, 43 U. MiAMI L. REv. 577 (1989).
27. That some undersecured parties had a security interest on rents proved that secured parties
without a security interest on rents had no right to postpetition interest:
Section 552(b) ... makes possession of a perfected security interest in postpetition
rents or profits from collateral a condition of having them applied to satisfying the
claim of the secured creditor ahead of the claims of unsecured creditors. Under
petitioner's interpretation, however, the undersecured creditor who lacks such a
perfected security interest in effect achieves the same result by demanding the "use
value" of his collateral under § 362. It is true that § 506(b) gives the oversecured
creditor, despite lack of compliance with the conditions of § 552, a similar priority
over unsecured creditors; but that does not compromise the principle of § 552, since
the interest payments come only out of the "cushion" in which the oversecured
creditor does have a perfected security interest.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (1988).
29. See David Gray Carlson, Undersecured Claims under Bankruptcy Code Sections 506(a)
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There was no reason why § 506(d) could not be used to avoid a security
interest on accruing rents." Under a § 506(d) avoidance theory, the secured
part of the undersecured claim would be capped forever at the value of the
collateral, as measured at some specified time. Thereafter, any lien on rent
receivables could not be used to secure the unsecured claim. At best, accruing
rents could serve only as an equity cushion for the capped secured claim.3
Occasionally, something like this did occur. 2 But before this theory could
be developed,3 the Supreme Court in Dewsnup v. Timrrp4 eviscerated the
theory, holding that § 506(d) served only to avoid liens where the entire claim
was not allowable under § 502. Because of this holding, it is now well
accepted that a secured party's position might improve over time.
There remain a few more possibilities for debtors to win control of cash
flow. If the security interest in accruing rents could be shown to be partly or
wholly invalid, the debtor-in-possession might again win at least temporary
control of the cash flow, thereby shifting the cost of reorganization to the
secured parties.
What makes the security interest in rent receivables vulnerable is that,
under most state law, the debtor can disencumber rent receivables by
collecting the rents. Often states insist that this power of collection continues
until the secured party dispossesses the debtor from the real estate. Because
the debtor has this power of collection, so do judicial lien creditors or bona
fide purchasers from the debtor. The power to collect arises from the trustee's
strong-arm powers,35 as well as the definitions of perfection under the
30. One might have pointed out that § 552(b) was expressly subject to § 506(c) or § 544, but
not to avoidance under § 506(d). On the other hand, one could have argued that § 506(d) and
§ 552(b) are not even in conflict. Section 552(b) establishes the existence of a security interest
on postpetition proceeds. It does not establish whether proceeds secure the undersecured deficit
claim, or whether such proceeds constitute a new debtor equity to the bifurcated secured claim.
Thus, § 552(b) preserves the security interest in proceeds, but § 506(a) and § 506(d) make it
clear that such proceeds do not secure the unsecured deficit claim.
31. An equity cushion triggers a secured party's right to postpetition interest. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(b) (1988). But it is uncertain whether a bankruptcy trustee must keep the equity cushion
in place while waiting for postpetition interest to accrue. See David Gray Carlson, Oversecured
Creditors Under Bankruptcy Code Section 506(b): The Limits of Postpetition Interest, Attorneys'
Fees, and Collection Expenses, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 381, 390-94 (1990).
32. See In re Reddington/SunarrowLtd. Partnership, 119 B.R. 809 (Bankr. D. N.M. 1990)
(McFeeley, J.); see generally Carlson, supra note 24.
33. The use of § 506(d) to disencumber rent receivables had been suggested in print a mere
two weeks beforeDewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992), was handed down, thereby giving this
good idea short reign. See David Gray Carlson, Time, Value, and the Property Rights of Secured
Creditors in Bankruptcy, or Do Secured Creditors Have to Ask for Adequate Protection in Order
to Get it?, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 113, 127-29 (1991).
34. 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (Blackmun, J.).
35. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
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trustee's power to set aside voidable preferences.36 This derived power has
given bankruptcy trustees hope that the security interest in rents might be
avoided under the trustee's strong-arm power or under the bankruptcy trustee's
power to recover voidable preferences.37
This hope may have been substantially increased by Congress's bizarre
amendments to § 552 in 1994. Congress removed governance of rent
receivables from a unified § 552(b) and placed them in a new § 552(b)(2),
together with language that upholds security interests in hotel receivables. In
the amendment, Congress indicated that the secured party could have
postpetition rents "[e]xcept as provided in section[]. . . 544 and notwithstand-
ing section 546(b) of this title." As § 546(b) allows secured parties to beat the
strong-arm power in § 544 by perfecting within a grace period under state law,
the reference in new § 552(b)(2) to § 544 "notwithstanding" § 546(b) may be
taken as intended to increase the ability of trustees to avoid security interests
on rent receivables.
The legislative history, however, seems to indicate the opposite-that the
author of the House bill intended to excuse mortgagees from avoidance, so
long as the underlying mortgage was recorded. According to Congressman
Jack Brooks, the amendment to § 552(b)
provides that lenders may have valid security interests in postpetition rents
for bankruptcy purposes notwithstanding their failure to have fully
perfected their security interest under applicable State law. This is
accomplished by adding a new provision to section 552 of the Bankruptcy
Code, applicable to lenders having a valid security interest which extends
to the underlying property and the post petition rents.
38
It is next to impossible to get this meaning from the statutory language
itself,31 and so, once again, the bankruptcy courts will have to choose
36. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1) (1988).
37. It may be noted that Congress recently has flirted with declaring all security interests on
rent receivables immune from the strong arm power. See Forrester, supra note 5, at 394-96.
Congress eventually elected not to help secured parties claiming rent receivables, leaving them
to the vicissitudes of state law, as interpreted through the trustee's strong arm power. Congress
amended § 552(b), however, to clarify that hotel receipts should be considered, like rents, to be
proceeds of prepetition collateral, not postpetition accounts. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West
Supp. 1995). Yet, the amendment does little to help secured parties establish the validity of their
security interests in rent receivables.
38. 140 Cong Rec H. 10752, at H10768 (October 4, 1994) (statement of Congressman
Brooks).
39. If "notwithstanding section 546(b)" modifies "except as provided in section 1 . . . 544,"
then the amendment increases the power of bankruptcy trustees by depriving mortgagees of the
ability to perfect within a state-law grace period. If "notwithstanding section 546" modifies the
subsequent language guaranteeing a secured party the right to postpetition proceeds of prepetition
collateral, then the amendment fails to overrule those holdings that allow the trustee to avoid
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between following the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code or following
some stray remark of a congressman on the floor of the house. As usual, the
early returns favor the stray remark over the actual provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code.'
Putting aside the 1994 amendments to § 552(b), the trend had been in
favor of the secured lenders. Yet, the precise theory by which the secured
party might prevail has never been entirely articulated, and many troublesome
analytical problems have been papered over. As Judge Elizabeth Perris noted,
"skipping the intermediate steps in the analysis may result in the confusion or
blending together of different concepts with independent significance." 4 In
the discussion to follow, no steps are skipped.
Before we visit the analytical difficulties, it is necessary to determine the
extent to which state or federal law governs the validity of security interests
in rent receivables. This is the province of the Butner opinion, which first
commenced the Supreme Court's struggle with the difficult question of cash
flow ownership.
Assuming that the security interest in rent receivables is valid in
bankruptcy, we' then consider whether, per Whiting Pools, the debtor-in-
possession can recapture the right to collect rent from the secured party who,
prior to banlauptcy, has already terminated the debtor's power to collect. The
answer ought to be yes, although some cases assert that if the mortgage
security interests on rent receivables, in whole or part, under § 544. Whatever "notwithstanding"
modifies, it is impossible to read the amendment as actually cutting back on the trustee's
avoidance powers.
40. See In re Newberry Square, Inc., 175 B.R. 910, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994)
(Shapero, J.) ("The primary purpose of those amendments ... was to provide lenders with valid
security interests in post-petition rents notwithstanding their failure to have fully perfected those
interests under state law"). According to Supreme Court jurisprudence, "a court may
appropriately refer to a statute's legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguity ..
Tobb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991) (Blackmun, 3.).
With regard to the legislative history of the 1994 amendments, Professor Janet Flaccus
writes:
The bill had an unusual history. It was passed by the Senate first, then the House
waited until close to congressional recess to act on the bill. Since there was not
enough time to pass a different bill and work out the differences with the Senate in
conference, Senators and staffers interested in passage of the bill met with House
members to work out differences before the bill passed the House. This was done.
Thus, there is no conference report. This section-by-sectionreview of the legislation
was written after the compromise bill was agreed upon. I have found it to be quite
accurate.
Janet A. Flaccus, A Potpourri of Bankruptcy Changes: 1994 Bankruptcy Amendments,
47 ARK. L. REv. 817, 821 n.30 (1994).
41. Scottsdale Medical Pavilion v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. (In re Scottsdale Medical
Pavilion), 159 B.R. 295, 297 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993).
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agreement labels the assignment of rents as "absolute," the rents are not cash
collateral and no turnover is permitted. This result will be criticized for
sanctioning a forfeiture in violation of Bankruptcy Code § 541(c)(1)(B) and,
generally, for ignoring the nature of absolute assignments as mere security
interests in rent receivables.
If the security interest in rent receivables is valid a bankruptcy trustee
must provide "adequate protection" to the secured party in rent receivables.
Otherwise, the secured party can insist that the automatic stay be lifted.4'
Yet, adequate protection is itself a controversial subject. Several different
versions of adequate protection have been asserted by the bankruptcy courts.
Accordingly, while continuing to stipulate the general validity of security
interests in rent receivables, this Article next considers when the right to
adequate protection arises. The longer this time is deferred, the better off
debtors-in-possession will be.
After these preliminary matters are discussed, the avoidance powers will
be analyzed. The avoidance powers consist of (1) the "equities" exception
under § 552(b), which invites bankruptcy courts to terminate security interests
in rents, (2) the trustee's strong-arm power, and (3) voidable preference law.
The new amendment to § 552 greatly clouds the picture of the avoidance
theory. The amendments could be interpreted to enable the trustee to use the
strong-arm power to avoid the security interest on rent receivables entirely.
Or, if we ignore the statutory language and follow the legislative history
instead, the precise opposite conclusion'will follow-no avoidance theory can
adversely affect the secured party's right to cash collateral.
II. BUTNER V. UNITED STATES
The validity of the security interest on rent receivables is usually thought
to depend upon local state law, as tested by the trustee's status as a hypotheti-
cal judicial lien creditor and bona fide purchaser of real property.43 Prior to
1979, a minority of the circuits insisted that federal equity considerations
should govern. 4 In 1979 the Supreme Court, in Butner v. United States,4'
ruled that state law governs the ownership of rents, 46 and, indeed, language
42. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
44. See Comment, The Mortgagee's Right to Rents and Profits Following a Petition in
Bankruptcy, 60 IOWA L. REv. 1388 (1975).
45. 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (Stevens, J.).
46. See id. at 56-57. The federal government is now the largest secured creditor claiming
security interests on rent receivables. The Supreme Court has ruled that federal law governs the
attributes of these property interests, but as part of the federal common law, the federal
government must adjust to the lien priorities of state. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,
440 U.S. 715 (1979) (Marshall, J.). Because the strong arm power is a matter of state lien
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can be found in the opinion to that effect. Yet Justice John Paul Stevens
affirmed a lower court opinion that deprived a secured party of its security
interest in rents (duly perfected under state law) for failure to follow a federal
rule of bankruptcy procedure. Thus, a descensus exists between what Justice
Stevens said and what he did.47 In addition, Stevens actually endorsed
federal intervention to help out the secured party after all:
[O]ur decision avoids the opposite inequity of depriving a mortgagee of his
state-law security interest when bankruptcy intervenes. For while it is
priorities, it must be assumed that the federal government obtains no special privileges in
bankruptcy because it is the sovereign. See generally Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention
in Real Estate Finance: Preemption and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. Rsv. 293, 331-33
(1993).
Judge Donald Ross ruled to the contrary in United States v. Landmark Park & Assocs., 795
F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1986), where a federal rule was invoked to overcome the effects of
Mississippi law. Judge Ross noted that Kimbell Foods affirmed that federal law should apply to
priorities of federal leaders and that Butner permitted deviation from state law when a federal
interest was served. Id. at 684-85. Judge Ross found that protecting federal funds was a federal
interest, id. at 686, even though Justice Thurgood Marshall rejected this very ground in Kimbell
Foods; see 440 U.S. at 729 (stating, "We are unpersuaded that, in the circumstances presented
here, nationwide standards favoring claims of the United States are necessary to ease program
administration or to safeguard the Federal Treasury from defaulting debtors."). Furthermore,
Judge Ross noted that deference to state law might be appropriate when state law is uniform, but
not when state law is in disarray as it is with mortgages. 795 F.2d at 686.
For cases following the theory that the federal government is entitled to untrammeled
victory in bankruptcy court, see Massachusetts Housing Fin. Agency v. Indian Motorcycle
Assocs. III Ltd. Partnership (In re Indian Motorcycle Assocs. III Ltd. Partnership), 174 B.R. 351
(D. Mass. 1994) (Freedman, J.); United States v. Borden Fin. Corp., 164 B.R. 260 (Bankr. E.D.
La. 1994) (McNamara, J.); Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Nazar, 100 B.R. 555 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1989) (Crow, Jr.); In re Westwood Plaza Apartments, Ltd., 154 B.R. 916 (Bankr. E.D.
Tex. 1993) (Abel, J,); but see United States, Farmers Home Admin. v. Buckley (In re Buckley),
73 B.R. 746, 748-49 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1987) (Jones, J.) (holding that because South Dakota law
was standard, it should be incorporated into the federal law of mortgages).
47. In Butner the issue was whether accumulated rents from land belonged to the secured
parties or the bankruptcy trustee. North Carolina law requires a mortgagee to dispossess the
debtor of the property before the mortgagee is entitled to rent payments. Golden Enters. v.
United States, 566 F.2d 1207, 1210 (4th Cir. 1977) (Winter, J.), aff'd, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). The
mortgagees had obtained a receiver from the bankruptcy court and all sides agreed that this
receiver was authorized to collect rents on behalf of the mortgagees. See id. (stating, "Of course,
there had been a receiver until the adjudication in bankruptcy and he had applied the rents
collected, inter alia, to the payment of interest and principal on the mortgages.").
When the debtor's proceeding was converted to a liquidation, the receiver was displaced
by the bankruptcy trustee, who terminated Butner's right to the rents. Butner lost the rents
because he made no separate request to the bankruptcy courts for the rents after his receiver was
displaced. See Butner, 440 U.S. at 51; Golden, 566 F.2d at 1211 (Bryan, J., dissenting) (stating,
"Despite the recital of other reasons, the majority decision actually turns on the single axis: that
appellee, the second mortgagee, failed to renew 'during bankruptcy' a request made during the
arrangement phase for a sequestration of rents for his benefit.").
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argued that bankruptcy may impair or delay the mortgagee's exercise of
his right to foreclosure, and thus his acquisition of a security interest in
rents according to the law of many states, a bankruptcy judge familiar with
local practice should be able to avoid this potential loss by sequestering
rents or authorizing immediate state-law foreclosures. 48
Therefore, even though Butner is supposed to stand for the supremacy of state
law, its holding and even its dicta point in the opposite direction toward
federal meddling with local regulation law.49
At best, Butner was a construction of the old Bankruptcy Act. As such,
it was arguably overruled by § 552(b),.0 which guarantees to mortgagees the
proceeds of and rent from their collateral, "except to any extent that the court,
after notice and a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders
otherwise.""' Although this clause strongly invites equitable intuition to
displace state law, courts nevertheless have asserted the continuing vitality of
Butner and its supposed insistence upon a state law rule.5" Some courts,
48. 440 U.S. at 56-57 (emphasis added). For examples of bankruptcy courts sequestering
rents on behalf of the mortgagee, even though the mortgagee made no move toward dispossessing
the debtor or the trustee, see In re Mount Pleasant Ltd. Partnership, 144 B.R. 727, 736 (Bankr.
W.D. Mich. 1992) (Stevenson, J.); BA Business Credit Corp. v. DiToro (In re DiToro), 22 B.R.
392 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (King, I.).
49. See Sears Says. Bank v. Tucson Indus. Partners (In re Tucson Indus. Partners), 129 B.R.
614, 623 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (Volinn, 1.), vacated as moot, 990 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1993);
Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Recognizing Lenders'Rents Interests in Bankruptcy, 27 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 281, 303-05 (1992). Some authorities accept that the Butner decision "has not
proven to be especially helpful to the courts and the cases that have followed Burner have
struggled in applying it's [sic] teachings." In re KNM Roswell Ltd. Partnership, 126 B.R. 548,
551 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (Coar, J.).
50. E.g. Sandra Elzerman, Comment, Interests in Collaterally Assigned Rents and Profits
Under the Bankruptcy Code, 22 Hous. L. REv. 1251, 1258-59 (1985); Glenn R. Schmitt, The
Continuing Confusion Over Real Property Rents as Cash Collateral in Bankruptcy: The Need for
a Consistent Interpretation, 5 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1, 47-51 (1992); see also Butner, 440 U.S. at
54 (conceding that Congress can legislate a special rule for rents, if it wishes).
51. 11 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West Supp. 1995). See Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village
Properties, Ltd. (In re Village Properties, Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441, 444-46 (5th Cir. 1984)
(Garza, J.) (hinting that the lower court might have applied the equities exception to vary state
law, if such equities existed, but claiming that the Butner decision remains unscathed) cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984); see also Great-West Life & Annuity Assurance Co. v. Parke
Imperial Canton, Ltd., 177 B.R. 843, 849 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (David, J.) (Butner overruled by
Bankruptcy Code); In re TM Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 91 B.R. 349, 353 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988) (Scholl, J.) (stating that § 552(b) "represents an attempt to soften slightly the strict
adherence to state law directed by Butner").
52. See Nobleman v. American Say. Bank, 113 S.Ct. 2106, 2110 (1993) (Thomas, J.); In re,
Wheaton Oaks Office Partners Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d 1234, 1241 (7th Cir. 1994)
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however, have suggested that Butner still requires a mortgagee to establish the
lien through perfection under state law, but once established, the equities
exception applies to whittle down the otherwise valid security interest.
53
M. THE STATE LAW OF MORTGAGES
A. The U.C.C. Compared
To assess the validity of security interests on rent receivables, it becomes
necessary to survey the state law of mortgages, most of which has been
discovered, invented, or changed in recent bankruptcy litigation. 54 But first,
to provide some comfort to bankruptcy lawyers who find the U.C.C. more
familiar than nonuniform real estate law, it might be profitable to see how
Article 9 governs the ownership of proceeds of accounts and general
intangibles so that security interests on real estate receivables readily can be
contrasted.
Under Article 9, a security interest in any piece of collateral is automati-
cally a security interest in proceeds of the collateral as well.55 If proceeds
are cash collateral, the security interest in the cash continues to be perfected,
so long as the original security interest in the collateral was perfected by
filing. 6 Whether default has occurred, or whether the debtor is authorized
53. See In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143, 145 n.1 (Bankr. D.N.H 1991) (Yacos, J.); Vienna
Park Properties, Ltd. Partnership v. United Postal Savings Ass'n (In re Vienna Park Properties),
976 F.2d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 1992) (Meskill, J.) (inviting bankruptcy judges to reduce the security
interest under the "equities" exception in § 552(b)); Randy Rogers, Note, Assignment of Rents
Clauses Under California Law and in Bankruptcy: Strategy for the Secured Creditor, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 1433, 1441 (1980); but see In re Trans-Texas Petroleum Corp., 33 B.R. 67
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983) (Flowers, J.) (using the "equitals exception" to increase the secured
party's collateral over the amount state law supposedly would have provided). On the equities
exception, see infra text accompanying notes 217-20.
54. Courts often discover that when a secured party and a debtor-in-possessionduel over the
right to post-petition rents, sparse local law almost never answers the question. E.g., In re
KNM Roswell Ltd. Partnership, 126 B.R. 548, 555 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1991) (complaining about
the "paucity" of New Mexico law).
Meanwhile, in reaction to bankruptcy litigation, some state legislatures have enacted rules
pertaining to the assignment of rents. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938 (West 1993); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 697.07 (West 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-116(a) (1993); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 7.28.230(3) (West 1992). For a discussion of such legislation, see Bonnie K. Donahue
& W. David Edwards, The Treatment of Assignments of Rents in Bankruptcy: Emerging Issues
Relating to Perfection, Cash Collateral, and Plan Confirmation, 48 Bus. LAW. 633, 654-68
(1993).
55. U.C.C. § 9-306(2), 3A U.L.A. 162 (1990) (stating that "except where this Article
otherwise provides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale ... and also
continues in any identifiable proceeds including collections received by the debtor").
56. U.C.C. § 9-306(3)(b), 3A U.L.A. 162 (1990).
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to collect and spend the cash, the security interest continues in the proceeds
so long as they are identifiable." For example, imagine these three different
collections: (1) A debtor, prior to default, collects an account encumbered by
a security interest. (2) The debtor is in default, but nevertheless collects a
second account. (3) The secured party intercedes and notifies a third account
debtor to pay the secured party directly," s and the account debtor does so.
Under Article 9, the secured party has a security interest in all of these
proceeds.5 9 As we shall discover, nonuniform real estate law infrequently
recognizes a security interest on the first or second types of collection. Only
the third type of collection is universally conceded to preserve the secured
party's rights to the proceeds of rent receivables. Most typically, if the debtor
collects, the security interest is effectively disencumbered.
B. Mortgage Liens Only
As a preliminary matter, it is important to understand who owns the rents
if a mortgage agreement contains no express assignment of rent receivables.
We may start with the premise that rent arises from a leasehold estate in land.
Leaseholds imply the obligation of the lessee to pay rent to the owner of the
reversionary interest.' Therefore, it is a principle of real estate law that
dominion over the reversion, a nonpossessory future interest in real estate,
implies a right to receive rent from all tenants.61. For example, a sale of the
57. U.C.C. § 9-205, 3 U.L.A. 486 (1990) (stating that "a security interest is not invalid or
fraudulent against creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use ... collateral (including
returned or repossessed goods) or to collect ... accounts or . . . dispose of proceeds, or by
reason of the failure of the secured party to require the debtor to account for proceeds or replace
collateral.").
58. U.C.C. § 9-502(1), 3B U.L.A. 43 (1990) (stating "when so agreed and in any event on
default the secured party is entitled to notify an account debtor or the obligor on an instrument
to make payment to him whether or not the assignor was theretofore making collections on the
collateral, and also to take control of any proceeds to which he is entitled under Section 9-306.").
59. This represents a reversal of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) (Brandeis, J.). In
Benedict, Justice Louis Brandeis ruled that under New York law any security interest in accounts
that allowed the debtor to control the proceeds was invalid in bankruptcy. Id. at 360 ("Under
the law of New York a transfer of property as security which reserves to the transferor the right
to dispose of the same, or to apply the proceeds thereof, for his own uses is, as to creditors,
fraudulent in law and void.") (footnote omitted). Hence, the security interest in the first two
accounts were void, and the third was valid, although perhaps a voidable preferenceunder federal
law. See id. at 364-65. Thus, the only way a secured party could finance accounts was by
controlling the collections from the beginning.
For praise of Benedict, see 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 8.3 (1965).
60. In re Wheaton Oaks Office Partners Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d 1234, 1241 (7th Cir.
1994); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 3.64 (A. James Casner ed. 1952 & Supp. 1977).
61. For this reason, Judge Shiff ruled that a real estate mortgagee claiming residential real
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reversionary interest is automatically the sale of the existing real estate
receivables connected with the reversion.
A security interest on the reversion in turn implies that, prior to default,
the debtor continues in dominion and, therefore, continues to have the right
to collect rent. So far, real estate law follows the U.C.C. pattern, but we
must acknowledge an important difference. Whereas under the U.C.C. the
secured party continues to own the dollars a debtor collects from accounts
receivable, the secured party typically does not own collected dollars under
real estate law. Rather, the debtor disencumbers any rents the debtor actually
collects. Such dollars are owned free and clear of the security interest.
This key distinction may no longer be valid in some states because of
recent statutory reform. In 1989, the state of Washington enacted the
following provision:
The recording of an assignment, mortgage, or pledge of unpaid rents
and profits of real property, intended as security ... shall immediately
perfect the security interest... and shall not require any further action by
the holder of the security interest to be perfected as to any subsequent
purchaser, mortgagee, or assignee. Any lien created by such an assign-
ment, mortgage, or pledge shall, when recorded, be deemed specific,
perfected, and choate.
62
In divining the nature of this enactment, Judge Sydney Volinn, in In re Park
at Dash Point, Ltd. Partnership,63 analogized the debtor's power to disen-
cumber rents to a judicial lien creditor's rights to collect an account encum-
bered by a perfected Article 9 security interest.64 If the meaning of the new
Washington statute is to make the mortgagee the owner of proceeds of rent
receivables, even after the debtor or, derivatively, a judicial lien creditor or
purchaser collects them, then Judge Volinn's analogy is correct. A judicial
lien creditor has a derivative power to collect under U.C.C. section 9-318(3)
in the sense that the account debtor satisfies her debt obligation if she pays the
lien creditor. Yet, these cash proceeds collected by the lien creditor would
still belong to the senior secured party. If the judicial lien creditor were to
estate is still protected under § 1322(b)(2)--claims "secured only by . . . 'the debtor's principal
residence'"-if the mortgage encumbers rents. In re Spano, 161 B.R. 880, 884-87 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1993). Mortgages encumber rents by their very nature. Cf. Hammond v. Commonwealth
Mortgage Corp. of America (In re Hammond), 27 F.3d 52, 56-57 (3d Cir. 1994) (recognizing
that claim to rents meant forfeiture of immunity to impairment).
62. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.28.230(3) (West 1992).
63. 121 B.R. 850 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990), aff'd, 152 B.R. 300 (D. Wash. 1991), and
aff'd, 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993).
64. See Dash Point, 121 B.R. at 855-56.
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expropriate these funds to her own use, she has committed the tort of
conversion and is liable to the secured party.6
This summary of Washington law is somewhat speculative, as there are
some ambiguities in the Washington statute. First, the statute indicates that the
mortgagee is to be "superior" to purchasers. It does not quite say that the
debtor has lost the power to disencumber rents by collecting them. Yet,
superiority over purchasers might suggest that the dollars collected still belong
to the secured party. This will have to await a test case. For example, if the
debtor sells the equity in real estate to a purchaser who then collects rent, a
court must be willing to hold that purchaser guilty of the tort of conversion
with regard to any rents collected.' This is the radical result of adopting the
U.C.C.-style rule for proceeds in real estate cases.
Second, the new Washington statute subordinates only voluntary
purchasers. Nonpurchasers, such as judicial lien creditors, are not mentioned.
Still, judicial lien creditors usually obtain less, not more, protection, from
prior real estate encumbrances. It is unlikely that the Washington Legislature
consciously intended that the mortgagee should be superior to subsequent
purchasers, but inferior to subsequent judicial lien creditors. This last point
has important bankruptcy consequences because the bankruptcy trustee is both
a judicial lien creditor and a bona fide purchaser of real estate as of the time
of the bankruptcy petition.67
Similar to Washington, Tennessee recently declared security interests on
rent receivables to be "perfected as to . . . all third parties" when the
mortgage is recorded. 6 In Creekstone Apartments Associates v. Resolution
65. In In re Stone Ridge Assocs., 142 B.R. 967 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992), Judge John
Flannagan, in dictum, read KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2343 as adopting the U.C.C. model of
proceeds law:
While this statute is not applicable to the present controversy, it aims to change the
present case law holding that the mortgagee must obtain actual possessionof the rents
before its lien can prevail over a judicial lien creditor or transferee of the mortgagor.
Read literally, the statute means that the mortgagee has a lien from the date of
recording . . . enforceable against rents traceable to any party dealing with the
mortgagor before or after default. The implications for third parties are frightening.
In their zeal to effectuate the relation-back mechanism of Bankruptcy Code § 546(b),
sponsors of this measure may have created a monster.
142 B.R. at 971 n.9.
66. When faced with this test, the Supreme Court of Texas blanched and acquitted the
mortgagee of tort liability for expropriating rents. See Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592, 595
(Tex. 1981) (McGee, J.); see also Miners Say. Bank v. Thomas, 140 Pa. Super. 5,8, 12 A.2d
810, 812 (1940) (Keller, 1.) (udicial lien creditor could keep all rents actually collected, but
could also be ousted by senior mortgage).
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988).
68. TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-116(a) (1993) provides:
Upon registration... the interest of the grantee... shall be fully perfected as
to the grantor, transferor, pledgor or assignor and all third parties without the
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Trust Corp. (In re Creekstone Apartments Associates)," Judge George Paine
interpreted this provision to mean that a U.C.C.-type rule concerning rent
receivables had been instituted wherein the secured party had priority over any
given purchaser or lien creditor as to any rent dollar collected.7" But, when
put to the test-whether recipients of encumbered dollars should be held guilty
of the tort of conversion-he lost his nerve. Inconsistently, he ruled that
because the secured party had not yet taken the necessary "enforcement steps"
for its security interest, 7' the debtor could use rents actually collected to pay,
for example, the debtor's attorneys. In short, Paine treated the rent receiv-
ables as disencumbered when collected. Therefore, it appears that the rent
receivables were unperfected after all. If Tennessee really intended to institute
the U.C.C. model for real estate proceeds, then the amounts paid from such
proceeds should have been deemed wrongfully converted by anyone who
interferes with or accepts such funds. 2 One suspects that Tennessee law, as
interpreted by Judge Paine, perhaps wants it both ways. On the one hand, the
statute establishes the security interest on rent receivables as valid in
bankruptcy. On the other hand, it allows the debtor to disencumber the rents.
These are inconsistent propositions. If the latter is true, then bankruptcy
courts, applying the hypothetical bona fide purchaser test of § 544(a)(3),
should view Tennessee security interests on rent receivables as unperfected.
Other examples of recent legislation are even less clear in their effect on
rent receivables. Thus, whereas Washington's statute proclaims that the
secured party's security interest is perfected "as to any subsequent purchaser,
mortgagee, or assignee,"13 other legislation simply proclaims the security
interest "perfected," as if the meaning of that word were self-evident.74
necessity of furnishing notice to the assignor or lessee, obtaining possession of the
real property, impounding the rents, securing the appointment of a receiver, or taking
any other affirmative action, and shall have the priority provided for in this chapter.
69. 165 B.R. 845 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1993).
70. See id. at 849; see also Wilhite Pure Oil Truck Stop, Inc. v. McCutchen (In re
McCutchen), 115 B.R. 126 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990) (Brovm, J.). Some states allow
invocation of the U.C.C. rule by contract. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-702(B)
(1990); Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Winslow Ctr. Assocs. (In re Winslow Ctr. Assocs.), 50
B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (applying New Jersey law).
71. 165 B.R. at 851.
72. The theories under which the attorneys or the bank would be liable to the secured party
for the conversion of cash proceeds of rent receivables are exceedingly complex and brilliantly
analyzed in Robert H. Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account Under
Section 9-306(4) of the Uniform Commercial Code, S. ILL. U.L.J. 120, 144-86 (1977); see also
In re EES Lambert Assocs., 43 B.R. 689, 692 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984) (Martin, J.), aff'd, 63
B.R. 174 (N.D. 111. 1986) (finding that lawyers must return retainer paid out of rent proceeds).
73. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.28.230(3) (West 1992).
74. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2938, § 2938.1 (West 1993); MD. CODE ANN. REAL
PROP. § 3-204 (Supp. 1994).
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For our purposes, the key issue must always be, who owns an identifiable
rent dollar after the debtor collects it? If the answer is that the secured party
has a security interest on such a dollar, then local real estate law conforms to
the U.C.C. Such a security interest means that the cash flow is always cash
collateral in bankruptcy. In contrast, if the debtor owns the rent dollars free
and clear, then the security interest may not work to establish a perfectly valid
security interest in bankruptcy.
Putting aside these attempts at legislative reform, in most states, the rents,
once collected by the debtor, are "severed" from the real estate, and the
dollars actually collected belong to the debtor free and clear of the security
interest on the rent receivables. 75 Thereafter, any postseverance contractual
arrangement that forces the debtor to segregate collected dollars for the benefit
of the secured party is likely to be viewed as an attempt to create an Article
9 security interest, which would then have to be perfected according to the
rules found therein.76
75. There is controversy on precisely when the debtor disencumbers the security interest on
the rent receivables. Some authorities assume that as soon as the tenant's obligation to pay the
debtor becomes unconditional, the secured party's security interest on the receivable is divested,
even before the debtor collects. Under this view, if a secured party notifies a tenant on October
2 to pay the secured party and if the tenant has not yet paid the September rent, the tenant owes
the September rent to the debtor free and clear of the mortgage lien and owes the October rent
to the secured party. See, e.g., Casbeer v. State Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Casbeer), 793
F.2d 1436, 1443-44 (5th Cir. 1986) (Gee, J.) ("[tihe district court erred to the extent that it
concluded that post-petition rentals from a given property that accrued before perfection
represented cash collateral under § 363(a)."); Balcor Pension Investors V v. Wiston XXIV Ltd.
Partnership (In re Wiston XXIV Ltd. Partnership), 147 B.R. 575, 582 n.10 (D. Kan. 1992)
(Saffels, J.), appeal dismissed, 988 F.2d 1012 (105h Cir. 1993); In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143,
149 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (Yacos, J.); In re Wynnewood House Assocs., 121 B.R. 716, 723
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990) (Fox, J.) (applying Pennsylvania law) (following this rule when an
intervening lien creditor appears, but not when the mortgagee directly instructs tenants to pay all
rents to mortgagee); In re KNM Roswell Ltd. Partnership, 126 B.R. 548, 554 (Bankr. N.D. I11.
1991) (Coar, J.) (applying New Mexico law); United States v. Farrell (In re Fluge), 57 B.R. 451,
456-57 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (Hill, J.); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Gotta (In re Gotta), 47 B.R.
198, 202 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985) (Martin, J.).
It is not so much accrual before perfection as it is whether the tenant has actually paid. The
tenant is privileged to pay the debtor until notified otherwise by the secured party. C. U.C.C.
§ 9-318(3), 3A U.L.A. 461 (1972). Even if rent is overdue, the secured party should be able
to obtain a senior right to be paid from the tenant, even after a judicial lien creditor or purchaser
also has notified the tenant that she expects to be paid. See, e.g., In re Polo Club Apartments
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. 840, 854 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) (Cotton, J.). The notion
that accrued rents belong to the debtor or to a judicial lien creditor is probably connected with
the mistaken notion that the tenant's obligation to pay rent in the future is not an obligation that
exists today. But if this is correct, then the security interest on the rent receivables is essentially
a security interest on after-acquired property and, hence, vulnerable to a voidable preference
theory. Later, a contrary theory, that the security interest is not a voidable preference, will be
offered. See infra text accompanying notes 318-19.
76. First Nat'l Bank v. United States (In re Dorsey), 155 B.R. 263, 269 (Bankr. D. Me.
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It is sometimes alleged that the debtor's power to collect free and clear
of the security interest on rent receivables proves that the security interest is
unvested," "inchoate,"7" or even nonexistent. 79  These terms are mislead-
ing.10 Rather, any mortgage lien constitutes a valid security interest on rent
receivables. The debtor, however, has the power to disencumber the rent
receivables by collecting them.81 This power to disencumber may be
compared to the debtor's power to disencumber security interests on inventory
by selling them in the ordinary course of business.' No one would say that
security interests in inventory do not exist because the debtor has the power
to disencumber the security interests by selling the inventory in the ordinary
course of business. Accordingly, it is best to say that the mortgagee has a
presently existing lien on the rent receivables, but this lien is subject to a
condition subsequent. The condition subsequent is the debtor's power to
collect the rents free and clear of the mortgage lien. The termination of this
1993) (Haines, J.). To the extent the money is in a deposit account, Article 9 does not apply,
although any lien on such account would still be in the province of personal property law.
U.C.C. § 9-104(0, 3 U.L.A. 180 (1990). If post-severance money is put into some sort of
escrow arrangement that is not a deposit account, Article 9 is fully applicable. Vienna Park
Properties v. United Postal Savings Ass'n (In re Vienna Park Properties), 976 F.2d 106, 114 (2d
Cir. 1992) (finding Article 9 applicable to an escrow account); Lowe v. Sheinfeld, Maley & Kay
(In re Saunders), 155 B.R. 405 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) (Clark, J.) (findingArticle 9 applicable
to real estate owned by partnership where partner pledged his share of rents after collection).
77. See Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Winslow Ctr. Assocs. (In re Winslow Ctr. Assocs.),
50 B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (Goldhaber, C.J.) (applying New Jersey law).
78. Vienna Park Properties, 976 F.2d at 112-13 (applying Virginia law).
79. Some courts think that the secured party has "no right" to rent receivables until the debtor
is dispossessed. Commerce Bank v. Mountain View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34, 39 (3d Cir. 1993)
(Weis, J.) (stating, "We recognize that mortgagees have no right to the rents until a default has
occurred and, before they give notice, a junior lienor can attach rents that otherwise would come
into the possession of the mortgagor." (emphasis added)); In re Harvey Road Assocs., 140 B.R.
302, 305 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992) (Hillman, J.) (applying New Hampshire law); In re KNM
Roswell Ltd. Partnership, 126 B.R. 548, 553 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1991) (Coar, J.) ("Until the
borrower defaults the assignee has no rights to the rents."). This demonstrates the standard
confusion between contingentproperty rights and no property rights. If correct, then the security
interest has not attached to the receivable at all. The security interest becomes a springing lien
that is invalid if it springs after the start of the preference period.
In fact, Judge David Coar, in KNM Roswell, goes on to describe an existing security
interest in rents that can be asserted against a lien creditor or purchaser who takes over the
debtor's right to collect. See id. at 553. This description contradicts the notion that the secured
party had no rights in rent receivables prior to enforcement. Rather, the contingent right existed
all along.
80. In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143, 148 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (Yacos, J.) (denouncing such
terminology).
81. See Averch, supra note 6, at 526.
82. U.C.C. § 9-307(1), 3A U.L.A., 256 (1993) (stating that "a buyer in ordinary course of
business . . . takes free of a security interest created by his seller even though the security
interest is perfected and even though the buyer knows of its existence").
1096 Vol. 46:1075
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debtor power will be analyzed as the lapse of a condition, not a transfer of
debtor property.83
C. Supplemental Assignments of Rent
So far we have been pondering the effect of a mortgage lien on rent
receivables. In addition to the bare mortgage lien on the reversion, a security
agreement may expressly set forth an additional assignment of the rents.
4
Often the assignment reserves to the debtor the right, prior to default, to
collect rent free and clear of the security interest. It may be thought that such
an assignment, therefore, adds nothing to the basic mortgage on the reversion-
ary interest itself, but this is not necessarily so. First, state law usually puts
a gloss on what is meant when a mortgagee takes possession of the reversion-
ary interest. The assignment of rents often purports to change that gloss.
Thus, if dispossession of the debtor ordinarily requires the appointment of a
receiver or other incident of judicial seizure of the property itself, the parties,
by means of an assignment of rents, may agree to terminate the debtor's
control of the rents at some other time. '
Thus, in Illinois, the debtor is entitled to retain possession, and the power
to collect rents, until after the foreclosure sale and postsale redemption period.
But, per an assignment of rents, the agreement may provide for an earlier
83. To those who equate "possession" with the sensuous grasping of property with one's
hands, possession of a future interest in real estate may seem problematic terminology. How
could a debtor owning a future interest be dispossessed when the future interest itself is a
nonpossessory interest in real estate? Yet, the term "possession" should not be so limited.
Indeed, feminist scholars assure us that any such conception is evidence of infantile phallic
metaphoric error. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Chix Nix Bundle-O-Stix:A Feminist Critique of the
Disaggregation of Property, 93 Mica. L. REv. 239 (1994). Instead, possession actually means
dominion or control or what real estate lawyers call "privity of estate."
84. A mortgage agreement is usually required to contain an express assignment of rents; if
no such assignment exists, then the mortgagee has no interest in rents until the mortgagee retakes
possession of the collateral. In re Prichard Plaza Assocs., 84 B.R. 289, 294 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1988) (Queenan, J.) (applying Massachusetts law).
85. See, e.g., Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Williams (In re O'Neill Enters.), 506 F.2d
1242 (4th Cir. 1974) (Haynesworth, J.) (applying Virginia law); In re May, 169 B.R. 462, 466-
67 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) (Davis, J.); In re Tripplet, 84 B.R. 84, 88 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988)
(Avyers, C.J.); Cf. Freedman's Saving & Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494, 502 (1888) ("It
is, of course, competent for the parties to provide, in the mortgage, for the payment of rents and
profits to the mortgagee, while the mortgagor remains in possession"); In re Centre of Mo. Ltd.,
116 B.R. 138, 141 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990) (Barta, J.) (recognizing that parties may agree to
change the point at which the debtor's right to collect rents ends); Otis Elevator Co. v. Mid-
American Realty Investors, 206 Mich. App. 710, 522 N.W.2d 732 (1994) (Shepherd, J.)
(judgment creditor could not garnish tenants after mortgage default occurred). But cf. South Plaza
Ventures, 167 B.R. 535, 539 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994) (Barta, J.) (explaining that Missouri law
does not honor such contracts).
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termination of the debtor's right to collect rents.86 In Wisconsin, the parties
may agree that a default automatically terminates the debtor's power to collect
rents, but courts also require some "affirmative action" by the secured party
to terminate this power." In Georgia, an act of taking "control" of the rents
might be construed to terminate the debtor's right to collect, for example,
sending a letter to the managing agent announcing that the agent must stop
giving rents to the debtor."8 Additionally, in Arizona, Maine, and Virginia,
the parties may agree that pure default terminates the debtor's right to collect
rent regardless of whether the secured party takes any affirmative action.89
Often state law does not honor the assignment of rents at all. Many states
require the mortgagee to take possession of the reversion through the
appointment of a receiver before she may collect rents regardless of contrary
language in the mortgage.' Because possession of the reversion implies the
right to rent, how does the assignment add anything that was not already
inherent in the concept of the mortgage on the reversion? In short, when
courts insist that the secured party must always obtain a receiver to collect
rents, state law effectively prohibits any assignment of rents separate and apart
from the mortgage.91
86. In re Wheaton Oaks Office Partners, 27 F.3d 1234, 1241-42 (7th Cir. 1994) (Manion, J.).
87. In re Century Investment Fund VIII Ltd. Partnership, 937 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir. 1991)
(Jones, J.) (footnote omitted) (citing Lincoln Crest Realty v. Standard Apartment Dev., 211
N.W.2d 501 (1973); First Wis. Trust Co. v. Adams, 261 N.W. 16 (1935)).
88. Empire Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Gingold (In re Real Estate West Ventures), 170 B.R. 736, 741
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) (Dighe, J.); contra, Jones v. United States (In re Jones), 77 B.R. 981
(Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1987) (Lancy, J.) (explaining that parties can agree that the secured party
owns rents immediately upon default).
89. See Scottsdale Medical Pavilion v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. in Rehabilitation (In re
Scottsdale Medical Pavilion), 159 B.R. 295, 299-300 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1993) (applying Arizona
law); In re Somero, 122 B.R. 634, 638 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (Goodman, J.); Eastern Says.
Bank v. Epco Newport News Assocs. (In re EPCO Newport News Assocs.), 14 B.R. 990, 996
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Ryan, J.) (applying Virginia law). For an argument that default as a
condition is too confusing in light of cure, see Randolph, supra note 49, at 300-03 (1992).
90. See, e.g., In re Anderson, 50 B.R. 728, 732 (D. Neb. 1985) (Beam, J.) (claiming that
the assignment was enforceable, but still requiring a receiver to dispossess the debtor); In re
South Plaza Ventures, 167 B.R. 535, 539 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1994) (Barta, J.) (applying Missouri
law); Empire Fin. Servs., Inc., 170 B.R. at 741 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) (Drake, J.); In re Polo
Club Apartments Assoc., 150 B.R. 840, 851 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) (Cotton, J.) (applying
Georgia law) (noting also the conditional nature of the assignment clause); In re Mews Assocs.,
144 B.R. 867, 868-69 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (Federman, J.); In re Stanley Station Assocs.,
139 B.R. 990, 1009 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) (Flannagann, J.) (applying Kansas law); In re Park
at Dash Point, Ltd. Partnership, 121 B.R. 850, 855-56 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990) (Volinn, J.)
(applying Washington law), aff'd sub nom. Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park
at Dash Point, Ltd. Partnership), 152 B.R. 300 (D. Wash. 1991), and aff'd sub nom. Steinberg
v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point, Ltd. Partnership) 985 F.2d 1008 (9th
Cir. 1993); Drummond V. Farm Credit Bank (In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr.
D. Mont. 1990) (Peterson, J.).
91. The reasons for this hostility to freedom of contract seem vaguely connected with the
1098
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Although courts often worry about whether relevant case law follows the
lien theory or the title theory of mortgages,' they need not bother. The
metaphysical inquiry that locates title or privity of estate has no relevance to
the meaning of the assignment of rents. 3  The real issue is the extent to
which state law permits freedom of contract in defining the terms of default.
The answer to this question cannot be improved by the useless drudgery of
locating where feckless title resides.94
IV. TURNOVER
When the secured party has taken over collection of the rents by the time
of the bankruptcy petition-whether by obtaining a receiver, notifying the
tenants, or otherwise-the amounts collected prepetition (or at least before the
voidable preference period of ninety days),95 are beyond the reach of the
bankruptcy trustee.96 Such rents, if they have already been collected, will
have been applied to the mortgage debt, and the debtor's property right to
these dollars will have ended.
sanctity and logic of the debtor's possession of the reversionary interest in real estate. See Note,
The Mortgagee's Right to Rents After Default, 50 YALE L.J. 1424, 1426-27 (1941). The instinct
expressed in this note seems to be similar to the logic of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353
(1925), discussed supra, note 59.
92. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 51 (1979) (Stevens, J.) (applying North
Carolina law); Commerce Bank v. Mountain View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34, 37-38 (3d Cir. 1993)
(Weis, J.) (applying Pennsylvania law and the title theory); Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village
Properties, Ltd. (In re Village Properties, Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir. 1984) (Garza, J.),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984) (applying Texas law).
93. Some authorities recognize this. See, e.g., In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143, 147 & n.2
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (Yacos, J.); Note, supra note 91, at 1425.
94. According to Professor Frank Alexander:
The most significant issue dividing title and lien theory states was the creditor's
right to possession of the land before foreclosure ....
Historically, the title theory, with its premise of a transfer of title to the
mortgagee, affirmed the rights of the mortgagee to possession, as well as to rents and
profits, immediately upon default. In contrast, lien theory jurisdictions denied a
mortgagee an action in ejectment against the mortgagor; the mortgagee could obtain
protection of the rents and profits only through foreclosure or the appointment of a
receiver.
Alexander, supra note 46, at 303 (footnotes omitted). For a lucid history of the title-lien
distinction, see August v. Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank (In re Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank), 2 B.R.
171, 179-82 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) (Merrick, J.); Robert Kratovil, Mortgages-Problenis in
Possession, Rents, and Mortgagee Liability, 11 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 4-6 (1961).
95. The effect of voidable preference law on prepetition collections of rent by an undersecured
creditor is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 315-19.
96. E.g., In re 5028 Wisconsin Ave. Assocs., 167 B.R. 699, 704 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994)
(reel, J.); In re Bethesda Air Rights, Ltd. Partnership, 117 B.R. 202,209 (Bankr. D. Md. 1990)
(Derby, J.).
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Nevertheless, the real estate receivables themselves, to the extent that they
have not been collected, are subject to turnover to the trustee. 7  If the
secured party has not obtained a "custodian,"98 then § 542(a) is the appropri-
ate turnover provision. If the secured party has obtained a receiver to collect
rents, § 543 enjoys the honor of jurisdiction. 9
Some courts hold that the parties to a mortgage can defeat a trustee's
turnover power by agreeing to an absolute assignment of rents. The idea is
that the debtor owns no property rights in rent receivables once default occurs.
According to § 542(a), turnover depends upon "property that the trustee may
use, sell, or lease under section 363. "100 Section 363, in turn, authorizes the
trustee to use "property of the estate"' 01 or "cash collateral."" °  Cash
collateral is defined as highly liquid collateral "in which the estate and an
entity other than the estate have an interest. " " If a custodian has been
appointed to collect rents, § 543(b) requires that the custodian be in charge of
the "property of the debtor.""
97. E.g., In re Newberry Square, Inc., 175 B.R. 910 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994) (Shaper, J.);
In re Bethesda Air Rights, 117 B.R. at 209-21; In re Mews Assocs., 144 B.R. 867, 871 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1992) (Federman, J.) (applying Missouri law).
98. A custodian is defined in § 101(11) of the Bankruptcy Code as
(A) receiver or trustee of any of the property of the debtor, appointed in a case
or proceeding not under this title;
(B) assignee under a general assignment for the benefit of the debtor's creditors;
or
(C) trustee, receiver, or agent under applicable law, or under a contract, that is
appointed or authorized to take charge of property of the debtor for the purpose of
enforcing a lien against such property, or for the purpose of general administration
of such property for the benefit of the debtor's creditors.
11 U.S.C. § 101(11) (Supp. V 1993).
99. E.g., In re Cadwell's Comers Partnership, 174 B.R. 744,755-56 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1994)
(Katz, J.) (Illinois law) (but refusing turnover where property was not necessary for an effective
reorganization);In re Donato, 170 B.R. 247, 256-57 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1994). Section 543 allows
for discretionary abstention by the bankruptcy court when it would serve the best interest of the
creditors. In re LCL Income Props. L.P. VII, 177 B.R. 872 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1995) (excusing
mortgagee's receiver on this ground); In re Constable Plaza Assocs., 125 B.R. 98, 103-04
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (Schwartzber, J.).
Turnover is an innovation of the Bankruptcy Code. See United States v. Whiting Pools,
Inc., 462 U.S. 198,206 n.13 (1983) (Blackmun, J.); Investors Syndicate v. Smith, 105 F.2d 611,
621 (9th Cir. 1939).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1988).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (1988); 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1) (1988), as amendedby Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, sec. 501(b)(8) (B), § 363(c)(1), 108 Stat. 4106,4144
(1944).
102. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (1988).
103. 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act. of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, see. 214(b), § 363(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4126 (1994).
104. Cf. 11 U.S. § 543(b) (1988) (requiring the custodian to deliver the debtor's property to
1100
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If the absolute assignment leaves the debtor with no property rights in the
rent receivables, then the trustee's turnover cause of action under either
§ 542(a) or § 543(b) is defeated."05
This theory can be traced to some imprecise and frequently misread
language in Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., where Chief Justice
Phil S. Gibson wrote:
The agreement between the parties .. either by a clause inserted in the
deed of trust or mortgage or by a separate instrument, may provide that in
the event of default the rents are assigned absolutely to the mortgagee. It
has been held that such a provision, rather than pledging the rents as
additional security, operates to transfer to the mortgagee the mortgagor's
right to the rentals upon the happening of the specified condition.'17
One is tempted to conclude that this passage is simply a clumsy way of
expressing the idea that the parties are free to terminate by contract the
debtor's right to collect rents free and clear of the security interest before
dispossession of the debtor. Unfortunately, other passages in this opinion
make such a conclusion doubtful. In Kinnison a debtor had defaulted on an
earlier standard mortgage. Therefore, the parties renegotiated. In the new
agreement, the debtor could collect rents, but only as agent of the secured
party. These collections found their way into a bank account in the name of
the debtor when a judgment creditor garnished the bank, and the bank paid the
garnishor. The secured party thereafter successfully sued the garnishor for
converting the secured party's property.
10 8
The Kinnison opinion does not set forth the exact factual situation, but it
appears as if the mortgage was substantially underwater, and the rents actually
collected by the debtor werc not part of any debtor surplus. Justice Gibson
probably should have ruled that the secured party had a superior lien on the
rents collected. The judicial lien creditor had only a junior lien, and when the
judicial lien creditor interfered with the secured party's dominion, it committed
the tor' of conversion against the secured party. This holding would have
protected the senior secured party while adhering to the idea that the secured
the trustee and to file an accounting of the debtor's property).
105. The debtor in a recent case argued that the mortgage agreement created an absolute
assi:,nment of this sort. Kansas had just enacted a U.C.C.-style statute with regard to proceeds
of rent receivables. Because the statute covered only liens, the debtor argued that an absolute
assignment was not covered and must be perfected to be valid in bankruptcy. Judge Julie
Robinson found, however, that the assignment was a lien, and that the new statute applied. In
re Kansas Office Assocs., 173 B.R. 745, 749 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1994).
106. 115 P.2d 450 (Cal. 1941).
107. Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 451-52.
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party had only a security interest in the receivables in question. But Justice
Gibson went much further:
Such an assignment cannot be said to have contemplated the transfer of a
mere security interest. The instrument is phrased as a complete transfer
of [the debtor's] interest in the rentals. Thus, there is no provision for a
continued enjoyment of the rents by the debtor so long as no default exists
in the obligation secured. Nor is there any indication that, by meeting the
obligations then due, [the debtor] could have regained its right to receive
the rents. Rather, the rents were relinquished completely, to be applied
•.. in satisfaction of the total outstanding indebtedness. This was not an
assignment as further security for the performance of [the debtor], but was
an attempt to liquidate the debt upon which [the debtor] had been in default
for at least eight months at the time the assignment was executed. Unlike
the rental assignments accompanying the deeds of trust executed in 1928
and 1932, this assignment contemplated an immediate application of the
rentals as a means of satisfying the total outstanding debt.'
9
Apparently, when the debtor defaulted under the earlier mortgage agreement,
the debtor and the secured party entered into a deed in lieu of foreclosure.
This deed made the secured party the absolute owner of the rent receivables.
Only then can it be said that the rent receivables reduced the outstanding debt
upon assignment and that the debtor had no right to collect these rent
receivables once the secured claim had been totally paid off. In short, Justice
Gibson treated Kinnison as an "asset payment" case, in which the mortgage
debt was reduced by the appraised value of the receivables, and the secured
party became the absolute owner of the receivables. In other words, the deal
describe by Justice Gibson is a sale of, not a security interest on, rent
receivables." 0
The "sale" of a rent receivable is certainly a possible form of property
transfer. If the agreement is reached in the context of a pre-existing default
on an earlier mortgage agreement, it might be a mode of paying the secured
claim. But the parties cannot agree that all rent receivables are to be deemed
as sold or forfeit immediately upon default. Such a forfeiture is precisely what
medieval equity courts intervened to prevent." Instead, any predefault
109. Id. at 454.
110. See Rogers, supra note 53, at 1449. From his perspective as a state supreme court
justice, Gibson had no particular reason to focus on the difference between the secured party's
exclusive ownership of a rent receivable and the secured party's shared ownership with the
debtor. Justice Gibson's sole concern was to determine the recipient of the money. Only in
bankruptcy (which after 1979 had a suddenly increased turnover provision) did this distinction
matter. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20. Because the legal landscape of bankruptcy
has changed so radically, it is odd that so much weight is put on a distinction made by Justice
Gibson that was utterly unimportant to him at the time.
111. See In re Growers Properties No. 56 Ltd., 117 B.R. 1015, 1015-16 n.1 (Bankr, M.D.
1102 [Vol. 46:1075
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forfeiture agreement would be treated as if it were a security interest,
regardless of the parties' intent. Despite the confusing terminology, an
absolute assignment governs merely the duration of the debtor's right to collect
free and clear of the security interest. An absolute assignment does not change
the fact that the debtor owns an equity interest in the receivables.
Under this theory, absolute assignment, when used in a security
agreement, implies merely that the debtor's right to collect rents may be
terminated automatically upon the occurrence of an event of default"' or by
notifying the tenants that they are to pay the secured party directly." 4 Other
courts think that the phrase invokes a U.C.C.-style of rule with regard to rent
proceeds. Judge Emil Goldhaber, articulating New Jersey law, stated:
[Tihe distinction between an assignment and a pledge of security is based
on the precise wording of the pertinent mortgage clause. If the pertinent
clause gives the mortgagee a vested interest in the rents at the time of the
creation of the mortgage, the clause is construed as an assignment. Who
has actual or constructive possession of the rents is irrelevant. The
applicable mortgage provision is deemed a pledge of security if the
mortgagee's interest in the rents does not vest until the occurrence of some
precipitating event such as default under the mortgage."'
Fla. 1990) (Baynes, J.) (stating that this approach "would create a forfeiture within the lien
context without a judicial foreclosure which is required by Florida law.").
112. See, e.g., FDIC v. Int'l Prop. Mgt., Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir. 1991) (King, J.)
(applying Texas law) (concluding that the assignment of rents was "to assure payment of the
debt"); Equitable Mortgage Co. v. Fishman (In re Charles D. Stapp, Inc.), 641 F.2d 737, 740
(9th Cir. 1981) (construing Nevada law as follows: 'Absolute' does not mean . . . that the
assignee is relieved of all obligation to account or that the right to rents is independent of the
underlying debt. Upon foreclosure, the creditor ... must account for any excess derived from
the sale and rents collected between the date of default and the date of foreclosure sale over and
above the amount of the obligation owed.); In re Cadwell's Comers Partnership, 174 B.R. 744,
755-56 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994) (Katz, J.) (Illinois law); 5028 Wisconsin Ave. Assocs. v. Copy
King, Inc. (In re 5028 Wisconsin Ave. Assocs.), 167 B.R. 699, 705 & n.8 (Bankr. D.D.C.
1994); In re May, 169 B.R. 462, 470-71 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994) (applying Georgia law); In re
Willows of Coventry, Ltd. Partnership, 154 B.R. 959,962-63 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1993) (applying
Indiana law); Shaw, Licitra, Parente, Esemio & Schwartz, P.C. v. Travelers Indem. Co. (In re
Grant Assocs.), 154 B.R. 836, 838 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Fleeh, J.); In re Mews Assocs.,
144 B.R. 867, 870 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992) (Mes, J.) (applying Missouri law); In re Salem
Plaza Assocs., 135 B.R. 753,756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Conard, J.) (applying North Carolina
law); In re Constable Plaza Assocs., 125 B.R. 98, 102-03 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(Schwartzberg, J.).
113. See Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village Properties, Ltd. (In re Village Properties, Ltd.), 723
F.2d 441, 443 (5th Cir. 1984) (Garza, J.) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974
(1984); In re May, 169 B.R. at 467.
114. Union Meeting Partners v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. (In re Union Meeting Partners),
163 B.R. 229, 236-37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (School, J.); see TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-26-
116(a) (1993).
115. Provident Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Winslow Ctr. Assocs. (In re Winslow Ctr. Assocs.), 50
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So conceived, the mortgage becomes the "vifgage"-the medieval device
allowing the lender to control the cash flow from the beginning of the
term. 116 Under these terms, the absolute assignment is not absolute, but is
conceived as a different form of security interest. 1
7
Nevertheless, judges routinely have authorized forfeitures upon default
based upon their reading of Kinnison.118 In Great West Life Assurance Co.
v. Rothman (In re Ventura-Louise Properties) 9 the secured party had
notified all of the debtor's tenants that they should pay rents to the secured
party in light of the debtor's default. The debtor soon responded with a
bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy trustee notified the tenants that they
should pay the trustee, not the secured party. The parties agreed that the
bankruptcy trustee could collect rent, but ownership of the rent would be
decided later by the bankruptcy referee. No reorganization was possible, so
the bankruptcy trustee eventually abandoned the real estate. 20 Judge Stanley
Barnes properly ruled that the secured party was the owner of the collected
rents. 121
In modem parlance, we might say that in Ventura-Louise the collected
rents were cash collateral that ought to be abandoned to the secured party
because there was no prospect of reorganization and because the debtor had
no equity in the cash collateral.'1 Instead, Judge Barnes decided that the
secured party should win by virtue of the absolute assignment of the rents,
believing this transaction to be the same kind of absolute assignment that
existed in Kinnison.'"
B.R. 679, 681 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985) (citations omitted).
116. SeeIn re 1301 ConnecticutAve. Assocs., 117 B.R. 2, 8 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1990) (Teel, J.),
aff'd 126 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991). (applying District of Columbia law) (drawing this
connection). For a description of vifgage, see generally August v. Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank
(In re Michigan Ave. Nat'l Bank), 2 B.R. 171, 176-77 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1980) (Merrick, J.).
117. See FDIC v. International Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1036-38 (5th Cir.
1991) (King, J.); In re Bethesda Air Rights Ltd. Partnership, 117 B.R. 202, 206 (Bankr. D. Md.
1990) (Derby, J.).
118. E.g., Eastern Says. Bank v. Epco Newport News Assocs. (In re Epco Newport News
Assocs.), 14 B.R. 990 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Ryan, J.) (applying Virginia law).
119. 490 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1974).
120. Id. at 1142-43.
121. See id. at 1145.
122. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1988) (providing that "the court shall grant relief from the
stay" in such circumstances).
123. Thus, Judge Barnes writes:
We therefore agree with the court in Kinnison which said: "In the present case we do
not see how it can be said that the parties contemplated merely the transfer of a
security interest in the rentals."
We hold that the present clause provides for an absolute assignment thus entitling
the Lender to the rents.
1104
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The opinion is consistent with the far more modest and supportable
definition of absolute assignment-that it governs the moment at which the
debtor's power to disencumber rents comes to an end. Under this view, the
right to collect rents, if useful to a reorganization, would be fully subject to
a trustee's right of turnover under § 542(a), which in turn would be condi-
tioned upon adequate protection to the security interest on the rent receiv-
ables.
124
Another oft-quoted misstatement, relying exclusively on Kinnison and
Ventura-Louise, comes from Taylor v. Brennan,'" in which Justice Sears
McGee opined that "an absolute assignment of rentals operates to transfer the
right to rentals automatically upon the happening of a specified condition, such
as default. The absolute assignment does not create a security interest but
instead passes title to the rents."126
This careless language, copied from California law, was harmless error
in the Taylor; Justice McGee found that the debtor had the right to collect
rents free and clear of the security interest and, therefore, was innocent of
converting property of the mortgagees. But the statement has created havoc
in the bankruptcy courts, where judges now believe that under Butner v.
United States27 they must look to state law, however demented, to deter-
mine bankruptcy entitlements.
A more sensible reading of the Kinnison-Taylor line of cases is provided
by Judge Carolyn Dineen King in FDIC v. International Property Manage-
ment, Inc. ,128 in which the secured party sought an injunction to prevent the
debtor's managing agent from disbursing collected rents to unsecured
creditors. The injunction was properly granted, and in affirnming this result,
Judge King expressed concern that Taylor v. Brennan seemed to support the
idea of forfeitures of rent receivables to secured parties upon default:
The Taylor court could have recogniz ed that all assignments in
connection with a mortgage are to secure the debt, as they undoubtedly
are, and then taken one of two approaches to such clauses. It could have
followed the common law rule and required a mortgagee always to take
some step to perfect its interest in rents following default; or it could have
decided that it would not follow the common law rule when the parties
Ventura-Louise, 490 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Kinnison v. Guaranty Liquidating Corp., 115 P.2d
450, 453 (Cal. 1941).
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988). For what constitutes adequate protection see infra text
accompanying notes 165-72.
125. 621 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1981).
126. Id. at 594 (citations omitted).
127. 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (Stevens, 1.). For further discussion, see supra text accompanying
notes 43-53.
128. 929 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1991).
19951 1105
31
Carlson: Rents in Bankruptcy
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
sufficiently evidence their intent that the right to rents should pass
automatically upon default. Texas, however, adopted neither of these
straightforward alternatives. Rather, it decided that certain assignments of
rents given in connection with a mortgage and contingent upon default
constitute title transfers rather than "security interests."I29
Judge King denied the premise that these forfeitures were not, in the end,
security interests:
Whatever terminology the court uses, however, mortgagees employ such
assignments to secure the debt, and all such assignments would be
considered security interests under the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), which treats all transfers intended to secure a debt as security
interests despite their form.
Article 9 does not apply, however, to the "creation or transfer of an
interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents thereunder," and
the concept of a contingent present assignment of rents apparently derives
from real property and trust concepts rather than the U.C.C. That the
economic reality underlying absolute assignment of rents is the desire to
assure payment of the debt did not prevent the Taylor court from
acknowledging that some collateral assignment of rent clauses operate "to
transfer rents automatically upon default" without being "activated by
some affirmative act" by the mortgagee. In fact, the principal case cited
by the Taylor court as an example of an absolute assignment [i.e.,
Ventura-Louise] contains a clause that only can be construed as intended
to assure payment of the debt. Such contingent present assignments allow
the parties to a mortgage to agree to an assignment that gives the
mortgagee an immediate right to rents upon default. In effect, Texas
allows the parties to a mortgage to agree that the mortgagee has a right to
rents immediately upon default through use of the concept of a present
transfer of title with enjoyment deferred until default. 30
129. Id. at 1035.
130. Id. at 1035-36 (citations and footnotes omitted). In one of the footnotes in this passage,
Judge King writes:
A contingent present assignment immediately transfers legal title to rents to the
mortgagee but the mortgagor continues to enjoy the rents until the occurrence of a
specified condition-usually default. Upon the occurrence of the specified condition,
the mortgagee receives the right to enjoy the rents (in addition to the legal title he
already possessed). This theory appears based on trust concepts, but the Texas courts
have not elaborated on this theoretical underpinning.
Id. at 1035 n.2. Actually, it can be said more definitively that the so-called Texas law of
absolute assignment comes entirely from a misreading of Kinnison-a California case. The theory
does not come from "trust concepts" at all.
[Vol. 46:10751106
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Because the parties had agreed that the debtor's power to collect rents free
and clear of the security interest on rent receivables should terminate upon
default, Judge King had no trouble affirming the injunction that prevented the
debtor's managing agent from dissipating the secured party's collateral. This
affirmance did not require a finding that the debtor had forfeited all equity
interest in rent receivables to the secured party.
From the above misreadings of Kinnison has come the extreme position
that the bankruptcy trustee has no turnover right if the mortgage agreement
contains an absolute assignment of rents.' This is because the secured
party has become the absolute owner of the real estate receivables, not merely
the secured party of the receivables.' 32 Accordingly, the real estate receiv-
able, upon default, is to be forfeited temporarily to the secured party. As soon
as the secured claim is paid, the receivables revert automatically to the
debtor. 13
In Commerce Bank v. Mountain View Village, Inc.'34 a mortgagee had
seized control of the rents and had been collecting them for more than ninety
days by the time of the bankruptcy petition. After the Chapter 1 1 petition had
been filed, the debtor-in-possession sought to re-establish its right to collect
rents.'35 Judge Joseph Weis ruled that the debtor had no property interest in
the rents because Pennsylvania law followed the title theory.' 36 In so ruling,
131. See id. at 595.
132. Whether an absolute assignment of rents is intended is often thought to turn on whether
the contract describes the assignment as "additional security." If such language appears, the
assignment is not absolute. See, e.g., In re Mocco, 176 B.R. 355, 341-42 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995)
(Gindin, J.); In re Association Ctr. Ltd. Partnership, 87 B.R. 142, 144-46 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1988) (Steiner, J.). But, given that absolute assignments are still security interests, such linguistic
examinations are pointless.
A better standard is whether the agreement manifests an intent to terminate the debtor's
right to collect rents at some agreed-upon time. In Association Center, such an intent was clear,
see id. at 143; thus, the absolute assignment should have been recognized-as a security interest.
133. In re Union Meeting Partners, 160 B.R. 757, 767 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (Scholl, J.)
(stating "thus, Mountain View effectively provides a mortgagee with either an ownership interest
in rents which expires when the mortgagee's claim is paid in full or an absolute assignment of
the rents for a limited duration."); compare Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater Than
the Whole: How Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and
Open the Capital Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 139 (1993)
(arguing similar arrangements are possible under Article 9 of the U.C.C.).
134. 5 F.3d 34 (3d Cir. 1993) (Weis, J.).
135. As described by the court, the debtor-in-possession "asserted its right to use the rents as
cash collateral in its reorganization plan." Id. at 35-36. Apparently, the debtor was seeking a
turnover of rents under § 542(a). See id. at 38-39 (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc.,
462 U.S. 198 (1983)).
136. Commerce Bank, 5 F.3d at 39 ("We find no indication that Pennsylvania has veered from
its longstanding title theory to one treating mortgages as security interests."). A similar claim
was made with regard to wage garnishments in Riddervold v. Saratoga Hosp., (In re Riddervold),
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Judge Weis implied that, by terminating the debtor's right to collect, the
secured party's lien was changed into an absolute interest in the rents: "[B]y
entering the property and collecting the rents, the banks were 'enforcing' their
rights, not 'perfecting' their liens. The banks' liens arose when the mortgages
were recorded. Liens arising at a later date would be junior to that of the
banks. "137
This passage recognizes that the right to collect rent was a lien prior to
the seizure of the right to collect. After the absolute assignment became
effective, the lien was no longer a lien. Debtor equity had been forfeited upon
default-precisely the medieval forfeiture that equity intervened to prevent so
many centuries ago.13s
647 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1981). In Riddervold, a creditor garnished wages before the voidable
preference period. Id. at 343. Judge Henry Friendly ruled that no voidable preferences had been
received. He found that when the wages were garnished, the judicial lien creditor had received
an absolute assignment of wages prior to the preference period, rather than a mere lien. Id. at
346-47. This position cannot be sustained; it implies that if the debtor were to pay off the debt
owed to the judicial lien creditor, the judicial lien creditor could go on collecting the debtor's
wages in perpetuity. Obviously, if the judicial lien creditor was paid off, the lien on wages
would disappear. In other words, the creditor could only claim a lien, not an absolute assignment
of wages.
Nevertheless, Riddervold was rightly decided for a different reason: The garnishment
encumbered an executory contract prior to the preference period and, was thus immune from
avoidance. See Susan J. Samuels, Note, Garnishment Payments: Voidable Preferences in
Bankruptcy?, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 309, 316-31 (1985).
137. Commerce, 5 F.3d at 39.
138. For other cases following this reasoning, see In re Glen Properties, 168 B.R. 537 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1993) (Debevoise, J.) (New Jersey law); In re Gould, 78 B.R. 590 (Bankr. D. Idaho
1987) (Taylor, J.); In re Woodmere Investor, Ltd. Partnership, 178 B.R. 346, 358-61 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Blackstein, J.) (Michigan law); In re Donato, 170 B.R. 247, 252-54 (Bankr.
D.N.J. 1994) (Ferguson, J.); In re South Pointe Assocs., 161 B.R. 224 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993)
(Barta, J.); In re Mount Pleasant Ltd. Partnership, 144 B.R. 727, 734-37 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1992) (Stevenson, J.); Imperial Gardens Liquidating Trust v. Northwest Commons, Inc. (In re
Northwest Commons, Inc.), 136 B.R. 215 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1991) (Schermer, J.); In re Fry
Road Assocs., Ltd. 64 B.R. 808 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986) (Ayers, J.); In re P.M.G. Properties,
55 B.R. 864 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985) (Brody, J.).
In In re Tripplet, 84 B.R. 84 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988), Judge Glen Ayers modified his
holding in Fry Road by finding absolute assignments to be security interests in rent receivables
and by pointing out that Fry involved special instances of estoppel and waiver. See id. at 87 &
n.2 (citation omitted).
Similarly, a recent Florida statute has been interpreted to create an absolute assignment of
the sort instituted by Mountain View Village. According to this statute:
A mortgage may provide for an assignment of rents. If such assignment is made,
such assignment shall be absolute upon the mortgagor's default, becoming operative
upon written demand made by the mortgagee. Upon application by the mortgagee,
a court of competent jurisdiction may require the mortgagor to deposit such rents in
the registry of the court pending adjudication of the mortgagee's right to the rents,
any payments therefrom to be made solely to protect the mortgaged property and meet
1108 [Vol. 46:1075
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Under such a holding, reorganization is impossible in any real estate case
unless the debtor-in-possession is willing to cover all expenses of the
reorganized entity with new equity contributions while the secured party milks
the rents. Thus, in In re Union Meeting Partners139 Judge David Scholl
found that "none of the Rents can be used by the Debtor in conjunction with
the Plan, even if they are used only to pay for the reasonable expenses of
operating the Property." 40 Instead, "the Debtor was relegated to either
having its General Partners fund the costs of operation throughout the term of
the Plan, or somehow regaining control of all or part of the Rents."141
the mortgagor's lawful obligations in connectionwith the property. Any undisbursed
portion of said rents shall be disbursed in accordance with the court's final judgment
or decree.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.07 (West 1994). For cases finding that this statute successfully excludes
rent receivables from the bankruptestate, see In re Thymewood Apartments, Ltd., 123 B.R. 969,
973 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991) (Kinneary, J.); In re Carter, 126 B.R. 811, 813 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1991) (Proctor, J.); In re Sunrise Indus. Dev. Corp., 121 B.R. 911 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990)
(Weaver, J.); In re Growers Properties No. 56 Ltd., 117 B.R. 1015, 1016 n. 1 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1990) (Baynes, J.); In re 163rd St. Mini Storage, Inc., 113 B.R. 87 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990)
fVeaver, J.).
For cases that deny the statute has any such effect, see In re Gorrow Dev. Corp., 135 B.R.
427, 429-30 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991) (Baynes, J.); In re Mariner Enters., 131 B.R. 190, 192
(Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) (Killian, J.); In re One Fourth St. N., Ltd., 103 B.R. 320, 322 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1989) (Paskay, J.); In re Aloma Square, Inc., 85 B.R. 623, 625 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1988) (Proctor, J.), aff'd, 116 B.R. 827 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (applying statute retroactively, but
finding that the meaning of the statute was to give the secured party only a security interest in
rent receivables).
Some recent state cases have supported the view that the Florida legislation does not create
a new forfeiture of rent receivables and assert that the legislation is only procedural in nature,
affecting the time at which the debtor's right to collect rents free and clear of the mortgage lien
has finally terminated. See Oakbrooke Assocs., Ltd. v. Insurance Comm'r, 581 So.2d 943 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1991)(Dauksch, J.); Nassau Square Assocs., Ltd. v. Insurance Comm'r, 579
So.2d 259 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (per curiam).
Judge Suzanne Conlon, in In re VIII South Michigan Associates, 145 B.R. 912 (N.D. Ill.
1992), ruled as a matter of Illinois law that rent receivables were completely forfeit once a
receiver was appointed, but she relied on dictum from In re Century Investment Fund VIII Ltd.
Partnership, 937 F.2d 371, 377-78 (7th Cir. 1991) (Jones, J.) ("Once bankruptcy is filed, the
debtor has the right to the use of the rental proceeds only if the security interests were not
perfected under state law"). The issue in Century Investment was strictly whether a security
interest on rent receivables was perfected not whether proceeds of the receivables were cash
collateral. Therefore, Judge Erwin Katz thought that the higher court in VIII South might Safely
be ignored. In re Cadwell's Comers Partnership, 174 B.R. 744,756-58 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1994).
139. 165 B.R. 553 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).
140. Id. at 556. Judge Scholl has also ruled that cash collateral stipulations agreed to by the
secured party do not waive the secured party's right to assert its absolute assignment theory. In
re Union Meeting Partners, 160 B.R. 757, 766 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
141. Meeting Partners, 165 B.R. at 557.
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The debtor in Union Meeting Partners argued that Pennsylvania law does
not allow a mortgagee to take possession of encumbered real estate, pocket the
rents, and then let the property deteriorate. Rather, the mortgagee has a duty
to use the rents to maintain the property and to pay down the secured claim
with net rents only.14 Judge Scholl, however, ruled that state law no longer
governed:
[w]e are bound by the decision in Mountain View which holds that a
mortgagee which has properly recorded its assignment of rents and has
made appropriate demand upon the tenants for payment of rents to it pre-
petition holds title to the rents which the debtor may not use to fund a plan
of reorganization. 
143
The alpine view, then, implies that mortgagees are free to milk property by
keeping gross rents. Ironically, rent assignments have been justified by the
fear that unscrupulous debtors would milk real estate rents and let the property
run down."4 Yet, holdings like Mountain View invite the secured party to
do the very thing it was feared debtors would do.
Thus, Mountain View, originally intended to survey the law of Pennsylva-
nia, has become a law unto itself. State law has been overridden even though
the Mountain View court held that, under Butner v. United States,14 a
bankruptcy court must apply state law with regard to security interests on
rent. 146
A series of tests prove that the perception of absolute assignment is false.
Each test shows that the debtor retains a property interest in rent receivables,
even after the debtor's power to collect rents has terminated.
First, assume that under an absolute assignment of rents a debtor has lost
the right to disencumber a security interest on rents by collecting. The
secured party, however, claims several pieces of collateral. Some other piece
of collateral is sold, and the proceeds are enough to pay the mortgage debt
entirely. What happens to the rent in which the secured party is supposed to
have absolute ownership? Theoretically, the secured party may continue to
142. Indeed this very obligation has been taken to mean that absolute assignments are security
interests after all. See infra notes 151-52.
143. 165 B.R. at 564 (footnote omitted).
144. See James McCafferty, The Assignment of Rents in the Crucible of Bankruptcy, 94 CoM.
L.J. 433, 437 (1989); Note, supra note 91, at 1424 & n.1.
145. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
146. Commerce Bank v. Mountain View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34, 37-38 (3d Cir, 1993).
Judge Scholl subsequently expressed "some misgivings regarding the soundness of Mountain View
holdings" and stated that "[the court is] not convinced that the repercussions it will have on single
asset [barlruptcies] are, on balance, fair to all players in the bankruptcy system." Union
Meeting Partners v. Lincoln Nat'l. Life Ins. Co. (In re Union Meeting Partners), 163 B.R. 229,
235 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).
1110 [Vol. 46:1075
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collect rent even after the debt is paid in full. But such a view is untenable.
Instead, courts allow the receivable to revert to the debtor. 47 This proves
that the debtor retained an interest in the receivable. Since the receivable is
rife with debtor equity, it is part of the bankrupt estate under § 541(a)(1) and,
therefore, can be used under § 363.118
147. Judge King described an absolute assignment as follows:
[The debtor] contends that the ... assignment of rents ... [was] included ... to
provide additional protection upon default. We agree. The provisions in the
assignment of rents clause that allow the mortgagor to receive rents until default..
. , that require the mortgagee to apply rental income to the debt (with any remainder
going to the mortgagor), and that provide for termination of the assignment of rents
on release of the deed of trust would be unnecessary were the clause not intended to
assure payment of the debt.
FDIC v. International Property Management, Inc., 929 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (5th Cir. 1991)
(footnotes omitted).
148. In re Mocco, 176 B.R. 355, 344-45 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1995) (Gordon, J.) (debtor owned
the right to redeem rent receivables); In re Hall Elmtree Assocs., 126 B.R. 73, 75 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1991) (Ollason, J.) (applying Virginia law), dismissed in part and rev'd in part, 139 B.R.
571 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991). Judge Jo Ann Stevenson, who thought that a debtor has no equity
interest in rents after default (if the agreement provides for an "absolute assignment"), rather too
quickly remarked:
As the illustration demonstrates, once default occurs a role reversal of sorts takes
place. The mortgagor now has an "inchoate" right to future rents, based on the
uncertain possibility that the property will be redeemed .... The interest which the
mortgagor has does not entitle him to payment of current rents even if he realizes on
his inchoate right of redemption. These rents have slipped forever from his grasp,
and bankruptcy cannot change this fact. To interpret Whiting Pools so broadly as to
never permit the debtor's rights in rents to terminate would effectively overrule
Butner; no matter what state law provided, a mortgagor could never become entitled
to receive rent payments once bankruptcy intervened.
In re Mount Pleasant Ltd. Partnership, 144 B.R. 727, 738 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992)
(Stevenson, J.). "Role reversal" and the debtor's inchoate right to rent actually defeat Judge
Stevenson's argument and prove that the debtor has an equity interest in rent receivables.
Stevenson confuses matters by apparently referring to the principle that, once a mortgagee
collects rents and applies them to the mortgage debt the debtor's equity interest disappears. This
is true (putting aside voidable preference law for the moment). But the issue is the whether the
debtor has an interest in rent receivables that have not yet been collected. Stevenson involuntarily
admits that the debtor has an equity interest in the rent receivables.
In In re South Pointe Assocs., 161 B.R. 224 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993), Judge James Barta
held that a debtor owns surplus in rents only after the secured claim is entirely paid. The rest
is owned by the secured party outright. But Barta does not apply the test suggested in the text,
which shows that the secured party and the debtor generally are covenants to any given rent
receivable, until the secured party collects rents and applies them to the mortgage debt.
Two commentators assert that Florida has made all rent assignments "absolute" in that they
are not mere security interests in rent receivables. Donahue & Edwards, supra note 54, at 657.
Close examination of the Florida legislation shows that this view is untenable. The provision
does say that "such assignment shall be absolute," but it also indicates that the debtor owns an
interest in rents after the mortgage debt is paid. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.07 (West 1994).
Therefore, an "absolute assignment" in Florida remains a mere security interest.
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Second, suppose that after a debtor's right to collect rent has terminated,
the tenant defaults on the obligation to a secured party who holds an absolute
assignment. Does the secured party have recourse against the debtor or the
debtor's property for that which the tenant has failed to ay? 4 9 If recourse
exists, the receivable is only collateral for the secured claim. If the secured
party owned the receivable absolutely, the assignment would constitute an asset
payment that extinguished the secured claim. The secured party would then
assume the risk that the tenant might not pay the rent due. Yet it is very
doubtful that an absolute assignment constitutes an asset payment.' 5
A third test, suggested by Judge Steven Rhodes, is whether the secured
party is restricted by state law to use rent proceeds on the maintenance of the
real estate-a common requirement. "Presumably," he wrote, "if the rents are
the exclusive property of the mortgagee, it can do with the rents as it
wishes."15 As the mortgagee commonly is required to spend proceeds of
rent receivables on property maintenance prior to satisfying the mortgage debt,
Judge Rhodes's test proves that absolute assignments are, in essence, security
interests. 
152
149. A nonrecourse estate mortgage requires a reformulated test: if a tenant defaults, would
the nonrecourse mortgagee have an unsecured artificial recourse claim under § 1111 (b)(1)(A) or
would assignment of the rent receivable absolutely extinguish the mortgage debt?
150. Accord, 500 Ygnacio Assocs. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (In re 500 Ygnac;o Assocs.), 141
B.R. 191, 195 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1992); In re Tripplet, 84 B.R. 84, 88 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1988) (Ayers, J.); Forrester, supra note 5, at 380-82. But see In re Fry Road Assocs., 64 B.R.
808, 809 n.1 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986) (Ayers, J.) ("if title was transferred, a portion of the debt
... has obviously been discharged or paid pro tanto.") (citation omitted).
151. In re Coventry Commons Assocs., 134 B.R. 606, 610 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991), rev'd
on other grounds, 143 B.R. 837 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
152. In re Gorrow Dev. Corp., 135 B.R. 427, 429 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 19)1) (Baynes, J.)
(finding that rent receivables were part of the bankrupt estate on this basis); accord In re One
Fourth St. N., Ltd., 103 B.R. 320, 322 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989) (Paskax, J.). This test,
however, was rejected by Judge Jo Ann Stevenson:
The interest [of the debtor in forcing the mortgagee to maintain the property] is
nothing more than the right any debtor has to see that payments made or collateral
liquidated are applied to the indebtedness. While the mortgagee is under a duty to
use the rents to preserve its collateral and may be required to make expenditures to
that end, the debtor has no interest in the actual payments made or the collateral
liquidated. The debtor's right is analogous to the right of a debtor whose vehicle was
repossessed and sold to have the sale proceeds applied to her loan. This right does
not give her the right to demand that the bank return her car. The only distinction
is that in the case of an assignment of rents the collateral executed upon and
liquidated is an income stream rather than a physical object.
In re Mount Pleasant Ltd. Partnership, 144 B.R. 727, 737 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992)
(Stevenson, J.). Closely examined, this refutation is a complete non sequitur. Stevenson states
that the debtor has no rights in the dollars actually applied to the mortgage debt, but Judge
Rhodes' point is that the debtor can stop application of dollars to the mortgage debt when the
property is not being maintained. It is the power to stop payment that proves the debtor owns
1112 (Vol. 46:1075
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It might as well be admitted that absolute assignments are security
interests, and that rent receivables are, therefore, property of the bankrupt
estate. If, in spite of the above tests, it is still insisted that the secured party
owns the rents free and clear of any debtor equity, then this forfeiture must be
struck down as a clear violation of § 541(c)(1)(B), which provides:
[A]n interest of the debtor in property becomes property of the estate
under subsection (a)(1) ... notwithstanding any provision in an agreement
(B) that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condition of the
debtor . . . or gives an option to effect a forfeiture, modification, or
termination of the debtor's interest in property."'
In effect, the view of the absolute assignment wherein the debtor forfeits her
right to rents upon default violates § 541(c)(1)(B). Even if such a view were
an accurate view of state law, which it is not, it would be negated in a federal
bankruptcy proceeding. Just as equity inserted itself into debtor-creditor
relations centuries ago to prevent forfeitures to mortgagees,154 Bankruptcy
Code § 541(c)(1)(B) intervenes to prevent forfeitures of rent receivables.
The notion of an assignment that is not as security, but rather establishes
the secured party as the unique owner of the rent receivables until the debt is
paid, is designed to deny bankruptcy court for jurisdiction over the cash flow
from the debtor's real estate. If this theory is accepted, no turnover action by
the debtor could be sustained. A turnover theory presupposes that the debtor
has property rights in the thing to be turned over.155 Obviously, such a
theory decreases the ability of a debtor-in-possession to reorganize a single-
asset real estate firm. Real estate receivables are the debtor-in-possession's
an equity interest in rents after all.
153. 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(B) (1988).
154. See In re Willows of Coventry, Ltd. Partnership, 154 B.R. 959, 963-65 (Bankr. N.D.
Ind. 1993) (Grant, J.) (describing Indiana law as interceding in this way); Bryn Athyn Investors,
Ltd. v. Hotton/Conam Realty Pension Investors (In re Bryn Athyn Investors, Ltd.), 69 B.R. 452,
456-57 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1987) (Small, J.) (describing similar North Carolina law). According
to Robert Kratovil:
Any provision in the mortgage purporting to terminate the mortgagor's ownership in
case of his failure to make his payments when due is against public policy and is
absolutelyvoid. "Once a mortgage, always a mortgage." It cannot be converted into
an outright deed by the mere default of the mortgagor. And no matter how the
mortgagee seeks to disguise an attempted waiver of the equitable right of redemption,
the courts will strike it down.
Kratovil, supra note 93, at 3.
155. Under § 542(a), the bankruptcy trustee must be able to "use, sell, or lease" the property
under § 363. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (1988). Under § 543, turnover requires the custodian to deliver
"property of the debtor." Id. § 543(b)(1).
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only source of cash. Without control of this cash, the administration of such
a Chapter 11 case becomes difficult and expensive. 1
56
V. ADEQUATE PROTECTION
A. The Automatic Stay
When a mortgagee has not dispossessed the debtor prior to the bankruptcy
petition, the automatic stay applies to prevent the mortgagee from performing
the act that terminates the debtor's right to collect rent." 7 Thus, § 362(a)(3)
prohibits "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate."158
Meanwhile, § 362(b)(3) permits perfecting acts "to the extent that the trustee's
rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b) of this
title or to the extent that such act is accomplished within the period provided
under section 547(e)(2)(A) of this title. " 1 9 Therefore, if terminating the
trustee's power to collect rents is deemed to be an act of perfection under
§ 546(b), the automatic stay permits termination of the debtor's right to
collect. Section 546(b)(1) provides: "The rights and powers of a trustee
under sections 544, 545, and 549 of this title are subject to any generally
applicable law that-(A) permits perfection of an interest in property to be
effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date
of perfection."'O
Significantly, § 546(b)(2) allows a secured party to replace clumsy
repossessions and receiverships with the elegance of simple notice:
If... a law ... requires seizure of such property or commencement of
an action to accomplish such perfection .,. and such property has not
been seized or such action has not been commenced before the date of the
filing of the petition; such interest in such property shall be perfected ....
by giving notice within the time fixed by such law for such seizure or such
commencement.'
61
156. On the other hand, debtors may have the last laugh when their lenders are held liable
under the Comprehensive Environmental Relief, Compensation, and Liability Act because they
are the controlling "owners" of land contaminated with toxic wastes. See United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990) (Kravitch, J.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046
(1991).
157. In re Park at Dash Point, Ltd. Partnership, 121 B.R. 850, 858 (Bankr. W.D. Wash.
1990) (Volinn, J.), (applying Washington law), aff'd. 152 B.R. 300 (D. Wash. 1991), aff'd, 985
F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993).
158. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (1988).
159. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(3) (1988).
160. 11 U.S.C.A. § 546(b)(1) (West Supp. 1995).
161. Id. § 546(b)(2).
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The mandatory tone of § 546(b) suggests that, when the perfecting act is
dispossession, the only perfecting act that is allowed is the ersatz system of
notification. 62 Any actual attempt to dispossess the debtor-in-possession
would violate the stay. For example, a motion to a state court for a receiver
would constitute a violation of the automatic stay because it is not a perfecting
act sanctioned by § 546(b). Oddly enough, § 362(b)(4) also excuses acts
permissible under § 547(e)(2)(A). Although § 546(b) replaces debtor
dispossessions with a notice procedure in bankruptcy courts, § 547(e)(2)(A)
does not, suggesting that obtaining the receiver under state law is authorized
by § 362(b)(3).' 63
Courts have managed to divide themselves over whether dispossession of
the debtor is a perfecting act or an enforcing act. This distinction becomes a
vital question for avoidance under the trustee's strong-arm power. 164 For the
moment, let us assume that the security interest on rent receivables is
fundamentally valid in bankruptcy. The question arises as to how and when
the debtor-in-possession must provide adequate protection on any security
interest in the rents.
B. Adequate Protection As Condition Precedent to Collection
While the automatic stay is in effect, and assuming that the security
interest has not been avoided, the secured party is entitled to adequate
protection of its security interest in exchange for the trustee's use of the
collateral during the bankruptcy proceeding." 6 According to § 363(e):
[A]t any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property used,
sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the
court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale,
162. In re Mears, 88 B.R. 419,421 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (Weaver, J.); but see In re 1301
ConnecticutAve. Assocs., 117 B.R. 2, 11 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1990), aft'd, 126 B.R. 1 (D.D.C.
1991). In In re 1301 Connecticut Avenue Associates, Judge Martin Teel ruled that a § 546(b)
notice could not perfect a security interest in rents because District of Columbia law conditioned
a receivership upon a finding that the mortgaged property is insufficient to fully secure the
mortgagee. In addition, the mortgagee had to file an adversary proceeding against the trustee and
prove the facts required by local law to obtain the receiver. In re 1301 Connecticut Avenue
Associates, 117 B.R. at 9-11. In a later case, however, Judge Teel ruled that the parties could
contract for other modes of debtor dispossession, if they chose to do so. In re 5028 Wisconsin
Ave. Assocs., 167 B.R. 699, 704 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994).
163. This inconsistency is what might be called a drafting glitch. One may expect bankruptcy
courts to ignore the plain meaning of the Bankruptcy Code and insist that obtaining a receiver is
barred by the automatic stay.
164. The trustee's strong arm power is providedby 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988). The avoidance
theory is discussed infra text accompanying notes 255-78.
165. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988).
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or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such inter-
est. 66
Quite apart from the confusing context of rent receivables, courts are
badly divided on the question of exactly when the trustee's duty of adequate
protection arises. 67 One theory of adequate protection holds that the right
to adequate protection arises as soon as the petition is filed. 165 Under this
view, adequate protection is the quid pro quo for the automatic stay's
prevention of enforcement acts. When this theory of adequate protection
prevails, the trustee may collect no rents, unless the proceeds are adequately
protected. Such collection depletes the real estate receivables to the prejudice
of an undersecured party. Accordingly, adequate protection becomes the
automatic precondition to collecting the cash as soon as the bankruptcy petition
is filed.1 69
Taken to its logical conclusion, this theory trumps the trustee's strong-arm
power. Collection disencumbers the rent proceeds from the security interest.
Yet, if adequate protection must be provided before collection occurs, the
trustee cannot avoid the security interest by collecting rent. One of the few
cases to follow this theory of adequate protection explicitly is In re Northport
Marina Associates. 70 There, Judge Cecilia Goetz conceded that the trustee's
strong-arm power might be temporarily senior to a security interest on a rent
receivable, but that the secured party claiming the receivable had a right to
adequate protection before the debtor could use the rent receivable by
collecting it:
But the Debtor cannot void Citibank's lien under 11 U.S.C. § 544 in the
sense of wiping that lien out. At best, Section 544 in this context
establishes priorities. The right of [the debtor] to the rents is superior to
Citibank's but in whatever use [the debtor] makes of the rents it is subject
to the restrictions the Code imposes on the use of cash collateral. Once
rents are deemed a type of cash collateral subject to the restrictions
166. Id.
167. See generally Carlson, supra note 33.
168. E.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Lee (In re Lee), 162 B.R. 217, 223 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1993) (MacLaughlin, J.) (finding that a secured party must receive value as it existed on the day
of the petition); In re Brinson, 153 B.R. 952, 954 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993) (Proctor, J.)
(determining that fair market value is determined as of the date of filing of the petition).
169. For examples of this view, see In re Wheaton Oaks Office Partners, 27 F.3d 1234, 1241-
42 (7th Cir. 1994) (Manion, J.); In re Mount Pleasant Ltd. Partnership, 144 B.R. 727, 737
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992) (Stevenson, J.); In re Princeton Overlook Joint Venture, 143 B.R.
625 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (Gindin, J.); In re White Plains Dev. Corp., 136 B.R. 93 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Schwartzber, J.); In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143, 146-49 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991)
(Yacos, J.).
170. 136 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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imposed on such property, regardless of whether the mortgagee had taken
possession of them pre-petition by appointment of a receiver or other legal
action, it becomes irrelevant whether Section 546(b) permits a relation-
back pre-petition.'
7 1
It cannot logically be the case, however, that the obligation to provide
adequate protection precedes the trustee's power as transferee of debtor
property under the strong-arm power. 72 If it did, then a trustee would have
the obligation to protect any unperfected security interest before the hypotheti-
cal judicial lien could take priority over it. In short, adequate protection
would terminate the strong-arm power. Therefore, to the extent a bona fide
purchaser of the debtor could collect free and clear of the security interest on
rent receivables, then no obligation to provide adequate protection can arise
until the secured party terminates this power.
C. Subjunctive Time
Some courts think that adequate protection does not arise upon the filing
of a bankruptcy petition. Rather, it arises when the secured party would have
repossessed the collateral under state law. 73 This theory was followed by
Judge Volinn in the often cited case of In re Park at Dash Point Limited
Partnership: 1
74
We are of the view that enforcing the secured creditor's interest in the
rents by declaring the mortgagee to be entitled to the rents collected after
a certain date when the mortgagee would have been able to enforce that
interest in state court but for the automatic stay is a proper exercise of
bankruptcy jurisdiction. 75
171. Id. at 920-21. This statement suffers from a slight imprecision. Judge Goetz writes that
once rents are deemed a type of cash collateral, the right to adequate protection arises. This
assumes that general intangibles are cash collateral, when it is better to admit that general
intangibles are not "cash" until they are collected. See infra text accompanying notes 188-95.
If this minor lapse is overlooked, Judge Goetz explains how the right to adequate protection for
the security interest on the rent receivable itself prevents any collection that would disencumber
the proceeds from the security interest on the receivable.
172. Accord, Baybank Valley Trust Co. v. Guay (In re Guay), 138 B.R. 3, 4 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1992) (Krechevsky, J.).
173. In re Glinz, 69 B.R. 916, 919-20 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1987) (Hill, J.); In re Asbridge, 66
B.R. 894, 900-01 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1986) (Hill, J.); In re Bessey, 65 B.R. 638, 644 (Bankr. S.D.
Cal. 1986) (Malugen, J.); see Carlson, supra note 33, at 130-35.
174. 121 B.R. 850 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990) (Volinn, J.), aff'd, 152 B.R. 300 (D. Wash.
1991), and sub. aff'd, nom. Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point
Ltd. Partnership), 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993).
175. Id. at 860. In so ruling, Judge Volinn contradicts an analogy he made to Article 9
treatment of encumbered accounts. Judge Volinn implied that a lien creditor garnishing a rent
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This view of adequate protection is closely connected with the valuation
exercise that adequate protection implicitly requires." In evaluating
collateral, a court is supposed to imagine what the secured party could have
obtained from a foreclosure sale if there had been no bankruptcy. Borrowing
from this subjunctive exercise, adequate protection arises only when the
secured party would have dispossessed the debtor after bankruptcy. Before
then, the trustee may use receivables without having to supply adequate
protection. Any collections achieved disencumber the cash from the mortgage
lien.
D. On Request Only
Many courts infer from § 363(e) that a trustee has no obligation to
provide adequate protection unless a secured party requests it.'" "Colloqui-
ally expressed, if you don't ask for it, you won't get it."7 8 This interpreta-
tion of adequate protection comes from the exact wording of § 363(e), which
provides:
[A]t any time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property used,
sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the
court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale,
or lease as is necessary to provide adequate protection of such inter-
est. 
179
receivable obtained rights analogous to a lien creditor who had garnished an account encumbered
by a perfected Article 9 security interest. If this analysis is followed through, then any amount
collected by a bankruptcy trustee is the secured party's cash collateral, which cannot be used
without adequate protection. This would be so no matter when the collection takes place. But
by allowing the trustee to disencumber rents until the subjunctive time of hypothetical
dispossession, Volinn is denying that the initial collections are cash collateral.
176. See David Gray Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Character of Bankruptcy
Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 63, 70-75 (1991).
177. In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 154 B.R. 176 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) (Balick, J.); In re
Best Products Co., 138 B.R. 155 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Lifland, J.), aff'd, 149 B.R. 346
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 134 B.R. 536, 544 (Bankr. D. Del.
1991) (Balick, J.); In re Kain, 86 B.R. 506, 512 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) (Gregg, J.); Greives
v. Bank of Western Indiana (In re Greives), 81 B.R. 912 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1987)
(Lindquist, J.); In re Offerman Farms, Inc., 67 B.R. 279 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986) (Melloy, J.);
In re Provincetown-Boston Airline, Inc., 66 B.R. 632, 633-34 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1986)
(Paskay, J.); First State Bank v. Advisory Info. & Management Sys. (In re Advisory Info. &
Management Sys.), 50 B.R. 627 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1985) (Lundia, J.); In re Briggs Transp.
Co., 47 B.R. 6, 8 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (Kressel, J.); United States v. Collins (In re Northeast
Chick Servs.), 43 B.R. 326 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (Glennon, J.); In re Hinckley, 40 B.R. 679
(Bankr. D. Utah 1984) (Clark, J.); In re Adams, 2 B.R. 313 (Bankr. M.D. Fla, 1980)
(Proctor, J.).
178. In re Kain, 86 B.R. 506, 512 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1988) (Gregg, J.).
179. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (1988).
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Under § 363(e), a court must award adequate protection when requested to do
so. Therefore, the trustee has no inherent duty to provide adequate protection.
Adequate protection arises only when the secured party requests it by filing
motion to lift the automatic stay18 or to sequester rents."' Until then, the
trustee may continue to collect rents free and clear of the mortgage lien.
E. Rent Receivables as Cash Collateral
If the trustee has no duty to supply adequate protection until the secured
party asks for it, a major exception exists when the secured party claims "cash
collateral." That term is defined in § 363(a) as follows:
"[Clash collateral" means cash, negotiable instruments, documents of title,
securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired
in which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest and
includes the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of proper-
ty... subject to a security interest as provided in section 552(b) of this




180. Section 362(d)(1) mandates lifting the automatic stay when there is a lack of adequate
protection. See I1 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (1988). It is assumed for the moment that dispossessing
the debtor to terminate the debtor's right to collect rents is an enforcing act, not a perfecting act.
When the security interest on rent receivables is deemed unperfected, it has been held that lifting
the automatic stay is a mere prelude to dispossessingthe debtor. It is not dispossessionitself and,
therefore, not sufficient to perfect the security interest.
181. See Sears Say. Bank v. Tucson Indus. Partners (In re Tucson Indus. Partners), 129 B.R.
614 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (Volinn, J.), vacated as moot, 990 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1993); In re
Raleigh/Spring Forest Apartments Assocs., 118 B.R. 42 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990) (Small, J.); In
re Selden, 62 B.R. 954 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986) (Mahoney, J.). No provision of the Bankruptcy
Code governs sequestering rents per se. Justice John Paul Stevens invited bankruptcy judges to
sequester rents under their equity powers. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 56-57
(1979). Section 363(c)(4) requires the trustee to segregate cash collateral. A motion to sequester
could be viewed as an adjunct to that provision.
InIn re Polo Club Apartments Associates Ltd. Partnership, 150 B.R. 840 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1993), dishonest collecting agents made off with prepetition rents. This theft gave rise to a
conversion chose in action. Id. at 844. Because the debtor had not been dispossessed from the
property, this chose in action belonged solely to the debtor. See id. at 855. Judge Stacey Cotton
ruled that Georgia law required the debtor to be dispossessed before termination of the debtor's
power to disencumber rents could occur. See id. at 851.
Judge Cotton went on to rule that the secured party had no right to adequate protection
solely because the petition was filed. Id. at 854. Furthermore, the act of dispossessionwas not
a perfecting act. See id. at 853. Therefore, the automatic stay perpetuated the trustee's right to
disencumber rents through collection. A motion to sequester rents, however, would terminate
the trustee's power to disencumber rents. See id. at 854-55.
182. 11 U.S.C. § 363 (a) (1988), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, see. 214, § 363(a), 108 Stat. 4106, 4126 (1994) (emphasis added). The reference
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When a secured party claims cash collateral, a bankruptcy trustee must apply
to the court for permission to spend the cash unless all interested entities
consent to its use.' Because the trustee must take the initiative, the burden
shifts to the bankruptcy trustee to show that adequate protection exists.'
Therefore, in the case of cash collateral, the duty to provide adequate
protection arises at the beginning of the bankruptcy proceeding, even when the
secured party has failed to play the supplicant. " Accordingly, if the rent
receivables are deemed cash collateral, then all of the preceding theories of
adequate protection must be displaced, and the secured party has an immediate
and automatic right to adequate protection as soon as the petition is filed.
Section 363 (a)'s definition of cash collateral specifically mentions "rents."
If rents means "real estate receivables,"186 then the secured party always has
the right to adequate protection as to rents-from the start of the bankruptcy
proceeding. This would be so under any theory of adequate protection.
Indeed, many courts have equated rent receivables with cash collateral. 17
to rents was added in 1984. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 98-353, sec. 442(a), § 363(a),
Pub. L. No. 98 Stat. 371 (1984) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 363(a) (1988)).
183. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (1988).
184. Id. § 363(o)(1).
185. In In re Coventry Commons Associates, 134 B.R. 606, 607 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1991),
rev'd on other grounds, 143 B.R. 837 (E.D. Mich. 1992), Judge Stephen Rhodes wrote,
"Whether an asset constitutes cash collateral or not is only important to the determination of
which party bears the burden of petitioning the court to resolve any disputes regarding the
debtor's use of the asset during the bankruptcy case." This assertion is true only if it is agreed
that a trustee has an automatic duty to provide adequate protection as soon as the bankruptcy
petition is filed. Judge Rhodes noted that the secured party had undertaken the burden and
therefore determining whether real estate receivables are cash collateral was unnecessary.
Id. at 607.
186. The term "rent" can mean different things in different contexts. Herbert Tiffany
identified four meanings: (1) rent receivables in general, (2) specific rent receivables, (3) the right
to collect rent receivables, and (4) money successfully collected in satisfaction of a rent
receivable. 3 HERBERT T. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 876 (3d ed. 1939).
187. E.g., Vienna Park Properties v. United Postal Say. Ass'n (In re Vienna Park Properties),
976 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1992) (Meskill, J.); Sears Sav. Bank v. Tucson Indus. Partners (In
re Tucson Indus. Partners), 129 B.R. 614, 625 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (Volinn, J.), vacated as
moot, 990 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1993); In re May, 169 B.R. 462, 467 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994)
(David, J.); In re Miller, 133 B.R. 882, 886 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (Krasniewski, J.); In re
KNM Roswell Ltd. Partnership, 126 B.R. 548, 556 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1991) (Coar, J.); In re
Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143, 148 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (Yacos, J.); In re Somero, 122 B.R. 634,
639-41 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991) (Goodman, J.); Wilhite Pure Oil Truck Stop, Inc. v. McCutchen
(In re McCutchen), 115 B.R. 126, 133 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990) (Brown, J.); Capital Realty
Investor Tax Exempt Fund Ltd. Partnership v. Greenhaven Village Apartments of Burnsville
Phase II Ltd. Partnership (In re Greenhaven Village Apartments of Burnsville Phase II Ltd.
Partnership), 100 B.R. 465, 471 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (Kressel, J.); In re Prichard Plaza
Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R. 289, 293 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (Queenan, J.).
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This equation is imprecise. A real estate receivable represents a tenant's
obligation to pay money for the use of real estate. The promise to pay money
is not the same as money, just as inventory is not the same as cash proceeds
of inventory. Therefore, it should be understood that rents in § 363(a) refers
only to collections, not to real estate receivables itself."' 8 According to the
legislative history:
[[I]f "non-cash" collateral is disposed of and the proceeds come within the
definition of "cash collateral" as set forth in this subsection, the proceeds
would be cash collateral as long as they remain subject to the original lien
on the "non-cash" collateral under section 552(b). To illustrate, rents
received from real property before or after the commencement of the case
would be cash collateral to the extent that they are subject to a lien.' 9
Furthermore, new § 552(b)(2), amended in 1994, contains this language:
[I]f the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement before the
commencement of the case and if the security interest created by such
security agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the
commencement of the case and to amounts paid as rents of such property
... then such security interest extends to such rents ... acquired by the
estate after the commencement of the case to the extent provided in such
security agreement .... o
The italicized language points to the collections as rents, not to the intangible
receivables, which continue to be noncash collateral.
In Vienna Park Properties v. United Postal Savings Association (In re
Vienna Park Properties), 9' Judge Thomas Meskill affirmed in an ironic way
the proposition that receivables are not the same as cash. In the first part of
the opinion, he ruled that rent receivables are cash collateral.192 But,
inconsistently, in the second part of the opinion, he ruled that cash and
obligations to pay cash are not the same.'93
In Vienna Park Properties, the parties had set up an escrow fund into
which the debtor and others paid cash. This escrow fund was to serve as
additional collateral. The secured party, however, forgot to file a U.C.C.
188. Accord, In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 855-56 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990)
(Volinn, J.), aff'd sub nom. Steinberg v. Crossland Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point
L.P.), 152 B.R. 300 (D. Wash. 1991), aft'd, 985 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1993).
189. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5841 (emphasis added).
190. 11 U.S.C.A. § 552(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
191. 976 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1992).
192. Id. at 113.
193. Id. at 116.
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financing statement. Judge Meskill ruled that the security interest in the
escrow fund was unperfected and, hence, void in the bankruptcy. 94 The
secured party had tried to argue that the escrow fund was money, a security
interest in which might be perfected by possession. Meskill ruled that "[a]
contractual right to obtain money at some future time is not the same thing as
money itself."1 Therefore, the escrow fund was a general intangible, not
cash.
Similarly, the real estate receivable is not cash either. It becomes cash
collateral only when collected. Hence, for those inclined to believe that the
trustee may use noncash collateral without adequately protecting it (until such
time as the secured party asks for it), it also follows that the trustee can collect
the receivable and thereby disencumber the receivable from the security
interest. In other words, the debtor's right to disencumber rents survives the
bankruptcy petition and is transferred to the trustee, until the secured party
makes the request that § 363(e) supposedly requires.
F. No Right at All
Judge James Queenan has taken the position that adequate protection is
never an impediment to a trustee's expropriation of rent collections. In In re
Mullen 96 Judge Queenan theorized that if the trustee expropriates rents as
they are collected, the secured party is adequately protected because the
expropriated rents are replaced by new rents that accrue over time.
[The secured party] says the value of its interest in the Debtor's
property declines each time the Debtor consumes a month's rent in its
operations. That is not so. Although [the secured party] loses its security
interest in each month's rents as the rents are consumed, [the secured
party] retains its security interest in all future rents. The value of that
stream of future rents is not declining. The lien on each month's rents
replaces the lien on the prior month's rents, so there is a replacement lien
of equal value, within the meaning of section 36.17
In claiming that the debtor can expropriate proceeds of rent because the
expropriated amounts are constantly replaced by new proceeds that become
due as time passes, Judge Queenan analogized real estate mortgages to security
interests on inventory or accounts receivable under Article 9:
194. Id. at 117.
195. Id. at 116.
196. 172 B.R. 473 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
197. Id. at 476.
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A lender's security interest in receivables or inventory and their
proceeds provides an analogy to the security interest in rents. A receivable
or inventory lender does not lack adequate protection, even if it is
undersecured, so long as the value of the stream of future accounts or
inventory and their proceeds is not declining. As a result, orders routinely
issue authorizing a debtor to use a lender's cash collateral consisting of the
proceeds of receivables or inventory. The lender cannot complain about
the debtor's consumption of any particular proceeds. Those proceeds are
used to generate new collateral and new proceeds. Assuming the debtor
is operating at no less than a break even, the new collateral and proceeds
will be of at least equivalent value of those they replace. The same is true
of each month's rents received by the Debtor. 9
It is true, as Judge Queenan suggested, that Article 9 security interests have
a renewable quality. When a debtor sells inventory free and clear of the
security interest and then spends the cash collateral on new inventory, the
secured party has conceivably obtained adequate protection for the inventory
because cash collateral was created to replace it. Meanwhile, the secured
party has been adequately protected for the cash collateral because new
inventory was bought with the cash.
Rent receivables are not different in nature. If a tenant signs a long-term
lease, a single rent receivable is created, which the tenant must pay over time.
When that lease has expired, the tenant vacates and allows a replacement
tenant to take over, replacing one rent receivable with another. As long as the
encumbered reversionary interest in the underlying real estate holds its value,
the secured creditor is adequately protected with replacement collateral. 99
198. Id. at 477-78 (footnotes omitted).
199. See id. at 478; see also In re Citicorp Park Assocs., 180 B.R. 15 (Bankr. D. Me. 1995)
(Goodman, J.) (following Mullen); In re Barkley 3A Investors, Ltd., 175 B.R. 755, 758-60
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1994) (Flanagan, J.) (following Mullen): In re Ledgemere Land Corp., 116 B.R.
338, 343 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1990) (Queenan, J.) (recognizing that adequate protection focuses on
the entire property, not solely the interest in rent receivables); In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 84 B.R. 289, 301 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988) (Queenan, J.) (denying adequate
protection to secured party claiming rents).
Similar ideas are set forth in In re Stone Ridge Associates, Ltd. Partnership, 142 B.R. 967
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1992). Judge John Flannagan defended the state law notion of connectingpower
over the rents with possession. This allows the mortgagor to pay taxes and maintain the
property, which evidences the debtor's being in possession of the reversionary interest in the real
estate. Furthermore, in Chapter 11, the debtor should be a debtor-in-possession, suggesting that
the debtor should have an unencumbered cash flow from the property. Thus, the debtor should
have all power over cash flow under Chapter 11. Id. at 970-71.
Technically, Stone Ridge is a strong-arm case, not an adequate protection case.
Interestingly enough, Flannagan simply declined to effectuate the strong-arm power where no
Chapter 11 reorganization was feasible. See id. at 972-73. On this aspect of the case, see infra
text accompanying notes 275-77.
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This view may be compared to the position articulated in In re Landing
Associates, Ltd.,2 °' where Judge Leif Clark found that the security interest
on rent receivables was "decidedly distinct from those conferred by a deed of
trust alone."2' According to Clark, "What appraisers are valuing (or
predicting) is what someone would be willing to pay to own the property and
enjoy its fruits. ... The right to specific rents prior to ownership of the
property... is a priori not calculated into this value.'"2 If the real estate
can be analogized to a job-human capital or an executory contract-owning
the job is one thing and getting paid is quite another. It is a distortion of the
employment market to say that salary and hire is the same as (and therefore
superfluous to) the job. Similarly, the security interest on the rent receivables
is not the same as the real estate itself.20
For his contrary view, Judge Queenan drew further support from the
landmark case of United Savings Ass' of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest
Associates, Ltd.,2' which established that undersecured creditors should not
obtain postpetition interest. In Timbers Justice Antonin Scalia strongly implied
that undersecured creditors should not improve their position over time.
Instead, everything should be frozen as of the time the bankruptcy petition is
filed. As Justice Scalia summarized the issue:
The crux of the present dispute is that petitioner asserts, and respondent
denies, that the phrase "interest in property" also includes the secured
party's right (suspended by the stay) to take immediate possession of the
defaulted security, and apply it in payment of the debt. If that right is
embraced by the term, it is obviously not adequately protected unless the
secured party is reimbursed for the use of the proceeds he is deprived of
during the term of the stay.205
Because the undersecured party should be protected only for the value of the
collateral on the day of the bankruptcy petition, the undersecured party was
not entitled to postpetition interest as part of its right to adequate protec-
tion. 6
Judge Queenan thought that this holding should also apply to security
interests on postpetition rent receivables:
200. 122 B.R. 288 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
201. Id. at 296.
202. Id. at 297.
203. Accord, Travelers Ins. Co. v. River Oaks Ltd. Partnership (In re River Oaks Ltd.
Partnership), 166 B.R. 94, 99 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (Duggan, J.).
204. 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (Scalia, J.).
205. Id. at 370-71.
206. Id. at 382. The undersecured party in Timbers was itself a mortgagee enjoying an
improvement in position as rents accrued. See infra note 220.
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What [the secured party] actually wants to do is to now realize upon its
security interest in rents. In United Savings Association of Texas v.
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., the Supreme Court held a
secured creditor's "interest in property" does not include the right to
immediate possession of collateral or its proceeds at foreclosure. By the
same token, "interest in property" does not include the right to immediate
possession of rents.2 7
Mullen is the second reported opinion in which Judge Queenan had
disencumbered rent receivables in the name of Timbers of Inwood Forest. In
the earlier case of In re Prichard Plaza Associates Ltd. Partnership,"s
Queenan held that the debtor-in-possession could expropriate all rents without
providing any adequate protection."°9 From Timbers, Queenan induced that
"adequate protection of a security interest consists of protection against decline
in the value of the security interest rather than protection against loss of the
opportunity of present realization on the collateral."210 As applied to real
estate cases, Queenan thought that so long as the value of the real property
was not declining adequate protection was satisfied. Meanwhile, the trustee
could collect the rent receivables as if they were disencumbered for the
duration of the bankruptcy proceeding.2 '
Judge Queenan's use of Timbers in these two opinions is not immune from
criticism. In deciding that undersecured parties did not deserve postpetition
interest, Justice Scalia specifically pointed out that under § 552(b) the secured
party with an assignment of rents was guaranteed an income flow after
207. In re Mullen, 172 B.R. 473, 476-77 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (footnote omitted).
208. 84 B.R. 289 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
209. Id. at 301-02. Queenan also delved into Massachusetts law to find that the assignment
of rents added nothing to the basic mortgage right. See id. at 297. He found that the assignment
of rents, by its terms, ambiguously attempted to expand the rights of the mortgagee beyond what
state law supplied in the absence of the assignment. Id. at 299. Hence, prior to this
dispossession, the debtor continued to have the right to collect rent. In this circumstance,
Queenan observed, the secured party's security interest in rent was "more accurately described
as inchoate rather than unperfected." Id. at 298. For this reason, Judge Queenan ruled that §
546(b) could not justify a postpetition sequestration of rents for the secured party. Dispossession
of the debtor was enforcement, not the perfection to which § 546(b) refers. Id. at 299-301.
In Prichard Plaza the secured party was collecting some rent at the time of the bankruptcy
petition, although other tenants were paying the debtor or paying into escrow. Collection of rents
might be evidence that the secured party had effectively dispossessed the debtor from the
reversion, but Judge Queenan specifically found that the debtor was still "managing" the property
and so had not been dispossessed. See id. at 298.
while illuminating, the above discussion was beside the point, because Judge Queenan
eventually ruled that the security interest on rent receivables was not entitled to adequate
protection. See id. at 301.
210. Id. at 301.
211. See id. at 301-03.
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bankruptcy. To give any secured party the same right to an income flow,
Scalia thought, was to render § 552(b) superfluous.212 Yet, when Judge
Queenan equated the assignment of rents with an illegitimate claim to
postpetition interest, he rendered § 552(b) superfluous in precisely the way that
Scalia opposed.
In yet a third unreported opinion, Judge Queenan once again applied his
reasoning, but, on appeal, in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Boston Harbor
Marina Co.,"' Nathaniel M. Gorton disagreed. While he did not dispute
Judge Queenan's reading of Massachusetts law,2"' Gorton thought that the
Bankruptcy Code required adequate protection of the rents at issue. All that
the security interest lacked, Judge Gorton thought, was its "enforcement."215
From this premise it followed, without further explication, that the secured
party had a "'cash collateral' security interest in post-petition rents."2" 6 This
view comports with the result defended earlier-that the trustee may not use
the encumbered rent receivable by collecting it until it is adequately protected.
Accordingly, adequate protection arises immediately when the bankruptcy
petition is filed.
In Mullen, however, Judge Queenan had the last word. He noted that in
Boston Harbor Judge Gorton had remanded to allow the district court to
explore whether the equities exception might apply.2" 7 The matter settled
before Judge Queenan could rule.218 Judge Queenan observed:
Significantly, Judge Gorton did not discuss adequate protection principles,
apparently because they were not argued. My ruling [in Boston Marina]
was largely grounded on these principles, but unfortunately it was not
accompanied by findings of fact or conclusions of law.
Judge Gorton's decision is therefore not inconsistent with my holding
here.2
19
For this reason, Judge Queenan felt at liberty to obliterate the security interest
on rent receivables, using Timbers as his blunt weapon.'
212. Timbers, 484 U.S. at 374.
213. 159 B.R. 616 (D. Mass. 1993).
214. See In re Mullen, 172 B.R. 473, 481 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (Queenan, J.); see also
Boston Harbor, 159 B.R. at 619-21.
215. Boston Harbor, 159 B.R. at 621-22.
216. Id.
217. Mullen, 172 B.R. at 481.
218. Id. Judge Queenan used the equities exception as his back-up reason to avoid the security
interest in rent receivables. See infra text accompanying notes 241-46.
219. Mullen, 172 B.R. at 481.
220. Judge Queenan looked to cases that dealt with adequate protection payments actually made
to an undersecured party. See generally Carlson, supra note 24. For example, if a court orders
an undersecured creditor to receive payment during the pendency of a bankruptcy proceeding,
[Vol. 46:1075
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the court must decide the meaning or effect of that payment. Payment might reduce the secured
claim or it might reduce only the unsecured portion of the total undersecured claim. Of these
opinions, Queenan writes, "Most helpful are decisions dealing with disputes concerning the
proper application of consensual payment made during the case to the mortgage holder. Most
courts hold no adequate protection payments was [sic] necessary when the property's value
remains constant." Mullen, 172 B.R. at 477.
This is perhaps a misleading description of the case law, and thus Judge Queenan's use of
such authority is on shakier ground than the rest of his opinion. If "adequate protection
payment" means payment of unencumbered dollars in order to compensate the secured party for
depreciation of the collateral, see 11 U.S.C. § 361(1) (1988), the descriptionis perhaps accurate.
Some courts think that such narrowly defined adequate protection payments are indeed improper.
See, e.g., In re Senior Care Properties, Inc., 137 B.R. 527, 529 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992)(
Killian, J.); In re Laymon, 117 B.R. 856, 865 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd, No. CIV. A. A-
90-CA-1025, 1991 WL 349624 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 22, 1991) rev'd on other grounds, 958 F.2d
72 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom. Crozier v. Bradford, 113 S. Ct. 328 (1992).
Surrenders of excess cash collateral-encumbered dollars-must be distinguished from
adequate protection payments. Here courts routinely insist that the secured party be paid, even
if the value of the collateral remains constant. One example is the famous Timbers case. Cash
collateral surrenders are more similar to abandonment of over-encumbered collateral than to
adequate protection payments in compensation for depreciation expense. To be sure, in both
cases, the secured party must apply the dollars received to reduce the total mortgage debt, and
also the secured portion of the undersecured claim. When unencumbered dollars are paid,
"reducing the secured portion of the undersecured claim" means subtracting the payments from
the pre-existing secured claim. When the dollars are encumbered, however, "reducing the
secured portion of the undersecured claim" occurs by the very fact of the surrender itself. Any
further deduction would constitute double counting. See Carlson, supra note 29.
Judge Queenan continues:
For example, in In re IPC Atlanta Ltd. Partnership, the debtor had voluntarily made
eight mortgage payments during the case. It did so even though the property's value
was not declining. The debtor later proposed a plan that sought to apply the
payments to the first eight mortgage payments due after confirmation. The mortgagee
argued that the payments already made were necessary to adequately protect it against
the debtor's use of rents because the rental assignment gave it a separate category of
collateral. The payments, said the mortgagee, merely offset the rents used and should
not reduce its debt at all. The court disagreed. It viewed the security interest as a
whole, treating as one the security interest obtained through the mortgage and the rent
assignment. Because the value of that over-all interest was not declining, the court
held there was no lack of adequate protection .... It therefore allowed the
payments to be offset against future plan payments. Not to apply the payments
against the debt, the court observed, would allow the creditor to receive more than
the amount of its secured claim. Most of the decisions have adopted this reasoning
and require postpetition payments to be credited to principal.
Mullen, 172 B.R. at 477 (citing In re IPC Atlanta Ltd. Partnership, 142 B.R. 547 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1992)) (footnotes omitted).
Judge Queenan somewhat misrepresents the holding in the difficult IPC case, because he
confuses genuine adequate protection payments with surrenders of cash collateral. In IPC Judge
Homer Drake effectively disencumbered the security interest on rent receivables, recharacterized
the surrendered cash collateral as genuine adequate protection payments, and then insisted that
the secured party reduce the secured claim on the reversionary interest of the debtor. In essence,
Judge Drake insisted that the secured party repay the debtor the "unencumbered dollars" that had
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G. Equity Cushions and § 506(c) Expenses
Although Judge Queenan's remarkable holding swims against the strong
riptide of recent authority, there are two important situations where the
trustee's duty of adequate protection does not exist or is, at least, entirely
consistent with expropriating the rents. First, if the rents constitute a surplus
of collateral for the mortgagee, the trustee may use the cash as if the rents
were entirely unencumbered.1 Even though the cash is part of the surplus,
it remains cash collateral and, therefore, is subject to § 363(c)(2). Consent or
court authority is still required, but adequate protection is not. This rule may
be compared to a frequently asserted state law principle that a mortgagee is
entitled to a receiver for the collection of rent only when undersecured. If the
sale of the underlying real estate is sufficient to cover the mortgage debt, some
states will deny the mortgagee the right to a receiver.'
Second, adequate protection is not required if the cash is to be used for
the benefit of the secured party. Section 506(c) provides, "The trustee may
recover from property securing an allowed secured claim the reasonable,
necessary costs and expenses of preserving, or disposing of, such property to
the extent of any benefit to the holder of such claim."' Real estate
requires maintenance, and when a building is maintained, the expense falls
within the scope of § 506(c). Section 506(c) represents the mirror opposite of
adequate protection. Whereas adequate protection implies protection against
the trustee's administration of the bankrupt estate, § 506(c) implies that the
secured party must pay for the trustee's administrative contributions. Section
506(c), therefore, institutes a principle that real estate law vindicates: secured
wrongfully been paid out. The repayment, however, was exacted in the form of setoffs against
the initial payments under the chapter 11 plan due to the secured party. IPC, 142 B.R. at 558-
59.
Nevertheless, Judge Queenan properly cited IPC as support for his controversial holding.
In both cases, the security interest on rent receivables was effectively avoided-not under any
strong arm or voidable preference theory but under the principles of adequate protection.
Queenan went on to invoke the equities exception to § 552(b), which, he thought, should
prevent any secured party from improving his position at the debtor's expense. This aspect of
the case is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 241-46.
221. See In re James Wilson Assocs., 965 F.2d 160, 171 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.); In re
Rancourt, 123 B.R. 143, 151-53 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) (Yacos, J.). An oversecured creditor
may try to claim that the trustee has the duty to let the cash accrue so that the secured party's
right to postpetition interest under § 506(b) might accrue against it. Although some authority
exists for the proposition that-the trustee has such a duty, the majority view is that the duty does
not exist. See Carlson, supra note 31.
222. See, e.g., In re 1301 Connecticut Ave. Assocs., 117 B.R. 2, 11 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1990)
(reel, J.), aft'd, 126 B.R. 1 (D.D.C. 1991); Restatement of Property-Security (Mortgages)
§ 4.3(a) (Tentative Draft No. 3 1994).
223. 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988).
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parties have the duty to maintain the value of the collateral on behalf of the
debtor during the time the secured parties are in possession.'
Neither of the above-described principles is in serious dispute. No right
to adequate protection adheres when the cash is part of the equity cushion or
where the trustee has a valid § 506(c) claim against the cash. Significantly,
both principles find expression in local law apart from federal bankruptcy
jurisprudence.
224. See Mullen, 172 B.R. at 477; Note, supra note 91, at 1432. According to Judge James
Yacos:
"[R]ents do not spring from the ground"; .. . if the mortgagee seeks to collect the
rents the mortgagee must likewise undertake the responsibilities and liabilities of
management and operation of the business premises to justify receiving future rent
payments. To do otherwise would in effect have the mortgagor act as an indentured
servant acting for the mortgagee in operation of the business while allowing the
mortgagee to take the fruits of the mortgagor's continuing efforts without any of the
liabilities.
In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. at 148 (citation omitted). On the basis of this principle from state law,
some courts rule that the security interest on rent receivables exists only to the extent of net rents
above the amount necessary to maintain the property. E.g., In re Willowood East Apartments
of Indianapolis II, Ltd., 114 B.R. 138, 143-44 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990) (Sellers, J.). Contra
Hartigan v. Pine Lake Village Apartment Co., (In re Pine Lake Village Apartment Co.), 16 B.R.
750, 756 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) (Schwartzber, J.) ("A consent that was given before the
expectation of a bankruptcy case cannot be treated as a continuing consent after the filing of a
petition for relief under the Bankruptcy Code"); Donahue & Edwards, supra note 54, at 677.
For a dissenting view, see Douglas L. Furth, et al., supra note 13, at 188. This trio of
critics poses the problem of one creditor who owns the rents separately from another creditor,
who claims only the reversion following the leases in question. In such a case, they claim,
expenditure of rents to maintain the reversion would be unjust. And if this is so when the rent
receivables and reversion are separately owned, it must also be true when the two security
interests are jointly owned by a single creditor. Thus, the theoretic possibility that a security
interest on rents might exist separately from a security interest on the reversion justifies
mortgagees milking the property without maintaining it. Presumably theirs is not a bankruptcy
logic. Rather, they are claim to describe a general principle of real estate finance.
The exact opposite should be true. If assignments of the pure rent receivable (but not the
reversion) are possible, see supra n.6, then the lender should understand that this security interest
is junior to the obligation of cash flow to maintain the property.
These authors also believe that § 506(c) authorizes only invasion of the specific piece of
collateral that is actually benefitted. Thus, if rents have been collected and placed in a bank
account, the bank account can only be invaded to justify maintenance of the bank account. The
bank account could not be raided to pay for any real estate maintenance. On this view, proceeds
could never be invaded to pay for benefits that accrue to the original collateral.
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VI. AVOIDANCE POWERS
A. The Equities Exception to § 552(b)
Bankruptcy Code § 552(b) reserves for the mortgagee the right to rents,
but it also provides that these rents might be disencumbered from the mortgage
"to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the
equities of the case, orders otherwise."' Various raids on cash collateral
have been permitted in the name of equity.' 6 Can the equities exception be
used to get rid of the security interest on rent receivables?
According to the legislative history, "[ifn the course of such consideration
the court may evaluate any expenditures by the estate relating to proceeds and
any related improvement in position of the secured party."I27 At another
place, the history continues:
If the security agreement extends to ...rents ...then the proceeds
would continue to be subject to the security interest pursuant to the terms
of the security agreement and provisions of applicable law, except to the
extent that where the estate acquires the proceeds at the expense of other
creditors holding unsecured claims, the expenditure resulted in an
improvement in the position of the secured party."'
These quotes suggest that improvement in position is to be condemned if it
accrues at the expense of the general creditors-a policy that §§ 506(c) and
547(c)(5) contradict. 9
225. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1988), amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, see. 214, § 552(b), 108 Stat. 4106 (1994).
226. For example, Judge James Yacos has held that, under the "equities" exception, a secured
party might have to finance the chapter 11 proceeding. Otherwise, firms whose income streams
were encumbered could not reorganize. In re Rancourt, 123 B.R. at 148-49. Judge Barbara
Sellers would not go this far, but, recognizing that a secured party might maliciously run up the
attorneys' fees of a debtor-in-possessionby filing "frivolous or ill-founded legal actions," she
suggested that § 552(b) would justify paying the debtor's attorneys fees caused by such actions.
In re Willowood East Apartments, 114 B.R. 138, 144-45 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
227. 124 CONG. REC. 32,400 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (emphasis added).
228. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787,
5877.
229. Section 506(c) allows the trustee to charge administrative expenses to the collateral to the
extent that the expenses benefit the secured party. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(c) (1988). Section
547(c)(5) prevents inventory and receivable lenders from improving their position over the
preference period, but only if the improvement is prejudicial to the general creditors. See 11
U.S.C. § 547 (c)(5) (1988). Therefore, it is not clear that the equities exception condemns all
improvements in position. Rather, it condemns only the ones that prejudice the general creditors.
1130 [Vol. 46:1075
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Based on the legislative history, many courts find that they may
disencumber proceeds only if the secured party improves its position by the
trustee's postpetition expenditures." This requirement is significant. In the
typical single-asset cases, all cash is cash collateral belonging to the secured
party unless an avoidance theory exists to destroy the security interest. Where
the debtor-in-possession intends only to spend cash collateral, there have been
no postpetition expenditures by the trustee capable of triggering the equities
exception.211
If trustee expenditure is required to whittle down or perhaps eliminate a
secured party's improvement of position after the bankruptcy petition is filed,
an allocative rule is needed to determine which part of the improvement of
position belongs to the trustee and which part belongs to the secured party.
One solution is that the trustee may recover expenses-the result if § 506(c)
were applied directly. But is it equitable that the trustee should receive no
return on a successful investment? One could affirm such a proposition. The
secured party is automatically stayed from recapturing the productive assets.
If the secured party were free to seize the collateral and invest in it, perhaps
the secured party could capture all the profit of the investment. This
subjunctive observation supports the notion that the trustee should never
recover more than the cost of the investment from the improvement of
position.
Searching for an allocative rule for splitting the gain from investment in
the collateral, Judge Arthur Spector in In re Delbridge2  opined that the
secured party is entitled to only the percentage of cash proceeds that represent
the contribution of collateral to the production of the proceeds. 3  What the
secured party contributes, according to Judge Spector, is the depreciation of
the existing collateral. What the debtor-in-possession contributes is the
230. See, e.g., J. Catton Farms, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 779 F.2d 1242, 1246-47 (7th Cir.
1985) (Posner, J.); Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village Properties, Ltd. (In re Village Properties,
Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984) (Garza, J.); Oliver
v. MBank Dallas, N.A. (In re Oliver), 66 B.R. 426 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986) (Akard, J.); United
States v. Van Vactor, Francis & Martin (In re Crouch), 51 B.R. 331, 332 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985)
(Sullivan, J.) (noting, "The purpose behind the 'equities of the case' rule ... is, in a proper
case, to enable those who contribute to the production of proceeds during [C]hapter 11 to share
jointly with pre-petition creditors secured by proceeds."); cf. Airport Inn Assocs., Ltd. v.
Travelers Ins. Co. (In re Airport Inn Assocs., Ltd.), 132 B.R. 951, 959 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990)
(Melloy, J.) (finding the prepetition expenditures by the debtor not competent to trigger equities
exception).
231. Delbridge v. Production Credit Assoc. 104 B.R. 824, 827 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(Newblatt, J.).
232. 61 B.R. 484 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986), aft'd, 104 B.R. 824 (E.D. Mich. 1989)
(Newblatt, J.).
233. Id. at 491.
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maintenance expense of the capital plus the labor needed to bring the proceeds
into existence. 34
In Deibridge, the collateral was cows and the proceeds were the milk
produced, which was sold to a dairy cooperative. At stake was ownership of
the checks issued by the cooperative in exchange for the milk. Spector




where CC = cash collateral, D = average depreciation per cow, E = average
direct expenses maintaining the cow, L = average labor per cow, and P =
average cash proceeds per cow.235 At least one court has thought that this
allocation formula has merit for real estate cases, 26 although in affirming the
Deibridge case on appeal, Judge Stewart Newblatt seemed to disapprove of the
formula in dictumY 7
One problem with this formula is that the secured party is independently
entitled to adequate protection for any depreciation (D) that eats into the
secured claim itself. If the secured party receives adequate protection for this
depreciation, then the secured party is contributing nothing to the cash flow.
Based on Spector's formula, the secured party therefore receives zero
234. Id. at 490-92.
235. Id. at 490. Judge Spector described this rule as follows:
The lender is entitled to the same percentage of the proceeds of the post-petition milk
as its capital contribution to the production of the milk bears to the total of the capital
and direct operating expenses incurred in producing the milk. Because the parties are
in a direct mathematical relationship, the rule should be easy to apply. Very simply,
the larger is the lender's capital contribution to the venture, the larger its share of the
proceeds ought to be. Conversely, if the farmer's input in the venture is great, the
"equities of the case" compel that his share of the proceeds likewise be great.
Id. at 491.
236. In re Selden, 62 B.R. 954, 958-59 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986) (Mahoney, J.) (announcing that
it would apply some version of the formula).
237. On appeal, Judge Newblatt affirmed the result in Delbridge, because the secured party
had an equity cushion in the case. Delbridge, 104 B.R. at 827-28. Because of the equity
cushion, Newblatt allowed the trustee to use cash collateral without any additional adequate
protection. Id. at 827. However, Newblatt disapproved of Spector's formula because the equities
exception is meant to prevent the secured party from benefiting when the trustee invests in the
collateral. Because the debtors-in-possession in that case planned only to invest cash collateral
in the further improvement of noncash collateral, Judge Newblatt ruled that the equities exception
could not be invoked. Id. at 826-27. According to this view, Judge Spector's formula cannot be
applied unless the debtor invests unencumbered assets into the production of cash proceeds. All
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proceeds. 8 Additionally, in many real estate cases, the collateral never
depreciates, even as cash collateral accrues. When a building is well-
maintained 9 and the real estate market is stable, the secured party will
obtain zero rent, according to Judge Spector's formula. 0
Judge Spector's formula is highly corrosive to the secured party's rights
under § 552(b). While this formula may not please real estate lenders, it is
undeniable that where unencumbered dollars have been spent, some allocation
formula will be required.
The need for an allocative rule arises from the legislative history, which
mentions expense by the trustee as the cause of the secured party's improve-
ment in position. This reference is taken to mean that trustee expense is the
sine qua non of the equities exception. One aggressive judge reads the
legislative history in quite a different light. In In re Mullen24 Judge James
Queenan noted that, in the original House version of what would become the
,Bankruptcy Code, the equities exception required a finding of "prejudice of
other creditors." 242 The Senate version required an improvement of position
as a result of expense by the trustee-the idea to which the above-quoted
legislative history refers.243 The final version mentioned no such require-
ments. From this Judge Queenan inferred, "Congress obviously did not wish
to limit the exception to those circumstances. The standard for application of
the exception-the 'equities of the case'-gives the court the broadest possible
charter. "2I Judge Queenan then used this charter to avoid a security interest
238. Judge Spector worried about the adequate protection of cash collateral, 61 B.R. at 491,
but this occurs only after his formula determines the secured party's ownership of P. Regarding
the underlying collateral that produces P, adequate protection may mean that the secured party
is entitled to zero proceeds.
If the above formula is applied in light of an equity cushion, then D can again be said to
equal zero, because depreciation does not harm the secured party so long as an equity cushion
is present. Such a conclusion means that the secured party's share of postpetition proceeds is
always zero. Judge Spector, however, applied his formula to a case involving debtor equity, and
found that D had a positive value, thereby winning for the secured party a twenty percent share
of the cash proceeds. Id.
239. The maintenance is financed out of cash collateral because collateral maintenance is a §
506(c) expense chargeable to the secured party. See supra text accompanying notes 223-24.
240. See, e.g., In re Ed Woods Livestock, Inc., 172 B.R. 294 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1994)
(Minahan, J.) (rejecting an allocation of improvement to the debtor).
241. 172 B.R. 473 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
242. Id. at 478 (citing H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978)).
243. S. 2266, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. § 552(b) (1978).
244. Mullen, 172 B.R. at 479. One commentator has complained that the above passage is a
mere example, and that he regrets decisions that "have often repeated that example as 'the'
purpose of the equity exception." James S. Cole, The "Carve Out" From Liens and Priorities
to Guarantee Payment of ProfessionalFees in Chapter11, 4 DET. C.L. REv. 1499, 1521 (1993).
Cole notes that nothing in the text of § 552(b) limits the equities exception to this particular
example, and, emboldened by some Supreme Court opinions that denigrate the worth of
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on rents because it improved the mortgagee's position over time. During each
month, he wrote, the secured party would substantially improve its posi-
tion.245 Its unsecured deficit claim would decline while its secured claim
remained constant.
[The] security interest in rents would be thereby changed from one that
fills and empties each month to one that increases.. . . The inequity is
present even though the estate's expenses for each month are deducted
before the monthly turnover or escrow. Reserves for replacement are
often necessary. Even with the deduction of any such reserves, however,
the paramount inequity would remain. [The secured party] would be
enjoying the fruits of the Debtor's labor while [the secured party] in effect
conducts a gradual foreclosure [i.e., collects rents through surrenders of
cash collateral] at a time when its security value remains constant.
246
In short, Judge Queenan found that any improvement in position was
inequitable. The equities exception, therefore, became the vehicle for total
lien avoidance.
A different theory of the equities exception was developed in Vienna Park
Properties v. United Postal Savings Assoc. (In re Vienna Park Properties) ,247
where Judge Thomas Meskill suggested that it would be "equitable" for a
court, under § 552(b), "to strip a creditor of rights to postpetition rents prior
to the point at which, under applicable state law, the creditor would likely
have been able to enforce those rights."248 The Bankruptcy Court had not
used its equitable powers in this way. Therefore, Meskill ruled that "the rents
were properly classified as cash collateral from the date of the commencement
of the bankruptcy case. "249
The security interest in rent receivables was upheld in Vienna Park
Properties because the bankruptcy court made no findings on the equities
exception. In future cases, however, judges in the Second Circuit might use
the equities exception to whittle down the security interest in rents. But
precisely what was Judge Meskill licensing courts to do in the name of equity?
Clearly Meskill intended that some rents should be disencumbered. Upon one
reading of this license of free foot, courts should figure out when a secured
party hypothetically would have dispossessed a debtor under state law and
legislative history, he suggests that courts might depart from the example and find new occasions
for equitable intervention. Id. at 1522 (citing Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992);
Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157 (1991)).
245. Mullen, 172 B.R. at 479.
246. Id.
247. 976 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1992) (Meskill, J.) (applying Virginia law).
248. Id. at 113.
249. Id. at 114.
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terminate the disencumbrance of rent at that time. This reading accords with
an operative theory of adequate protection-that the trustee need not provide
adequate protection until the hypothetical time when the secured party would
have repossessed the collateral if there were no bankruptcy. Such an appeal
to subjunctive reasoning accords with valuation theory-that the collateral must
be valued as if there were no bankruptcy. Part of the assumption is a delay
in dispossessing the debtor, during which time the debtor could use the rent
receivables and disencumber them by collectingY 0
On another, more extreme reading, Judge Meskill might be suggesting
that courts may disencumber all rents because state law enforcement is entirely
stayed for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding. Because disencumbra-
nee continues until the stay is lifted, the secured party is not entitled to
adequate protection. Given no right to adequate protection, the secured party
cannot obtain a removal of the stay while the property continues to be
necessary for an effective reorganization. If the trustee owes no duty of
adequate protection and if property is necessary for a reorganization, then the
secured party has no grounds on which to insist that the stay be lifted. 5
Dewsnup v. Timm 52 may affect the scope of the equities exception. It
surely eliminates another theory that trustees could have exploited to
disencumber rent receivables from security interests. Before Dewsnup, debtors
could plausibly maintain that once a secured claim is bifurcated, the mortgage
for the unsecured deficit is simply avoided. Therefore, all accruing rent
beyond the postbifurcation secured claim belonged to the trustee, not the
secured party."5 3 This theory has been rendered impossible by Dewsnup.
Instead, bifurcation is final only when the collateral is disposed of or when a
reorganization plan is confirmed. In the meantime, all appreciation value and
all accruing rents belong to the secured party.
If the Supreme Court thinks that improvement in position of the
underlying collateral is equitable, it is a little hard to maintain that the
accumulation of proceeds is inequitable. Therefore, Dewsnup might constitute
a restraint on how the equities exception to § 552(b) is interpreted.
Conversely, Justice Blackmun virtually ordered lawyers not to draw any
morals from Dewsnup by proclaiming:
250. In Vienna Park Properties, Judge Meskill labeled real estate receivables "cash
collateral"-even while proclaiming an escrow fund to be noncash collateral, because it was only
a general intangible. See id. at 117. If this characterization of cash collateral were accepted, the
trustee's obligation to provide adequate protection would arise immediately, and Chief Judge
Meskill's equities theory could not properly be termed a theory of adequate protection. See supra
text accompanying notes 191-95.
251. Cf. Glessner v. United Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Glessner), 140 B.R. 556, 561
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) (Pusateri, J.) (taking this position with regard to Kansas law).
252. 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
253. See Carlson supra note 31, at 127-29.
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The foregoing recital of the contrasting positions of the respective
parties and their amici demonstrates that § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code
and its relationship to other provisions of that Code do embrace some
ambiguities. Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those
advanced at oral argument illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the statute
in a single opinion that would apply to all possible fact situations. We
therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other facts to await their
legal resolution on another day. 4
This language should suffice to dispel the chance that Dewsnup might affect
the meaning of the equities exception-to § 552(b).
B. The Strong Arm Power
1. Partial Avoidance
A bankruptcy trustee becomes a hypothetical judicial lien creditor and a
bona fide purchaser of real estate on the day that the bankruptcy petition is
filed. 5 As rent receivables find themselves in the province of real estate,
both of these tests are relevant to the priority of a security interest on rent
receivables. Nevertheless, the status of a bona fide purchaser and the status
of a lien creditor given a recorded real estate mortgage are identical. Each
succeeds to the debtor's power to disencumber rents by collecting to the same
degree-if at all. Therefore, in the name of convenience, the bankruptcy
trustee will be referred to as a hypothetical bona fide purchaser, although it
should be understood that whatever is said about this status applies equally to
the trustee's status as hypothetical judicial lien creditor.
How does the security interest on rents fare against the trustee's strong-
arm power? Courts are divided on the issue. 6 As purchaser, the trustee is
certainly on constructive notice of the real estate mortgage itself, if it has been
validly recorded before bankruptcy. On the strength of this fact, many courts
declare the security interest on rents to be perfected and, hence, totally valid
against the trustee's strong-arm power. In other words, recording is said to
be perfection, and many courts think that this observation closes the mat-
ter. 7 In this vein, it is popular to characterize termination of the debtor's
254. Dewsnup, 112 S. Ct. at 778 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
255. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988). See generally David Gray Carlson, The Trustee's Strong Arm
Power Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 S.C. L. REV. 841 (1992) (providing an overall discussion
of the bankruptcy trustee's avoiding powers).
256. A useful state-by-state appendix is provided in Schmitt, supra note 50, at 56-58.
257. See, e.g., Commerce Bank v. Mountain View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34, 39 (3d Cir. 1993)
(Weis, J.); Vienna Park Properties v. United Postal Say. Ass'n (In re Vienna Park Properties),
976 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1992) (Meskill, J.); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Boston Harbor Marina
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power to disencumber rents as an enforcing act,"8 not a perfecting act. This
nomenclature is supposed to prove that the trustee has no strong-arm power
against the secured party.2 9
Such nomenclature is merely word-play in the guise of analysis. Just
before entering the bankruptcy, the debtor had the right to collect the rents,
and when collected, the proceeds belong to the debtor outright. The trustee
succeeds to this power as the hypothetical purchaser of the debtor's equity
interest in the reversion. If perfection invokes a hypothetical test of status
against an intervening bona fide purchaser, then in most states, security
interests on rent receivables are not perfected, at least as of the time the
bankruptcy petition is filed.2"
Co., 159 B.R. 616, 619 (D. Mass. 1993) (Gorton, J.); Balcor Pension Investors v. Wiston XXIV
Ltd. Partnership (In re Wiston XXIV Ltd. Partnership), 147 B.R. 575, 582-83 & n.10 (D. Kan.
1992) (Saffels, J.), appeal dismissed, 988 F.2d 1012 (10th Cir. 1993); Federal Land Bank v.
Terpstra (In re Porter), 90 B.R. 399, 401-04 (N.D. Iowa 1988) (Hansen, J.); In re Columbia
Office Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 175 B.R. 199, 202 (Bankr. D. Md. 1994) (Schneider, J.);
McCafferty, supra note 144, at 471 (equating perfection with public notice).
258. See In re Vienna Park Properties, 976 F.2d at 114 (applying Virginia law) (stating that
the secured party is not "aided by section 546(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that
certain security interests may be perfected by notice after bankruptcy. As noted above, the
security interests in the rents were properly perfected but the steps necessary to enforce those
interests were not yet complete"); In re Foxcroft Square Co., 178 F.2d 659 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(Gawthrop, J.); In re Baltic Assocs., L.P., 170 B.R. 568, 570 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (Hutton, J.)
(applying Delaware law); J.H. Streiker & Co., Ltd. v. SeSide Co., Ltd. (In re SeSide Co., Ltd.),
152 B.R. 878, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Bartle, J.); In re Princeton Overlook Joint Venture, 143
B.R. 625, 629-30 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (Gindin, J.); Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Sourlis, 141 B.R.
826, 833-34 (D.N.J. 1992) (Lifland, J.); In re Coventry Commons Assocs., 143 B.R. 837, 838
(E.D. Mich. 1992) (Duggan, J.); Rancourtv. Dionne, 123 B.R. 143, 149 & n.4 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1991) (Yacos, J.); In re Raleigh/Spring Forest Apartments Assocs., 118 B.R. 42, 46 (Bankr.
E.D.N.C. 1990) (Small, J.); Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Metro Square (In re Metro
Square), 106 B.R. 584 (D. Minn. 1989) (Murphy, J.); Capital Realty Investor Tax Exempt Fund
Ltd. Partnership v. Greenhaven Village Apartments of Burnsville Phase II Ltd. Partnership (In
re Greenhaven Village Apartments of BurnsvillePhase II Ltd. Partnership), 100 Bankr. 465,468-
69 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (Kressel, J.).
259. Cf. 1972 Official Text Showing Changes Made in Former Text of Article 9, secured
Transactions, and of Related Transactions, and of Related Sections and Reasons for Changes,
General Comment of the Approach of the Review Committee for Article 9 E-16:
The term "perfection" is not defined by the [UCC]. In general, it means the
point at which a security interest becomes good against third parties when there is
also attachment. The additional requirements for perfection beyond the requirements
for attachment are set forth in Sections 9-302 to 9-305. It would be unwise to attempt
a formal definition of perfection, because of the subtlety of the problems involved in
rights against many groups of third persons.
This is advice that many state legislatures and bankruptcy courts have ignored, when they easily
equate recordation with defeat of the bankruptcy trustee's strong arm powers.
260. See Rogers, supra note 53, at 1435 & n.11. For a revealing discussion of the
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"Perfection" is surely a federal concept. When state law proclaims an
assignment of rents perfected as a general proposition, bankruptcy courts are
not necessarily bound by this. Instead, they must assess the perfection of the
security interest according to their own federal notions.
As earlier explained, § 546(b) preserves state law grace periods by
providing in part:
(b)(1) The rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545, and
549 of this title are subject to any generally applicable law that-
(A) permits perfection of an interest in property to be
effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property
before the date of perfection.26'
Thus, § 546(b) refers to perfection that is "effective against an entity that
acquires rights in such property before the date of perfection." This language
suggests that perfection must constitute a hypothetical test of the sort that
§ 547(e)(1) provides in voidable preference law.262 Section 547(e)(1) defines
perfection solely for the purpose of § 547(b) avoidance. But if we liberate that
definition from its confines in § 547, we learn that
enforcement-perfectiondistinction, see McCafferty, supra note 144, at 470-71, wherein we learn:
Perfection is thus a concept involving the relative interests of the lienholder and
an intervening third party. It does not deal with the relationship between the debtor
and the secured party, or between the secured party and the collateral property.
Those latter relationships raise only the question of "enforcement" of the security
interest.
Id. On the contrary, because the debtor-in-possession inherits the ability to disencumber rents,
dispossession of the debtor will involve "the relative interests of the lienholder and an intervening
third party." Thus, the distinction between perfection and enforcement is a false one. Just as
a pledgee out of possessionwho repossesses simultaneously perfects and enforces, so a mortgagee
out of possession who dispossesses the debtor or some purchaser from the debtor both perfects
and enforces the security interest on rents.
This point is overlooked by Professor Patrick Randolph, who made an analogy to
repossession of equipment under Article 9. Randolph reasoned that because repossession is not
perfection, neither should be dispossession of the debtor in a real estate case. Randolph, supra
note 49, at 318-19. This analogy is a false one, however. When a secured party perfects under
Article 9, no judicial lien creditor or purchaser of equipment can ever obtain better priority than
the secured party. This same test, applied to real estate cases, produces a different re-
suit-temporary superiority of the purchaser who succeeds to the debtor's power to collect rent
receivables free and clear of the security interest.
261. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b)(1) (1988), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, see. 204, § 546(b)(1), 108 Stat. 4106, 4122 (1994).
262. See In re 1301 Conn. Ave. Assocs., 117 B.R. 2, 10 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1990) (Teel, J.),
aff'd, 126 B.R. 1 (D.D.C. 1991); In re Microfab, Inc., 105 B.R. 152, 157 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1989) (Kenner, J.) (stating that "[T]o perfect a lien or other security interest is to satisfy all the
conditions necessary to make the lien effective against third parties and, in the case of a statutory,
non-consensual lien, against the property owner").
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a transfer of real property other than fixtures... is perfected when a bona
fide purchaser of such property from the debtor against whom applicable
law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is
superior to the interest of the transferee. 2 3
As applied to mortgages recorded prior to the bankruptcy petition where the
mortgagee has not yet dispossessed the debtor, a purchaser takes an interest
that is superior to the mortgagee. The purchaser is allowed to collect rents
free and clear of the mortgage lien. This superiority, however, is temporary.
The mortgagee may terminate the debtor's power by dispossessing the
purchaser. There is no good reason why this cannot be called a perfecting act
with a relation-back effect." Thus, if under state law the debtor sells the
reversion to a purchaser, the purchaser takes over the debtor's right to collect,
but this right may be terminated by the mortgagee's act-which we assume
ex hypothesi to be a perfecting act. If the mortgagee so reacts to the purchase,
then any future amounts not yet collected may not be paid to the debtor's
successor. Rather, the future amounts must be paid to the mortgagee. This
263. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(A) (1988).
264. For cases so holding, see Virginia Beach Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Wood, 901 F.2d
849, 852 (10th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (applying Oklahoma law); Waldron v. Northwest
Acceptance Corp. (In re Johnson), 62 B.R. 24, 28-30 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (Elliot, J.) (applying
Washington law); Wolters Village, Ltd. v. Village Properties, Ltd. (In re Village Properties,
Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1984) (Garza, J.) (applying Texas law), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 974 (1984); In re Mews Associates., L.P., 144 B.R. 867, 869 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992)
(Federman, J.); Home Savings Ass'n v. Woodstock Associates I, Inc. (In re Woodstock
Associates I, Inc.), 120 B.R. 436, 446-48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (Squires, J.); Chaussee v.
Morning Star Ranch Resorts Co. (In re Morning Star Ranch Resorts), 64 B.R. 818, 821-23
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1986) (Matheson, J.); In re Winzenburg, 61 B.R. 141, 143-45 (Bankr. D.
Iowa) (Melloy, J.), aff'd, No. 85-01128W, 1986 WI 21352 (N.D. Iowa, Dec. 17, 1986); United
States v. Farrell (In re Fluge), 57 B.R. 451, 456-57 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (Hill, J.) (applying
North Dakota law); Consolidated Capital Income Trust v. Colter, Inc., 47 B.R. 1008, 1011 (D.
Colo. 1985) (Matsch, J.) (applying Colorado law).
In SLC Ltd. V v. Bradford Group West, Inc. (In re SLC Ltd. V), 152 B.R. 755, 761
(Bankr. D. Utah 1993), Judge Judith Boulden ruled that dispossessionin a straight mortgage case
is a perfecting act, but dispossession in light of an express assignment of rent is not. This ruling
is peculiar because it means that a purchaser or lien creditor can collect free and clear, pending
the dispossession. A slightly more defensible view along these lines is that the assignment of
rents allows for contractual variation on the termination of the debtor's power to collect. Thus,
perhaps the parties could agree that the debtor's power to collect terminates when the debtor
defaults. On this basis it is possible to conclude that dispossession is not perfection when the
parties have agreed to an assignment of rents.
1995] 1139
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ability to take back the rent receivables establishes a "relation back" 20
within the meaning of § 546(b). 21
To be sure, the second clause of § 546(b) obviates the need to actually
dispossess the debtor-in-possession, as a hypothetical purchaser. According
to that clause:
(2) If -
(A) a law ... requires seizure of such property or commencement of
an action to accomplish such perfection.. .; and
(B) such property has not been seized or such action has not been
commenced before the date of the filing of the petition;
such interest in such property shall be perfected ... by giving notice
within the time fixed by such law for such seizure or such commence-
ment.
267
Therefore, if the debtor files for bankruptcy when the debtor still has the
power to disencumber a rent receivable by collecting it, the security interest
in rent receivables is unperfected, and the amounts actually collected by the
265. See In re 1301 Conn. Ave. Assocs., 117 B.R. at 10-11 (applying District of Columbia
law). Thus, in In re Wheaton Oaks Office Partners, Ltd. Partnership, 27 F.3d 1234, 1245 (7th
Cir. 1994) (quoting Stevens v. Blue, 57 N.E.2d 451 (Ii. 1944)), Judge Daniel Manion wrote:
[U]nder Illinois law, even if a junior lienholder "wins the race" to possession, his
right to collect the rents is still subject to the previously recorded, yet unenforced rent
assignment of a previous mortgagee. If it were not so, that is, [if] the mortgagee's
superior right to the rents could be extinguished by virtue of an intervening judgment
creditor, then how could the Illinois Supreme Court . . . declare the intervening
judgment creditor to be a "subordinated" lienholder?
266. In United Savings Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd., 484 U.S. 365
(1988), Justice Antonin Scalia cited with apparent approval cases in which the strong arm power
avoided in whole or in part security interests on rent receivables. Id. at 374 (noting, "Section
552(b) sets forth an exception, allowing postpetition 'proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or
profits' of the collateral to be covered only if the security agreement expressly provides for an
interest in such property, and the interest has been perfected under 'applicable nonbankruptcy
law'") (citing Casbeer v. State Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re Casbeer), 793 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir.
1986) (granting partial avoidance under Texas law); Johnson, 62 B.R. at 28-30 (granting total
avoidance under Washington law)).
267. 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1988), as amendedby Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, see. 204, § 546(b), 108 Stat. 4106, 4122 (1994). Because § 546(b) substitutes notice
for dispossession of the debtor, courts have reasoned that a motion to lift the automatic stay is
insufficient to perfect the security interest on rent receivables. Therefore, the trustee's right to
collect rent survives lifting the automatic stay until the secured party actually dispossesses the
trustee under state law or pursuant to § 546(b). See, e.g., Village Properties, 723 F.2d at 446-
47; Drummond v. Farm Credit Bank (In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 507 (Bankr. D. Mont.
1990) (Peterson, J.).
In contrast, Judge David Houston, in Delta Plaza Partners v. Minnesota Mutual Life
Insurance Co. (In re Delta Plaza Partners), 133 B.R. 355, 359 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1991), ruled
that a counterclaim in an adversary proceeding could constitute notice under § 546(b).
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debtor-in-possession are not cash collateral. This situation can be reversed
when the mortgagee complies with the notice provision in § 546(b).
Some courts apply an apparently federal test of their own devise that
analyzes whether it is possible to avoid the security interest. If not, then the
security interest is perfected. 68 In short, temporary unperfection is simply
to be ignored when the mortgage is recorded.269 This view also evades the
crucial issue. An intervening purchaser can avoid the security interest by
collecting the rents prior to dispossession. This temporary avoidance is
enough to justify calling the security interest unperfected pending the
perfecting act described by § 546(b).
The purpose of § 546(b) is to deal with unperfection, coupled with a state
grace period that allows the creditor to retake priority from an intervening lien
creditor or purchaser of the debtor's real property. For example, § 546(b) is
usually associated with mechanics' liens, for which a supplier of goods or
services must file a notice before some deadline to prevail against prior
encumbrances.270 It also is associated with U.C.C. section 9-301(2), in
which Article 9 secured parties are unperfected against judicial lien creditors,
but may regain priority if they file within ten27' days of the debtor receiving
possession of the collateral. Both of these concepts involve temporary
juniority, which might be rectified by some postpetition perfecting act.
Security interests on real estate receivables should be similarly analyzed, given
268. See, e.g., J.H. Streiker & Co., Inc. v. SeSide Co., Ltd. (In re SeSide Co., Ltd.), 152
B.R. 878, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (Bartle, J.); In re KNM Roswell Ltd. Partnership, 126 B.R. 548,
552-53 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (Coal, J.); In re Park at Dash Point L.P., 121 B.R. 850, 853
(Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1990), aff'd, 152 B.R. 300 (D. Wash. 1991), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1008 (9th
Cir. 1993); In re Foxhill Place Assocs., 119 B.R. 708, 711-12 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1990)
(Fox, J.).
The Foxhill case is peculiar because Judge Karen See labored hard to demonstrate that
dispossessionof the debtor is an enforcing, not a perfecting, act. 119 B.R. at 711-12. She then
required the secured party to file a motion to lift the automatic stay, sequester rents, or prohibit
the use of cash collateral as substitutes for dispossession, which the automatic stay forbids. Prior
to the motion, the trustee had unfettered power to disencumber rents. See Foxhill, 119 B.R. at
713-14. In effect, Judge See ruled that the security interest on rent receivables was unperfected
after all.
269. One commentator in support of this view writes, "The fact that the junior recorded
creditor ... could temporarily take control of the property to which the rent assignment relates
is immaterial. At no time is the junior recorded creditor's interest superior to that of the first
creditor. It is merely enforced while the first creditor's interest is not." Schmitt, supra note 50,
at 38. This is no argument but merely a pronouncement.
270. E.g., Yobe Elec., Inc. v. Graybar Elec. Co. (In re Yobe Elec., Inc.), 728 F.2d 207 (3d
Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
271. Many nonuniformamendments to U.C.C. § 9-301(2) have extended this period to twenty
days. In recognition of this fact, Congress has recently extended the grace period in
§ 547(c)(3)(B) to twenty days as well, but the grace period in § 547(e)(2)(A) remains at ten days.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(c)(3)(B) (West Supp. 1995).
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a judicial lien creditor's right to succeed to the debtor's power to collect rents
free and clear of the mortgage lien.
2. Total Avoidance
Many courts have professed themselves unable to find any relation-back
theory under state law,2' often because no statute expressly uses that
retrospective trope.273 When such an assertion was coupled with the view
272. See, e.g., Sears Say. Bank v. Tucson Indus. Partners (In re Tucson Indus. Partners), 129
B.R. 614, 622-23 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991) (Volinn, J.), vacated as moot, 990 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir.
1993) (applying Arizona law); In re Princeton Overlook Joint Venture, 143 B.R. 625, 632
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1992) (Gindia, J.); In re Harbour Town Assocs., Ltd., 99 B.R. 823 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1989) (Paine, J.); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Gotta (In re Gotta), 47 B.R. 198, 202
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985) (Martin, J.).
In Casbeer v. State Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n (In re Casbeer), 793 F.2d 1436 (5th Cir.
1986), Judge Thomas Gibbs Gee described Texas law as requiring not only the assignment of
rents, but also the express statement that the assignment of rents is to be senior to any subsequent
lien. The failure to reserve seniority over subsequent liens is said to be the sine qua non of the
relation back effect that occurs when the secured party takes back control over collection of rents.
For this proposition, Judge Gee cited a Texas case that utterly fails to support the proposition.
See Casbeer, 793 F.2d at 1443 (citing Vahlsing Christina Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 491 S.W.2d
954 (rex. Civ. App. 1973) (holding that a subordination agreement covering personal property
and equipment did not extend to real property liens)).
Surely the mere taking of an assignment of rent implies that the assignment is to be senior
over subsequent assignments. Why should priority depend upon its express reservation in the
mortgage agreement?
The above analysis conceptualizes the security interest on real estate receivables as pre-
existing the secured party's seizure of the power to collect. In Commerce Bank v. Mountain
View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34 (3d Cir. 1993), Judge Joseph Weis confused matters by
simultaneously asserting that the security interest on receivables pre-exists seizure of control over
collection and that the seizure of control itself is also a transfer. First, he wrote that "by entering
the property and collecting the rents, the banks were 'enforcing' their rights, not 'perfecting' their
liens. The banks' liens arose when the mortgages were recorded. Liens arising at a later date
would be junior to that of the banks." Mountain View, 5 F.3d at 39. Conversely, in the next
sentence lie continued:
We recognize that mortgagees have no right to the rents until a default has occurred
and, before they give notice, a junior lienor can attach rents that otherwise would
come into the possession of the mortgagor. Once having given notice and enforcing
its rights, however, a mortgagee would prevail over the junior lienor.
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Colbassaniv. Society of ChristopherColumbus, 48 A.2d 106 (1946);
Miners Sav. Bank v. Thomas, 12 A.2d 810 (1940)). How can the secured party both have a pre-
existing right and not have a pre-existing right? The paradox is solved if it is recognized that the
right to rent pre-exists seizure of control of collection. The latter is not a transfer, but merely
the disappearance of a condition subsequent on that right.
273. Cf. Klein v. Civale & Trovato, Inc. (In re Lionel Corp.), 29 F.3d 88, 93-94 (2d Cir.
1994) (Walker, J.) (stating that a statute need not expressly set forth relation back principle so
long as the practical effect of relation back exists). In comparison, one oft-cited commentator
complains that no grace period exists because "[t]here is no recording statute . . . that says a
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that dispossession of the debtor was a perfecting act, the result was total
avoidance of the security interest on rent receivables.274
The avoidance of security interests on rent receivables constitutes the most
radical prodebtor position available, yet its consequences should not be
overestimated. The mortgage on the reversion remains valid. In a Chapter 11
proceeding, the secured party is entitled to receive the value of the collateral
in a cram down. The valuation, in essence, awards to the secured party the
present value of all rents as of the effective date of the Chapter 11 plan.
Control of the cash flow during the pendency of the Chapter 11 proceeding is
at stake. Avoidance of the security interest under the strong-arm power,
however mistaken, does no more than to reduce mortgagees to the status of
undersecured creditors who do not control cash flow. That is, mortgagees are
entitled to the value of their collateral as of some specific point in time, but
they are prohibited from improving their position over time.
security interest in rents is good against an intervening transferee if notice of the security interest
in rents is good against an intervening transferee if notice of the security interest is recorded
within some number of minutes, or days, or weeks, after the interest was created." McCafferty,
supra note 144, at 464. True, recording acts do not mention any such thing, but the relation-
back effect is with regard to the ability of a mortgagee to take back a rent receivable that a bona
fide purchaser has succeeded to. McCafferty also complains that
the legislative history of Section 546(b) makes it clear that there must be some date
"before the commencement of the case" to which the post-petition perfection must
relate back. What date is that, in the case of an assignment of rents? There is none,
because there is no known non-bankruptcy law ... which creates a "relation back"
mechanism...
Id. (citing H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 86-87 (1977)). It is easy to locate the date
back to which the recapture of the rent receivable relates. It relates back to the time the
mortgage lien first attached to the rent receivable taken back from the purchaser.
274. See, e.g., Saline State Bank v. Mahloch, 834 F.2d 690, 694-95 (8th Cir. 1987) (Lay, J.)
(discussing the issue in dictum); In re Stanley Station Assocs. L.P., 139 B.R. 990, 1009 (Bankr.
D. Kan. 1992) (Flannagan, J.); In re Harvey Road Assocs. VIII, 140 B.R. 302, 305 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1992) (Hillman, J.) (finding that under New Hampshire law, no perfection existed because
no attachment had occurred); Glessner v. United Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Glessner), 140
B.R. 556, 561 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992) (Pusateri, J.); In re Wynnewood House Assocs., 121 B.R.
716, 724-26 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); In re Westport-Sandpiper Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 116
B.R. 355 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990) (Shiff, J.) (applying Florida law, but refusing to apply the
Florida corrective statute retrospectively); In re Forest Ridge, II, Ltd. Partnership, 116 B.R. 937,
946-48 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1990) (Wooton, J.); Drummond v. Farm Credit Bank (In re Kurth
Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990) (Peterson, J.); In re HarbourTown Assocs.,
Ltd., 99 B.R. 823 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989) (Paine, J.); In re Camelot Assocs. Ltd.
Partnership, 102 B.R. 161 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1989) (Kishel, J.) (applying Florida law, but
refusing to apply Florida corrective statute retrospectively); Kearney Hotel Partners v. Richardson
(In re Kearney Hotel Partners), 92 B.R. 95, 103-08 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Buschman, J.);
In re TM Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 91 B.R. 349, 357 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (Scholl, J.);
In re Association Ctr. Ltd. Partnership, 87 B.R. 142, 145-46 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1988)
(Steinel, J.).
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On this basis, Judge John Flannagan in In re Stone Ridge Associates, Ltd.
Partnership275 held that the strong-arm power is capable of defeating a
security interest on rent receivables altogether, and he defended the premise
that in Chapter 11 the debtor deserved to control the cash flow. 276 But
because the collateral had already been abandoned to the secured party, no
Chapter 11 plan was feasible. Judge Flannagan simply refused to avoid the
security interest based on some sort of equitable abstention theory.2'
Some courts unable to find the relation-back effect make the error of
concluding that debtor dispossession serves merely to establish the secured
party's right to rents going forward. Dispossession has no effect on rents
already collected or, perhaps, on rents already accrued. 278 Therefore, no
relation-back effect exists. This view, however, makes the common error of
equating a conditional obligation of a tenant to pay rent in the future with no
obligation to pay. For example, suppose that a tenant signs a twenty-year
lease and that a mortgage lien attaches to this receivable. The tenant only has
to pay rent as the requisite time passes. The lease is nevertheless a receivable
once the lease is signed. Suppose that the lease is signed on January 1, 1990.
A mortgage lien attaches to the rent receivable on the same day. Years later,
on January 2, 1995, the debtor files for Chapter 11 protection. On January
10, the tenant pays rent for the month of December, 1994. This rent belongs
to the bankruptcy trustee free and clear under the view that holds dispossession
of the debtor is a perfecting act. Suppose that on January 15 the secured party
files the notice required by § 546(b).
Ex hypothesi, this notice perfects the security interest by displacing the
trustee as bona fide purchaser of the reversionary interest. All future rents are
the secured party's cash collateral, and a relation-back effect fully exists. The
security interest on the rent receivable was created in 1990. The tenant's
obligation to pay rent in February 1995 is simply the accrual of the tenant's
1990 obligation to pay. By filing the notice required in § 546(b), the secured
party is perfecting a security interest created in 1990. This perfection is good
against intervening purchasers, and thus, the relation-back effect required by
§ 546(b) is fully present.
For this reason, total avoidance is based on the faulty premise that no
relation-back effect exists with regard to the mortgage lien on rent receivables.
275. 142 B.R. 967 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992).
276. See id. at 971-72.
277. On the theory that a bankruptcy court may refuse to avoid transfers for equitable reasons,
see Carlson, supra note 255, at 912-45.
278. J.H. Streiker & Co. v. SeSide Co., Ltd. (In re SeSide Co., Ltd.), 152 B.R. 878, 884
(E.D. Pa. 1993) (Bartle, J.); see also In re D'Anna, 177 B.R. 819 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995)
(Raslavich,J.) (under Pennsylvanialaw, amounts collected by debtor-in-possessionfree and clear
of mortgage lien and so could be used to pay debtor's lawyers).
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3. The 1994 Legislation
In 1994, Congress amended § 552(b) to make it clear that hotel receipts
would be considered proceeds of prepetition collateral, not postpetition
accounts that are disencumbered under § 552(a).279 In the course of achiev-
ing this end, Congress added some words that may affect the trustee's
avoidance theory. Section 552(b)(2) now upholds security interests in rents
"[e]xcept as provided in section... 544[]... and notwithstanding section
546(b) of this title."280 The reference to § 546(b) is certainly mysterious.
One possible meaning is that courts should apply § 544(a) to security interests
on rent receivables notwithstanding § 546(b). So read, the secured party has
lost the chance to establish a valid security interest on rent receivables going
forward.
This new language may mean that § 546(b)'s relation-back requirement
is to be ignored. On this wobbly reading, the strong-arm power in § 544 is
still efficacious, but § 546(b)'s insistence on relation back is no longer
operable.
Perhaps these words mean that secured parties have a valid security
interest if they have recorded the mortgage-this takes care of the reference
to § 544-but once this is done, secured parties are to have valid security
interests on rent receivables "notwithstanding" that they have not complied
with the requirements of § 546(b).
What these added words mean is anyone's guess. It can be noted that
these words are from the House bill, which substituted for an earlier Senate
version in which security interests on rent receivables were declared to be
"automatically perfected," whatever that might mean.28' It is completely
279. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 552(b) (West Supp. 1995).
280. Id. § 552(b)(2) (emphasis added).
281. S. 540 § 206. This proposed revision stated:
(2)(A) except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545, 547, and 548,
if-
(1) the debtor and an entity entered into a security agreement that was
duly recorded in the public records before the commencement of the case: and
(II) the security interest created by the security agreement extends to-
(1) property of the debtor acquired before the commence-
ment of the case; and
(Il)(AA) to amounts paid as rents of such property...
the security interest extends to such amounts paid to the estate as rents or as fees,
charges, accounts, or other payments after the commencement of the case to the
extent provided in the security agreement, whether or not the security interest in
such rents or such fees, charges, accounts, or other payments is perfected under
applicable nonbankruptcy law, except to the extent that the court, after notice and
a hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.
(B) If a security interest extends under subparagraph (A) to rents
acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case, the security interest
1995] 1145
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unclear whether the House version is opposed to or consistent with the
displaced Senate version.
Meanwhile, we have seen that the House sponsor of the amendment,
Congressman Jack Brooks, has read into the Congressional Record a statement
to the effect that mortgagees who have recorded mortgages on the underlying
real estate have valid security interests in the rents, whether or not they have
perfected their security interests under state law.' It is all but impossible
to obtain this meaning from the actual amendment. Nevertheless, it can be
expected that the courts will skip the statutory language and adopt this scrap
of legislative history as the governing law. 3
C. Voidable Preference Theory
Suppose a secured party seizes control of the rents within the preference
period or has taken no such action by the time of the petition. Even if the
secured party can beat the trustee's strong-arm power with regard to
postpetition rents, it remains a possibility that a court will avoid security
interests in rent receivables as voidable preferences. This possibility has often
been overlooked.' In fact, voidable preference concerns arise over nearly
every case involving security interests on rent receivables; yet, the matter is
rarely discussed.'a
Having argued that a security interest on rent receivables can have, at
best, only a temporary juniority to the trustee's strong-arm power, it would be
odd to maintain that the security interest is void as a preference. Accordingly,
this position can be resisted on three grounds. First, in the typical single-asset
real estate case, the debtor is not insolvent as that concept is defined in the
Bankruptcy Code. Second, so long as no receiver had been appointed prior
to the bankruptcy petition, the trustee can never establish the hypothetical
liquidation test of § 547(b)(5) because if the secured party has received nothing
before bankruptcy, the secured party's bankruptcy entitlements will equal the
sum of the secured party's prebankruptcy transfers plus bankruptcy entitle-
in such rents shall be deemed to be perfected for the purpose of section 544(a).
(Emphasis added). For a critical description of other failed Senate bills, see Donahue &
Edwards, supra note 54, at 651-54.
282. See supra section IV.A.
283. E.g., In re Newberry Square, Inc., 175 B.R. 910, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1994)
(Shapero, J.) (dictum).
284. In Commerce Bank v. Mountain View Village, Inc., 5 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 1993), Judge
Joseph Weis pointed out that the dispossession of the debtor had occurred before the voidable
preference period, but apart from this reference and the few cases to be discussed herein, the
thought of voidable preferences is never invoked.
285. See, e.g., Averch, supra note 6, at 523 & n.34 (conceding a connection between strong
arm and voidable preference theory, but denying the validity of the strong arm theory).
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ments.286 Given this equality, the security interest in rents is not preferen-
tial-at least insofar as the secured party collects no rents before bankruptcy.
Third, even if the trustee can make out a technical case of voidable
preference under § 547, avoidance per se cannot profit the trustee. As will be
shown, all that avoidance accomplishes is the setting aside of a transfer that
state law otherwise honors. After that, the trustee must expropriate the
property for which the transfer was set aside. Expropriation is achieved by
the strong-arm power, which means that voidable preference theories cannot
extend the trustee's rights past the rights that already exist under the strong-
arm power because that power would have existed if no transfer had occurred
before bankruptcy.
1. The Banks and Shoals of Timing
Voidable preference law is a threat to the security interest on rent
receivables because § 547(e)(2) defers the time of the transfer until the transfer
is sufficiently perfected against a bona fide purchaser for value-at least for
transfers of real property.
Timing the transfer is vital for determining whether it is a voidable
preference. Timing is important for at least three different elements of
§ 547(b). Knowing when the transfer of debtor property occurred is necessary
to determine (a) whether the transfer was on account of an antecedent
debt,287 (b) whether the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer,us
and (c) whether the transfer was within ninety days of bankruptcy 9 -or
within one year if the secured party is an "insider" of the debtor.2"
The timing rules for voidable preference law require a definition of the
term "perfection," a task which, as already shown, has divided courts in
applying the strong-arm power to the security interest on rent receivables. In
that context, procreditor courts have equated recordation with perfection,
ignoring the fact that purchasers of the debtor's equity can actually disencum-
ber rents by collecting them. Prodebtor courts have tested the rights of bona
fide purchasers to see if the security interest is perfected. The hypothetical
bona fide purchaser test also is relevant for voidable preference law because
it is expressly set forth in § 547(e)(1)(A), which provides "A transfer of real
property other than fixtures.. . is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of
such property from the debtor against whom applicable law permits such
286. Regarding this test, see Carlson, supra note 25.
287. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) (1988).
288. See id. § 547(b)(3).
289. See id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
290. See id. § 547(b)(4)(B).
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transfer to be perfected cannot acquire an interest that is superior to the
interest of the transferee."291
Notice that this definition does not account for unperfection pending some
future act to establish seniority over an intervening transferee-precisely the
dilemma that security interests on rent receivables pose. Nevertheless, this is
the definition given to us in order to apply the timing rules supplied by
§ 547(e)(2). These timing rules are as follows:
For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3) of
this subsection, a transfer is made-
(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the
transferor and the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within
10 days after, such time, except as provided in subsection (c)(3)(B);
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is
perfected after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition,
if such transfer is not perfected at the later of-
(i) the commencement of the case; or
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between
the transferor and the transferee.
11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2) (1988), as amended by Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, sec. 203, 108 Stat. 4106, 4122 (1994)).
The first rule, found in § 547(e)(2)(A), is the mortgagee's best chance to
escape liability. This rule looks to the creation of the security interest on rent
receivables-what Article 9 would call attachment 2 --to establish the time
of the transfer. If § 547(e)(2)(A) applies, the time of the transfer likely is to
be beyond the ninety-day preference period.213 In contrast, if either of the
other rules applies, the transfer may be placed within the preference period-a
favorable development for the bankruptcy trustee.
For the secured party to invoke the timing rule of § 547(e)(2)(A), the
secured party must show perfection within ten days of attachment, to borrow
again the Article 9 phrase.294 In the case of a security interest on rents, the
291. Id. § 547(e)(1)(A).
292. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (3 U.L.A. 363) (1990).
293. Where the security agreement is signed within the preference period, § 547(e)(2)(A) tends
to make the extension of credit contemporaneous with the creation of the security interest on the
rent receivable. As contemporaneous exchanges of value are not preferential, See 11 U.S.C. §
547(b)(2) (1988), the secured party also would escape liability for this reason.
294. The U.C.C. Article 9 concept of the attachment of a security interest requires that a
signed security agreement exist, the creditor give value, and the debtor have rights in the
collateral. U.C.C. § 9-203(1) (3 U.L.A. 363) (1990). Attachment equates with what
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secured party has a lien on rents as soon as the receivable arises2" or the
underlying mortgage is recorded, whichever is later in time. The receivable
arises when the trustee signs the lease. Therefore, if attachment is the
standard, the security interest on rent receivables will be deemed a transfer
early in time, as compared to the bankruptcy petition. This security interest
i§ nonetheless susceptible of later pro tanto destruction-whenever a tenant
lawfully pays the debtor prior to the secured party's seizure of control. Thus,
every dollar collected by the debtor terminates a portion of the receivable, the
remainder of which continues to be encumbered. The dollars actually
collected are property of the debtor.
Seizure of control, according to this view, is not a transfer of debtor
property. 296  Rather, it is a termination of the debtor's opportunity to
disencumber the receivables through collection-the elimination of a condition
subsequent on the secured party's preexisting property right. Unfortunately
for mortgagees, it is precisely this termination that ultimately defeats a bona
fide purchaser who has inherited the tenant's obligation to pay rent to the
debtor. This implies that the mortgage is unperfected within the meaning of
§ 547(e)(1)(A).
Like all legal principles, it can be ignored. In SLC Ltd. V v. Bradford
Group West, Inc. (In re SLC Ltd. V), 297 Judge Judith Boulden applied
§ 547(e)(1)(A)'s definition of perfection in the context of a mortgage, but
found that perfection meant recordation of the basic mortgage on the
reversion. 291 "[Tihe transfer that cut off a bona fide purchaser's rights," she
wrote, "was the execution and recordation of the documents in 1986, outside
the ninety day period prior to filing." 29
Recordation of the mortgage, however, did not "cut off" the purchaser's
right to collect rents prior to the dispossession of the purchaser following the
debtor's default. The issue that Judge Boulden failed to address is whether the
purchaser's provisional superiority proves that dispossession is an act of
perfection.
295. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1988).
296. See Financial Ctr. Assocs. v. TNE Funding Corp. (In re Financial Ctr. Assocs.), 140
B.R. 829, 831 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (Holland, J.). Cf. Sullivan v. Willock (In re Wey), 854
F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1988), where a debtor lost a down payment in a real estate contract by not
fulfilling the balance of the contract. Judge Michael Kanne ruled that no transfer occurred
because the debtor "possessed no rights which he could transfer." Id. at 199. In other words,
a condition subsequent to the creditor's ownership of the down payment (and accompanying
equitable interest in the real estate) had failed, and such a failure is not a transfer.
But see Carlson v. Farmers Home Admin. (In re Newcomb), 744 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1984),
discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 315-18.
297. 152 B.R. 755, 760-62 (Bankr. D. Utah 1993) (applying Utah law).
298. See id. at 760-62.
299. Id. at 764; accord Financial Cr., 140 B.R. at 831 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
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On the definition of perfection offered up by § 547(e)(1)(A) it is very
possible to say that a purchaser can obtain a superior right to real estate
receivables. A purchaser takes over the right to collect rents until dispos-
sessed by the secured party. To the extent that this right is exercised, the
purchaser, not the secured party, owns the rents collected. The purchaser's
superior right is, therefore, only temporary, but nevertheless superior. Thus,
dispossession becomes a perfecting act within the meaning of § 547(e)(1)(A).
This means that the timing rule of § 547(e)(2)(A) will rarely apply because the
actual dispossession of the debtor will not, in general, take place within ten
days of the creation of the mortgage lien .3  Rather, either § 547(e)(2)(B)
or § 547(e)(2)(C)301 will apply. If so, the perfecting act of ending the
debtor's power to collect establishes the time of the transfer.
So long as the hypothetical bona fide purchaser test in § 547(e)(1)(A) is
applied according to its terms, a mortgagee rarely obtains the benefit of the
timing rule in § 547(e)(2)(A). But, in their quest to prove that temporary
inferiority over bona fide purchasers is real superiority, secured parties
claiming real estate receivables can find support in cases involving purchase
money security interests under Article 9 in which state law gives a longer
grace period than the stingy ten days granted in § 547(e)(2)(A).3 ° Cases
have arisen in which the secured party missed the federal grace period, but
nevertheless managed to perfect within the state law grace period. Ordinary
intuition tells us that, because federal law preempts state law, the ten-day
grace period of § 547(e)(2)(A) overrides the longer state-law period. As a
result, only § 547(e)(2)(B) or (C) can apply. Accordingly, the secured party
must be defeated for missing the federal grace period.3 3
300. This timing rule may apply where the debtor and a new tenant sign a lease agreement less
than ten days before the secured party dispossesses the debtor. See infra text accompanying notes
301-07.
301. See McCombs Properties VI, Ltd. v. First Tex. Say. Ass'n (In re McCombs Properties
VI Ltd.), 88 B.R. 261, 264-65 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1988) (Ryan, J.) (noting § 547(e)(2)(C)'s
applicability in dictum).
302. See, e.g., N.Y.U.C.C. LAW. § 9-301(2) (McKinney 1990) (employinga twenty-daygrace
period). In 1994, Congress amended § 547(c)(3)(B), to provide for a twenty-day grace period
so that, if purchase money secured parties qualify for that defense to voidable preference lability,
they need no longer be concerned with the timing rules in § 547(e)(2). See 11 U.S.C.A.
§ 547(c)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
303. For cases finding that § 547(e)(2)(A) overrides state law grace periods, see Howard
Thornton Ford, Inc. v. Fitzpatrick (In re Hamilton), 892 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1990); Wachovia
Bank & Trust Co. v. Bringle (In re Holder), 892 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam);
Fitzgerald v. First Security Bank (In re Walker), 161 B.R. 484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993)
(Pappas, J.), aff'd, No. 92-02863-7,93-6020, § V 93-0498-E-EJL, 1994 WL 739698 (Bankr. D.
Idaho, Oct. 26, 1994); Woodson v. City Fin. Co. (In re Holloway), 132 B.R. 771 (Bankr. N.D.
Okla. 1991) (Wilson, J.).
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A theory exists, however, that saves the purchase money secured party
from the bad effect of this deferral. According to the federal definition of
perfection in § 547(e)(1)(B) that applies to transfers of personal property, "a
transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a
creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is superior to
the interest of the transferee." 3" Some courts have read § 547(e)(1)(B) to
mean that if the secured party successfully meets the state grace period,
perfection relates back to the time of attachment; the security interest is
simultaneously created and perfected."5 According to Judge Stephen Covey,
"The Bankruptcy Code does not say the physical act of perfection has to occur
within ten days; it just states that the lien must be perfected within ten
days."3"' On this view, § 547(e)(2)(A) always supplies the timing rule when
a secured party meets a state grace period, but exceeds the federal period."°
If this controversial theory is applied to security interests on real estate
receivables, § 547(e)(2)(A) applies after all, and secured parties can prevent
avoidance of their security interests under § 547(b). If the theory is rejected
and if the definition of perfection in § 547(e)(1)(A) requires dispossession of
the debtor, then in many cases the security interest in rent receivables must be
deemed transferred just before the bankruptcy petition.
In 1994, Congress amended § 547(e)(2)(A) to lengthen the grace period
for purchase money security interests. Now, a ten-day grace period exists
"except as provided in subsection (6)(3)(B)." 05 Section 547(c)(3)(B) was
in turn amended to provide for a twenty-day grace period. This amendment
seems aimed at accommodating the problem caused by many states having
twenty-day grace periods for purchase money security interests while
§ 547(c)(3) or § 547(e)(2)(A) provided only ten-day grace periods. Therefore,
304. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(1)(B) (1988).
305. See Webb v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Hesser), 984 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.
1993) (Campos, J.); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Busenlehner (In re Busenlehner), 918
F.2d 928, 931 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) ("The general message to creditors is that should
they follow state commercial law their secured loans will be protected in bankruptcy."), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 949 (1991); Beaumont v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Power), 133
B.R. 242, 244 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991) (Covey, J.); Jahn v. First Tenn. Bank (In re Burnette),
14 B.R. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) (Kelley, J.).
306. Beaumont, 133 B.R. at 244.
307. The theory has been harshly criticized. See, e.g., Walker, 161 B.R. at 499; Holloway,
132 B.R. at 774 (stating that the cases supporting this theory "effectively read the statutory
language 'within 10 days' to mean 'within 10 days plus some variable period of time as may be
added thereto by State laws'"); Rutledge v. First Nat'l Bank (In re Carson), 119 B.R. 264, 267
(Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1990) (Ryan, J.) ("other sections of the Code make express reference to state
law grace periods and thus we must consider that the failure of Congress to do so ... was
cognizant"); Irving A. Breitowitz, Article 9 Security Interests as Voidable Preferences, 3
CARozo L. REv. 357, 398 (1982).
308. 11 U.S.C.A. § 547(e)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1995).
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it may be argued that Congress has now given all the solicitude to state law
grace periods that it cares to give. Accordingly, obtainment of a receiver
within a state law grace period cannot automatically invoke the rule of
§ 547(e)(2)(A). Rather, the rule of § 547(e)(2)(B) or (C) will apply, and the
security interest will be deemed a transfer just prior to the bankruptcy.
Even though the choice of the timing rule goes against the secured party,
several other reasons cast doubt on whether a security interest on rent
receivables will be a voidable preference.
2. Insolvency
Loosely speaking, voidable preferences are transfers of debtor property
made shortly before bankruptcy when the debtor is insolvent.2 9 Yet, in a
typical commercial real estate case, the secured party has an interesting
argument that the typical single-asset debtor is never insolvent as required by
§ 547(b)(3). If correct, the mortgagee always escapes voidable preference
liability.
It is assumed that the typical single-asset Chapter 11 real estate case
entails the following features: The debtor is a partnership, and the mortgage
is almost always nonrecourse. These features are demanded by tax consider-
ations.3"' In a typical real estate failure, the mortgagee is by far the domi-
nant creditor. Often, a few trade creditors exist, but their claims are small.
These trade creditors have recourse to the general partners under state
partnership law. Such a debtor is likely to be considered solvent under the
special definition that Bankruptcy Code § 101(32)(B) gives for partnership
entities. Section 101(32)(B) defines partnership insolvency as
financial condition such that the sum of such partnership's debts is greater
than the aggregate of, at a fair valuation-
(i) all of such partnership's property... ; and
(ii) the sum of the excess of the value of each general partner's
nonpartnership property... over such partner's nonpartnership
debts.
31'
Because the mortgage is nonrecourse, the mortgagee's claim is inherently
equal to the value of the collateral, and the trade creditors claims are usually
trivial. The assets consist of the single asset, equal to the nonrecourse
mortgagee's claim, plus the surplus assets of the general partners after their
309. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988).
310. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
311. 11 U.S.C. § 101(32)(B) (Supp. V 1993).
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nonpartnership debts are covered. The partnership assets, therefore, are likely
to exceed the partnership debts.
This conclusion, however, rests on an assumption that should be made
explicit. Notice that the definition in § 101(32)(B) includes net general partner
assets as a component of the partnership's estate. Under state law, the
partnership would not own a right over against the partners. Yet, § 723(a)
gives a bankruptcy trustee the right to pursue the general partners in the name
of the recourse creditors. Therefore, it appears that, loosely speaking, the
definition of insolvency includes postpetition property of the estate in order to
determine prepetition insolvency. Because it does so, the typical real estate
Chapter 11 case will involve a solvent debtor.
If the trustee's postpetition right under § 723(a) is an asset of the
partnership for the purpose of calculating prepetition insolvency, then perhaps
it is fair to count postpetition liabilities of the partnership as well. Thus, if the
debtor files in Chapter 11, which is universally the case in single-asset real
estate bankruptcies, the nonrecourse creditor gets artificial recourse under
§ 111 l(b)(1)(A) in the Chapter 11 proceeding. If this postpetition artificial
recourse is also counted as a prepetition debt of the partnership, then many
single-asset partnerships are radically insolvent prior to bankruptcy. In some
cases, general partners will have wealth sufficient to cover this claim. But the
general partners are never personally liable to pay the artificial recourse claim.
Only the bankrupt partnership has this liability.3"2
The definition of partnership insolvency includes the postpetition asset of
§ 723(a) liability, but it says nothing about the postpetition liability under
§ 111l(b)(1)(A). This omission may lead teutonically minded courts to
conclude that whatever is not permitted must be forbidden. On this view, real
estate partnerships are likely to be found solvent, and any payments to the
secured party will not be voidable preferences.
In Union Meeting Partners v. Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. (In re
Union Meeting Partners)31 3 Judge David Scholl found that a single-asset
partnership debtor was solvent in a case where the general partners had
312. See In re Greystone III Joint Venture, 102 B.R. 560, 570 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989)
(Clark, J.) (finding the partners of debtor not liable to a nonrecourse secured party in Chapter
11), aff'd, 127 B.R. 138 (W.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 995 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 72 (1992). In the preceding remarks, it is important not to
confuse the requirement of insolvency in § 547(b)(3) with the hypothetical liquidation test in §
547(b)(5), which posits a hypothetical Chapter 7 proceeding. In the hypothetical Chapter 7
proceeding, the recourse claim under § 1111(b)(1)(A) does not exist, but this is, by itself, no
reason to conclude that the obligation cannot exist for calculating a partnership's insolvency. If
the secured party may count the § 723(a) right as an asset of the debtor-an asset that also exists
in Chapter 11, see Carlson, Classification Veto, supra note 7, at 586-87 the secured party must
also count the artificial obligation of the chapter 11 debtor as well. Alternatively, neither should
be counted; the debtor probably is insolvent when only state law property rights are considered.
313. 163 B.R. 229, 239-40 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).
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substantial net wealth. In doing so, he implicitly included the partners' net
assets and the artificial recourse claim in the calculation. Nevertheless, the
general partners' net wealth was such that, even after adding the artificial
recourse claim, the partnership was solvent at all times, and the mortgagee
was innocent of voidable preference liability. In a different case, however, the
artificial recourse claim, if counted as a liability, could render the partnership
entity insolvent.
3. The Hypothetical Liquidation Test
Many courts are committed to the idea that security interests on rent
receivables are not perfected until the secured party dispossesses the debtor,
or at least serves the notice on the bankruptcy trustee that § 546(b) requires.
Such a view is plausible because a hypothetical bona fide purchaser of the
debtor could collect rents free and clear of the mortgage lien until the lien
creditor is dispossessed.
If the transfer is deemed to occur just before bankruptcy, the secured
party might escape liability by grace of the hypothetical liquidation test in
§ 547(b)(5). Section 547(b)(5) provides that a transfer is a voidable preference
if it
enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if-
(A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by
the provisions of this tide.314
When the secured party has not actually collected rents prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, the security interest on the rent receivables is not
preferential within the meaning of the test. Suppose that (A) we pretend the
case was a Chapter 7 case, (B) we pretend that the security interest on the rent
receivables had not been made, and (C) we calculate that the secured party
would be entitled to sell the debtor's reversionary interest in real estate
because the mortgage is recorded and valid. The case law of § 547(b)(5)
insists that no time pass between the start of the hypothetical Chapter 7 case
and the hypothetical distributions that such a case would generate. 15
Because the secured party would receive the value of the reversionary interest
in the hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation anyway and because that is all the
314. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (1988).
315. E.g., Neuger v. United States (In re Tenna Corp.), 801 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1986)
(Jones, J.); see also Carlson, supra note 25.
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secured party has received in reality, the bankruptcy trustee cannot show that
the test in § 547(b)(5) is violated.
The matter is different, however, when the secured party has actually
collected some rent prior to the bankruptcy petition. These collected rents
establish that the secured party received more from actual transfers than would
have been received from a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. Accordingly,
at least the rents actually collected are voidable.
One case that solved a similar dilemma by hypothetical liquidation test is
Carlson v. Farmers Home Administration (In re Newcomb),3 16 where the
debtor and creditor set up an escrow fund to cover the amount of a judgment
in favor of the creditor. The fund would go to the creditor if the creditor
survived an appeal. Otherwise, it would revert to the debtor. The escrow was
created before the ninety-day preference period, but the creditor's victory on
appeal occurred within the preference period.
The proper way to view Newcomb is that the debtor transferred funds to
the creditor, via the escrow, more than ninety days before the bankruptcy.
Appellate victory was no transfer at all, but was instead the elimination of a
condition subsequent that, if fulfilled, would have vested the debtor with the
funds once again.
This is not how Judge William C. Hanson chose to analyze the matter.
He thought that the Bankruptcy Code's definition of transfer was "broad
enough to include both the transfer that occurs when an escrow is created and
the transfer that occurs when the condition of an escrow is met. "317 Two
transfers occurred, and the court had to choose which one counted. This
interpretation was the result of the judge's confusion regarding the termination
of a condition subsequent and the transfer of property.18 Nevertheless,
316. 744 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1984).
317. Id. at 626.
318. See Carlson, supra note 25, at _. To call the disappearance of a condition subsequent
a transfer is not entirely implausible if property is defined in the Hohfeldian manner as a
concatenation of rights, immunities, privileges, and powers. Hohfeld would say that the
termination of the debtor's power to collect rents is also the creation of the secured party's
immunity from this power. One of the sticks in the debtor's bundle has disappeared, and the
correlative stick has simultaneously appeared in the secured party's bundle. But Hohfeldian
analysis is not absolutely imposed by the Bankruptcy Code, in spite of a breathtakingly broad
definition of transfer. 11 U.S.C. § 101(54) (Supp. V 1993) (defining a transfer as "every mode,
direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or involuntary, of disposing or of parting
with property or with an interest in property, including retention of title as a security
interest. . . ."). Read literally, every time the debtor does not exercise a stock option by the
contract deadline, the debtor has transferred the underlying stock to the person who sold the
option because the debtor failed to exercise it. But see Allan v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co. (In
re Commodity Merchants, Inc.), 538 F.2d 1260, 1263-64 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding expiration of
option not to be a transfer). Such a view would upset the stock market even more than the triple
witching hour. It is best to say, if only on consequentialist grounds, that the termination of a
condition subsequent, contrary to Judge Hanson's view, simply is not a transfer. Therefore, it
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Judge Hanson's analysis put him in the position of having to assess the effect
of the hypothetical liquidation test on a transfer that was artificially deemed to
occur just before bankruptcy. According to Judge Hanson:
[t]he transfer that occurred when the condition of the escrow was met is
not the type of transfer that can be avoided. To be avoidable a transfer
must deprive the debtor's estate of something of value which could
otherwise be used to satisfy creditors. Once the escrow was created, the
only interest in the escrowed funds remaining in the debtor was a
contingent right to the funds if.. .the judgement [was reversed]. This
interest is worthless in light of ... [the] affirmance of the judgment ....
Therefore, the "transfer" of this interest did not deprive the estate of
anything of value. It follows that this "transfer" cannot be avoided.3 19
Thus, the later transfer is not avoidable because it did not diminish the
debtor's estate. Presumably, this reference to diminution was meant to invoke
the hypothetical liquidation test of § 547(b)(5). According to this test, a
transfer is preferential only to the extent that the transfer allows the secured
party to obtain more than would have been obtained if the transfer had been
foregone in favor of the dividend a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation would
have produced.
Judge Hanson's formulation worked to defeat the trustee in Newcomb.
Under the hypothetical liquidation test, if the debtor had lost or abandoned the
appeal, the secured party would have obtained all the funds in escrow in the
hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding called for in § 547(b)(5).
Because the secured party would have received the same amount in the
hypothetical bankruptcy as the party actually received, the transfer was not
preferential.
This approach works with regard to security interests on rent receivables
when the secured party has not actually collected any rents. In Such a case,
the secured party has not received more from her security interest on rent
receivables than she would have received in the hypothetical chapter 7
liquidation. This approach does not work, however, if some rents were
actually collected. Suppose that a mortgagee has succeeded in capturing the
right to collect rents before bankruptcy and has actually collected some. Such
a transfer always meets the hypothetical liquidation test. In a hypothetical
Chapter 7 liquidation, the secured party would obtain the value of the
reversion. In real life, the secured party will have obtained whatever rents
were collected plus the value of the reversion. Therefore, any actual
is assumed that the disappearance of a condition subsequent is not a new transfer of debtor
property.
319. Newcomb, 744 F.2d at 626-27 (citation omitted).
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dispossession that resulted in collections by the secured party would fall afoul
of § 547(b)(5).21
In the end, even if the trustee can make out all the elements of a voidable
preference, the trustee's victory is Pyrrhic at best because the fundamental
nature of all avoidance theories is that they are mere adjuncts to the trustee's
strong-arm power, a step usually skipped because it rarely makes a difference.
But, with regard to security interests on rent receivables, this theory makes all
the difference.
4. Consequences
If it is decided that dispossessing the debtor is a perfecting act, the
security interest on rent receivables is usually a voidable preference. Many
will think that the trustee can, therefore, continue to collect rents during the
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding. This would be a mistake.
Instead, a deep inquiry into the concept of avoidance prevents this result.
If the trustee can avoid a transfer, the transfer is treated as if the debtor never
transferred it. But the way the trustee obtains this "debtor" property is by the
transfers described by the strong-arm power.
This theory of bankruptcy avoidance can be elaborated.32" ' Even if we
imagine the voidable security interest to be avoided, we are left with the
proposition that the debtor owns the would-be collateral free and clear of the
avoided encumbrance. This property enters the bankrupt estate, but the nature
of the transfer from the debtor to the bankruptcy trustee is described by the
strong-arm power. In other words, avoidance sets aside the otherwise valid
transfer, but the trustee's strong-arm power brings the property into the
bankrupt estate. Avoidance under § 547(b) simply supplements the strong-arm
power. Accordingly, avoidance of the assignment of rents allows the bona
fide purchaser to claim the collateral as a transferee with rights superior to that
of the avoided lien.
So conceived, the trustee becomes a purchaser m or lien creditor of the
320. This was heavily implied by Judge David Scholl in Union Meeting Partners v. Lincoln
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. (In re Union Meeting Partners), 163 B.R. 229, 236-37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1994). In that case, very shortly before bankruptcy, a secured party had served notice on the
tenants that, henceforward, they were to pay the secured party directly. According to Judge
Scholl, the debtor's power to collect free and clear of the security interest constituted a property
interest, which the debtor "transferred" when the secured party terminated the debtor's power
to collect. Judge Scholl indicated that, if any prepetition rents had actually been collected, the
rents would have to be returned as voidable preferences. Id. at 237 & n.2. On the facts,
however, Scholl decided that no prepetition rents had been collected, and so there were no
voidable preference recoveries. Id.
321. For a more complete account of this theory, see Carlson, supra note 255, at 855-63.
322. For a case denying that trustees can hypothesize themselves as mortgagees, see United
States v. Farrell (In re Fluge), 57 B.R. 451, 456 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1985) (Hill, J.). Although
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rent receivables. This reinstitutes all that has been previously explained with
regard to the strong-arm power. Thus, the trustee has a temporary right to
disencumber rent receivables by collecting them, a right that the secured party
can terminate by sending the notice required by § 546(b).
At the heart of this theory is the notion that avoidance sets the stage for
a creditor or, in the case of federal bankruptcy law, the trustee to attach a lien
to the property subject to the avoided transfer. By the way of analogy, under
the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act, a defrauded creditor may avoid a
transfer by having it set aside or by disregarding it and establishing a judicial
lien as if the property still belonged to the debtor.3" The avoiding creditor,
however, must still proceed to obtain a judicial lien on the fraudulently
conveyed property. Similarly, it is never enough for the trustee to avoid a
transfer under § 547. Rather, the trustee must bring it into the estate via the
strong-arm power under which the trustee is either a judicial lien creditor or
a bona fide purchaser of real estate.324
nothing seemed to turn on this question in Fluge, it is wrong that trustees cannot imagine
themselves as mortgagees. Rather, trustees can imagine themselves to be any sort of purchaser
if that will aid in the avoidance of some defective transfer. Moreover, the hypothesis of a
mortgagee is essential under some fact scenarios. For example, suppose the debtor owes $1
million dollars on a nonrecourse mortgage and the property is worth $500,000. Suppose there
are only $10,000 in other unsecured claims. The mortgage is unrecorded and, therefore, invalid
under the strong-arm power. If this is so, the nonrecourse mortgagee would have no claim in
the bankruptcy, secured or unsecured, without the mortgagee's claim. The debtor would be
technically solvent. Arguably, the trustee should avoid the mortgage only to the extent of
$500,000, the value of the property, and return the balance of the mortgage to the nonrecourse
mortgagee. This is easy to imagine if the trustee is a hypothetical mortgagee representing
$500,000 worth of creditor claims. Alternatively, if the trustee is the outright buyer of fee simple
absolute, there is no way to explain how the nonrecourse mortgagee has any right to the surplus
after the creditors are paid.
323. UNIF. FRAUDULENT CONvEYANcE AcT § 9, 7A U.L.A. 577-78 (1985).
324. Some objections can be made to this general theory of avoidance. First, the trustee
recovers not through the strong-arm power but through § 550(a), which permits the trustee to
recover "the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property." 11
U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988). Therefore, even if no strong-arm theory exists, so long as the transfer
is a voidable preference, the trustee can recover property-no questions asked. Furthermore, §
541(a)(3) makes clear that any property recovered is property of the estate, See id. § 541(a)(3).
All of this is without regard to the trustee's strong-arm power in § 544(a).
A few responses are available to this challenge. First, § 550(a) is not the exclusive mode
by which avoidance powers are exercised. For example, § 548(a)(1) calls for the avoidance of
transfers and obligations, see id. § 548(a)(1) while § 550(a) speaks solely of transfers, see id.
§ 550(a). If § 550(a) were the exclusive portal through which avoidance powers must pass, then
how could obligations be avoided under § 548(a)? Second, an historical inquiry reveals that §
550(a)(1) was added principally to make clear that the value of transfers-not the transfers
themselves-can be recovered. Old § 60(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, in contrast, provided only
for the recovery of transfers, or, in case of conversion, the value of the transfer from the
converter. See Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 575, § 60(b), 52 Stat. 840, 870 (1938) (repealed
1978). Meanwhile, § 60(a) made liable non-transferees who merely benefitted from the transfer.
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On this admittedly arcane, but nonetheless logical, reasoning, security
interests in rents may routinely be voidable preferences. But the exploitation
of avoidance is by means of the strong-arm power. Hence, the bankruptcy
trustee can never exploit the voidable preference theory beyond the reach of
the strong arm power. The strong-arm power might temporarily subordinate
the security interest on the rent receivables, 3" until the secured party serves
the repossessory notice described in § 546(b),326 but it can never totally
avoid the security interest. Voidable preference theories add nothing to this
inherent limitation on the trustee's ability to disencumber rent receivables.
5. After-Acquired Leases
Suppose a debtor grants a new lease within the preference period; one
receivable has ended, and another has been created. According to some
authorities, the bare mortgage lien on the reversion does not attach to after-
acquired leases.327 Thus, Judge Bruce Fox writes, "Such lessees are viewed
not in privity with the mortgagee, and the mortgagee is limited to ejecting the
No theory existed to explain how a nontransferee might be liable under § 60(a). Bankruptcy Act
of 1898, ch. 70, § 60(a), 64 Stat. 24, 25 (1950) (repealed 1978). This gave rise to the notorious
"two-transfer" theory, which was used to justify recovery from the beneficiary. Under this
theory, the benefit was called a transfer, thereby justifying recovery under § 60(b). The principal
utility in adding § 550(a), then, was to explain in a more satisfactory way why beneficiaries
should have to pay for a transfer they never received. Section 550(a) was not meant to change
the status of the avoided recovery itself.
Because of this history, § 550(a) does not uniquely mediate voidablepreference recoveries.
Rather, the strong-arm power does. Suppose a debtor owes fifty dollars and gives away his only
asset, a hundred dollar painting, so that the creditors cannot get it. The gift is a fraudulent
transfer under § 548(a)(2). The bankruptcy trustee can only avoid the transfer and then impose
the hypothetical judicial lien on it. The hypothetical judicial lien amounts to fifty dollars.
Therefore, the trustee may recover the painting and sell it, but the trustee can only recover fifty
dollars. The rest is a surplus that necessarily belongs to the donee. This example proves that
a trustee can only avoid the transfer to the extent of the strong-arm power. See Note, Fraudulent
Conveyance Law as a Property Right, 9 CARDOZO L. REv. 843 (1987). But see Acequia, Inc.
v. Clinton (In re Acequia, Inc.), 34 F.3d 800, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that any
recovery may be retained).
325. This conclusion accords with the result, if not the reasoning, in Union Meeting Partners
v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. (In re Union Meeting Partners), 163 B.R. 229 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1994). Judge Scholl conceded that rents actually collected by the secured party before bankruptcy
might be preferential, but the mortgage on the reversion was not at risk. Scholl reasoned that
since the mortgage on the reversion was recorded, the mortgage must be good. Id. at 235-36.
A more complete analysis is that the trustee's right to collect rent in light of this recorded
mortgage is limited or, on the expansive view of adequate protection, non-existent.
326. The ability of a secured party to overthrow the tyranny of the strong arm power by
serving notice under § 546(b) is discussed supra in the text accompanying notes 255-71.
327. See GEORGE E. OSBORNE ET AL., REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §4.25 (1979); Kratovil,
supra note 93, at 9-10; Yale Note, supra note 91, at 1434-35.
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tenant (whether or not the lessee is in default) or to creating a new lease
agreement with the lessee."" Judge Fox thought that if the mortgage
contains an express assignment of rents, the assignment is capable of attaching
to after-acquired rent receivables.329 In contrast, Judge David Scholl, also
interpreting Pennsylvania law, thought that a mortgage agreement containing
an express assignment was not competent to encumber after-acquired receiv-
ables.330
Assuming that the mortgage lien attaches to the after-acquired rent
receivable, the security interest on such a receivable is deemed transferred to
the secured party only when the receivable comes into existence. Section
547(e)(3) states, "For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until
the debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred."33 Why should
this new real estate receivable not be deemed a transfer within ninety days to
a secured party? If the secured party is undersecured, the transfer might be
a voidable preference.
There are at least two possible reasons to think that no voidable
preference has occurred.332 First, all voidable preference recoveries must
be assessed according to the strong-arm power.333 Therefore, even if the
security interest on the after-acquired rent receivable is a voidable preference,
this only means that the trustee's hypothetical bona fide purchase attaches to
the receivable. The mortgagee's postpetition perfection under § 546(b) can
take back this status.
Second, even if the strong-arm theory is rejected, § 547(c)(5) may defend
the security interest on the after-acquired rent receivable. The rent receivable
created within the preference period is a "receivable" within the meaning of
328. In re Wynnewood House Assocs., 121 B.R. 716, 722 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1990); accord
In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. Partnership, 84 B.R. 289, 299 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988).
329. 121 B.R. at 721.
330. See In re TM Carlton House Partners, Ltd., 91 B.R. 349, 355 & n.1 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1988). In support of this proposition, Scholl cited Teal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 242 (1884), in
which Justice Edward Burnham Woods wrote:
Where, however, the lease is subsequent to the mortgage, the rule is well settled
in this country, that, as no reversion vests in the mortgagee, and no privity of estate
or contract is created between him and the lessee, he cannot proceed, either by
distress or action, for the recovery of the rent.
Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
331. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (1988).
332. One insufficient reason is the observance that the lease is proceeds of real estate. The
creation of proceeds is always a transfer of property from the debtor to the secured party. If the
secured party has given up collateral in exchange for its new security interest in proceeds,
perhaps the secured party has a voidable preference defense under § 547(c)(1). Such a theory
cannot work in a real estate case, where the secured party has likely given nothing up. The new
receivable is entirely an improvement in position.
333. See supra text accompanying notes 256-78.
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§ 547(a)(3), which broadly defines it to be a "right to payment, whether or not
such right has been earned by performance. "13 Therefore, a secured party
might be entitled to the defense in § 547(c)(5).
According to this defense, all perfected security interests in receivables
are defended unless the secured party's position has improved across the
preference period. Improvement of position is tested by subtracting the
secured claim from the value of "all security interests" that existed at the start
of the preference period. 335 This is then compared to the like insufficiency
on the day of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. If the insufficiency has
shrunk, the secured party's position has improved; the defense is withdrawn
to the extent of the improvement of position.336
Even so, the improvement in position brings grief only if it is "to the
prejudice of other creditors. "M' This has been interpreted as expenditure of
unencumbered assets to improve the value of the secured party's collateral.
In a real estate case, any rents the debtor collects have been disencumbered
and are property that the unsecured creditors might get in bankruptcy. If the
debtor spends these dollars in generating or maintaining the new lease, then,
to that extent, the unsecured creditors have been prejudiced. This is ironic
because the unencumbered dollars are proceeds of collateral that the secured
party owns. Ordinarily, the release of cash proceeds occurs contemporaneous-
ly with or after the secured party receives a proceeds security interest. Here,
disencumbrance of the cash collateral occurs before the new lease is obtained,
thereby depriving the secured party of voidable preference defenses. 338
On the above analysis, the secured party is immune from voidable
preference liability for leases signed during the preference period because
either the leases do not improve the secured party's position or because any
improvement in position is barely to the prejudice of the creditors. Only if the
debtor spends special identifiable amounts on landing a tenant have the
unsecured creditors been prejudiced.
Another reason, rather unconnected from the statutory language of
§ 547(b), why voidable preference law should have no grievance against leases
granted during the ninety-day period is that postpetition leases belong to the
334. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(3) (1988).
335. When the mortgage itself was created during the preference period for new value, the
relevant date is not the start of the preference period, when zero claim would be subtracted from
zero collateral, but rather "the date on which new value was first given under the security
agreement creating such security interest." 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5)(B) (1988).
336. Carlson, supra note 25, at _.
337. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (1988).
338. Section 547(c)(1) requires that the parties intend a contemporaneous exchange, see 11
U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) (1988), which will not be the case here. Section 547(c)(4) requires that new
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Few legal subjects are in the advanced state of disarray enjoyed by the
law of security interests on rent receivables. The confusion arises from the
fact that (1) courts have made metaphoric errors with regard to the absolute
assignment of rents, taking "absolute" to mean that the debtor has forfeited
rent receivables to secured creditors-forfeitures that § 541(c)(1)(B) and
probably state law independently prevent; (2) courts are deeply divided as to
when a secured creditor's right to adequate protection starts; and (3) courts are
disparate in applying the avoidance powers against a security interest that is
temporarily junior to bona fide purchasers of the underlying real estate.
On this last issue, procreditor courts, offended by real estate entrepre-
neurs trying to extend their tax shelters through abuse of Chapter 11, have
tried to put an end to the avoidance powers by proclaiming that termination of
the debtor's power to disencumber rent receivables is "enforcement," not
"perfection." Furthermore, courts have noted that "perfection" generally
means public recordation and that security interests in rent receivables should
be deemed perfected as they are recorded. Conversely, because these security
interests cannot be permanently avoided, they must perforce be totally valid.
These conclusions, illegitimately obscure the truth that a bona fide purchaser
or lien creditor, in most states, temporarily disencumbers a rent receivable
from the recorded security interest by collecting.
These opinions can be viewed sympathetically as protests against a
bankruptcy law that has degenerated into gamesmanship. Security interests
rise and fall on bureaucratic acts that serve no purpose except to establish that
the bankruptcy trustee ought to lose and the secured creditor ought to win with
regard to specific collateral. It is unsatisfactory that secured parties should be
put to the meaningless ritual of meeting postpetition grace periods. It should
be apparent that the typical secured party wants maximum rights in bankrupt-
cy. Why make the secured party jump through meaningless hoops to perfect
the security interest? Why not save them the trouble? This is what courts
have done in proclaiming that the termination of the debtor's power to
disencumber rents is enforcement, not perfection. The instinct may be
admirable, but the legal reasoning that accompanies it is not.
If it is useless bureaucracy to make secured creditors claiming rent
receivables take some postpetition action to trigger their right to adequate
protection, this same critique can be made of § 546(b) in general. This
subsection was written primarily with purchase money secured parties and
339. See Oliver v. MBank Dallas, N.A. (In re Oliver), 66 B.R. 426 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986);
Donahue & Edwards, supra note 54, at 678-79.
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mechanics' lienors in mind. Why should those parties have to live up to the
bureaucratic requirements of postpetition perfection? Are not their burdens
just as useless?340 Unfortunately, the legislative history is far too clear for
these secured creditors to win relief from § 546(b).
Section 546(b) exists to force unperfected secured parties to jump through
postpetition hoops. One argument holds justifying this state of affairs is that
state law has given too much power to secured creditors. By hindering
secured creditors with bureaucratic requirements, some admittedly ad hoc
justice can be done through the art of ambush. This is, of course, nothing but
the time honored principle-privately admired though publicly scorned-that
two wrongs do indeed make a right.
On the view that it is up to Congress to make debtor-creditor policy and
that bankruptcy courts should follow the law, it is clear that in many states
security interests in rent receivables are temporarily unperfected, but when
perfected postpetition, perfection validly relate back to the time that the
security interests first attached to the rent receivables.
The law would appear more rational if Congress would address more
cogently the status of security interests on rent receivables. Congress made
an attempt to do so in the 1994 amendments to § 552(b), but Congress made
it clear that the right to proceeds still had to pass through the gauntlet of the
trustee's strong-arm power. In these amendments, Congress said that,
"notwithstanding section 546(b)," the security interest on proceeds is
valid.34' This may have been an attempt to declare that, once a mortgage
is recorded, the assignment of rents should be fully honored in bankruptcy.
Unfortunately, the draftsmanship is so poor that courts might draw the
opposite conclusion-that the strong-arm power prevails "notwithstanding" the
debtor's attempt to comply with a state grace period under § 546(b). As often
happens, Congress's amendment to § 552(b) may have done nothing but
complicate further the law of rents in bankruptcy proceedings.
340. It has been suggested that secured parties should, in general, prevail in bankruptcy
whenever the bankruptcy petition bifurcates a grace period under state law. See Carlson, supra
note 25, at .
341. See supra text accompanying notes 38-42.
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